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RESUMEN 
 
Desde las modernas ciencias cognitivas, la posibilidad de que la mayoría de 
nuestras evaluaciones estén sustentadas en procesos psicológicos automáticos parece 
imponerse en el panorama académico. En esta línea, el emergente campo de la 
psicología moral favorece la caracterización del juicio moral como una evaluación 
predominantemente automática, en la cual los procesos intuitivos y afectivos priman 
sobre los racionales. Así, diversos estudios sugieren que los juicios morales son 
susceptibles a la influencia de variables afectivas incidentales. La investigación en torno 
al componente emocional de los juicios morales ha encontrado nuevas posibilidades en 
el estudio de la emoción de repugnancia, aprovechando lo que parece ser una estrecha 
relación entre dicha emoción y el ámbito de la cognición moral. A pesar de que 
diferentes estudios sugieren que la repugnancia incrementa la severidad de los juicios 
morales (moralidad más estricta), la naturaleza de la relación causal entre repugnancia y 
juicio moral no ha sido aún debidamente explicada.  
A modo de ejemplo, los estudios anteriores no han explicado suficientemente si: 
(a) la susodicha influencia de la repugnancia es específica de los juicios morales 
o afecta también a los juicios no morales 
(b) si dicho efecto resulta de la valoración  (appraisal) específica vinculada a la 
emoción discreta o se trata de una influencia afectiva más básica, no mediada 
por la evaluación cognitiva.  
Adicionalmente, la evidencia actual resulta insuficiente para corroborar la eficacia de 
los métodos de inducción afectiva que se utilizan habitualmente en el estudio de los 
efectos de la emoción sobre los juicios morales. En este contexto, la presente 
investigación propone una aproximación afectivo-dimensional para abordar estas 
cuestiones. En particular, los diversos experimentos de los que consta este trabajo se 
centran en contrastar como el priming afectivo, tanto de repugnancia como de horror, 
influye sobre los juicios morales, investigando asimismo como cambia dicha influencia 
según los parámetros temporales del priming. Atendiendo a este último objetivo, el 
presente estudio incorpora también como variable independiente el intervalo temporal 
entre la aparición del estímulo prime y la del estímulo target (stimulus-onset 
asynchrony, SOA). Hasta donde sabemos, nuestra propuesta constituye el primer estudio 
sobre el curso temporal del efecto del priming afectivo sobre los juicios morales. 
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1.1. THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MORALITY  
 
1.1.1. The evolutionary approach to the study of morality  
 
 
The importance of incorporating a correct characterization of human beings’ unique 
derivate traits (apomorphies) into the study of human nature has been the focus of recent 
research. Thus, Cela-Conde and Ayala (2008) concluded that the phylogenetic 
characterization of the species is incomplete if it does not include functional 
apomorphies. With regard to this issue, it is assumed that the central traits that set H. 
Sapiens apart from other species include language as a means of communication and 
mental representation, aesthetic appreciation of beauty and a highly developed moral 
cognition (Nadal, Barceló-Coblijn, Olivera, Christensen, Rincón-Ruìz, & Cela-Conde, 
2009). However, one of the main obstacles of this field of research is the assumption 
that humans’ moral behavior is the result of a particular trait that emerged through 
human evolution. In other words, the evolution of the moral faculty is studied ignoring 
that it is, in fact, the outcome of multiple cognitive and affective components (Nadal et 
al., 2009).  
 
Without a doubt, the study of the biological roots of morality as a distinctive human 
trait is anything but new. For instance, it was a central theme in Charles Darwin’s 
research, who understood morality as a logical product of evolutionary processes 
(Darwin, 1871). Darwin’s conception of the evolution of organisms as a biological 
continuum is essential to understand morality. Thus, he argues that the presence of 
“social instincts” in other species must be understood from a phylogenetic perspective 
as the requisite for the further development of the moral sense. In Darwin’s words: “(...) 
of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience 
is by far the most important” (Darwin, 1871, Chap. III). 
 
According to Darwin, humans’ moral capacity is an emergent outcome resulting 
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
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from the combination of simple capacities (such as the social instincts) and more 
sophisticated cognitive capacities that are only present in our species (such as critical 
reasoning). Hence, moral behaviors are founded on instincts—understood as 
motivational potentials that underlie behavioral predispositions—that work together 
with rational and empirical processes (see also Cela-Conde, 1986). Consequently, the 
“moral sense” is not directly derived from the process of natural selection. Conversely, 
it is an indirect result of the development of sophisticated intellectual abilities (Cela-
Conde, Burgues, Nadal, & Olivera, 2009): 
 
Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the 
parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a 
moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as 
well, or nearly as well, developed as in a man (Darwin 1871, p. 472) 
 
 
In this sense, it is to some extent paradoxical that, for Darwin, the moral sense is 
exclusively present in our species. Thus, because Darwin establishes a correspondence 
between cognitive and moral development, the emergence of moral capacity is argued to 
be a recent evolutionary product (see Cela-Conde & Ayala, 2007). With regard to this 
issue, despite some interpretations that suggest that H. neanderthalensis developed 
some moral behaviors (Trinkaus, 1986), it is not yet clear whether those behaviors were 
complex enough to deserve the distinction of being called moral. In addition, it is also 
incorrect to consider non-human primates as moral beings, despite the fact that some 
species appear to display some behaviors associated with a moral sense (De Waal, 1996; 
Flack & De Waal, 2000). On the basis of these findings, the term “proto-moral” has 
been suggested to differentiate the cognitive complexity between those social skills and 
human morality (Capo, Nadal, & Cela-Conde, 2006).  
 
In the last decades, evolutionary perspectives on morality have made some 
contributions to the study of humans’ moral processes. From the field of philosophy, the 
rise of evolutionary epistemology (Campbell, 1974) allowed a novel conception of 
human cognitive processes, based on the premise that any organism is explained as a 
“system of obtained knowledge.” According to this approach, our central nervous 
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system has evolved to provide us with a model of reality adapted to our environment. 
Consequently, the conditions of human cognition can be explained a priori from an 
ontogenetic perspective, but a posteriori from a phylogenetic context (Popper, 1972; 
Wuketits, 2006).  
 
 
1.2.1. The sociobiological approach to morality  
 
 
The study of the biological foundations of morality experienced a new revolution in 
the 1960s and 1970s with the flourishing of the ethological and sociobiological 
approaches. Thus, ethology is a biological discipline focused on the study of animal 
behavior, explaining both its innate and acquired aspects with special emphasis in its 
adaptive value. Indeed, this framework is theoretically based on Darwin’s evolutionary 
assumptions. For instance, the concept of instinct1 is central to this discipline and it is 
frequently cited to respond to what might be the main ethological question: why does an 
animal behave in a certain way? 2 
 
Within this framework, human ethology focuses on the adaptive significance of 
human behavior. In particular, this line of research applies the knowledge obtained from 
the study of animal behavior to the subsequent formulation of hypotheses concerning 
human social behavior. For example, aggressive behavior is understood as an instinctive 
response, that is, there is an innate tendency to manifest aggressive potential. This 
argument relies on the observation that other species need to manifest their aggressive 
potential in order to regulate it (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977, 1979).  
 
Unlike ethology, which explains behavioral patterns of each species in the context of 
its ecological niche, sociobiological approaches adopt the gene point of view to explain 
social behavior. According to Wilson (1975), sociobiology must be understood as the 
                                                 
1 The term instinct should be understood as a genetical dimension that establishes the potential for the 
specific behaviors of the species (Palmero, Gòmez, Carpi, Guerrero & Díez 2005).  
2 According to Tinbergen (1951), each animal behavior can be explained as resulting from the interaction 
between environmental variables and internal conditions of the particular species.  
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systematic study of the biological basis of any social behavior exhibited by animals and 
humans. Thus, sociobiology is based on the comparison of social species, considering 
each species as an evolutionary experiment resulting from millions of years of gene-
environment interaction.  
 
From this perspective, social behavior can be understood as a means developed by 
the gene to increase its replication (Dawkins, 1976). Such a claim matches the theory of 
natural selection. However, as Darwin admitted, this “selfish”3 conception of genes 
seems to contradict the occurrence of certain social phenomena in wildlife. For Darwin, 
the explanation of altruistic behavior was particularly intriguing because, for this 
behavior to take place, an individual had to invest his or her own resources to maximize 
the adaptive fitness of another individual (see Cela-Conde et al., 2009).  
 
Wynne-Edwards’ (1962) research suggests that certain aspects of animal social 
behavior can be explained as individual sacrifices for a greater benefit of the group. 
Although “group selection” models have been the object of criticism (Williams, 1966), 
the occurrence of altruistic behavior in humans and other social species is undeniable. 
Hamilton (1963) explained this phenomenon through the notion of “kin selection”, 
which is based on the fact that closely related individuals share copies of many genes. 
Thus, organisms can increase the presence of these common genes in subsequent 
generations by favoring the reproduction of close relatives. In short, the closer the 
relative, the greater the sacrifice the individual is willing to make.  
 
However, in the dynamics of human social interactions, altruist acts also appear 
between unrelated individuals. Trivers (1971) proposed the notion of reciprocal altruism 
as an answer to this particularity. Hence, he suggested that altruistic behavior could 
appear between individuals who interact for long periods of time if there is a high 
probability for the altruistic act to be returned by the other individual on a future 
occasion. Therefore, if this dynamic is not interrupted, both individuals will have 
benefited from their altruistic interaction4. In addition, the occurrence of altruistic 
                                                 
3 Dawkins (1976)  
4 Indeed, it seems that reciprocal altruism is quite frequent in our species, which has developed methods 
such as altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gatcher, 2002) in order to deal with the appearance of cheaters 
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behaviors outside kinship has also been addressed by Alexander (1987) and his theory 
of indirect altruism in the context of a dynamic of reputation.  
 
As mentioned above, sociobiological theories have contributed to our 
understanding of certain social phenomena, such as altruistic behavior and cooperation 
outside of kinship. However, it seems evident that the explanation of human altruism 
cannot be reduced to the point of view of a gene. Thus, the notion of altruism that is 
operative in sociobiological theories embraces an economic conception of these 
behaviors, in the sense that they imply an immediate cost (survival and reproductive 
resources) to their perpetrators as a means to achieve further benefits (increasing 
fitness). Such a mechanicist conception faces several problems when it tries to explain 
behaviors that can hardly be conceived in terms of their adaptive benefits. For example, 
there is no evidence of adaptive benefits derived from war veterans that justifies the 
possible sacrifice of their lives. In fact, as Tullber (2004) points out, it actually appears 
to be the opposite.5 
 
The failure of sociobiological theories to capture the complexity of social cognition 
revealed the necessity of more detailed explanations of the psychological mechanisms 
mediating social behaviors. In this context, the emergence of evolutionary psychology 
was a step further in the study of the social mind. For instance, the distinction between 
ultimate causes (such as increasing fitness) and proximate causes (such as the 
psychological processes mediating altruistic behaviors) constitutes a fundamental 
conceptual improvement in order to avoid reductionist explanations. Thus, unlike 
“traditional” sociobiologists, evolutionary psychologists redefined the gene point of 
view by adopting a functionalist conceptual framework to understand the adaptive 
function (the “whys”) of the psychological processes that underlie human social 
                                                                                                                                               
(Laland & Brown, 2002).  
5 It is noteworthy that biological approaches to human social behavior generated an unprecedented debate 
in the academic field. As Harris (1999) points out, these approaches were built on the legacy of Darwin 
and Spencer, assuming as a central claim that natural selection mechanisms constitute the modus 
operantis underlying human social behaviors. Indeed, this sort of “Neo-Darwinism” was frequently 
associated with conservative right-wing movements and racist ideologies. Eventually, accusations of this 
type led to further exclusion of sociobiology and to academic ostracism.  
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behaviors (Barkow, Cosmide, & Toby, 1992; Pinker, 2002).  
 
According to this discipline, Krebs and Denton (2005) embrace a pragmatic 
perspective of the function of morality. From their perspective, it is necessary to 
understand the processes of moral decisions as resulting from the interaction between 
social processes and cognitive-affective mechanisms that allows people to live 
cooperatively. Further, the mental mechanisms that are involved in moral issues (such as 
moral norms) evolved because they allowed our hominid ancestors to benefit from the 
advantages of sociality.  
 
 
 
1.2. THE NEW SCIENCE OF MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
1.2.1. The emergence of modern moral psychology  
 
 
 Recent multidisciplinary approaches to the nature of morality have given rise to 
important findings, constituting what appears to be a “new era” in this topic. This was 
largely possible because a priori theoretical models of morality are now required to be 
complemented with experimental data. But, even before the current “boom” of moral 
research, there was an important tradition in moral psychology, with the paradox that it 
was not recognized as a research topic per se. In other words, during the last century, 
social psychology has made remarkable progress in the study of morality through the 
study of topics such as empathy, aggression, fairness, norms and obedience without 
considering them aspects of an integrated moral field.6  
 
 In this context, an important particularity of morality is that it has been 
traditionally studied as a part of developmental psychology. Piaget (1932/1965) 
                                                 
6 As suggested by Haidt and Kesebir (2010, p. 797), “(…) just as Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain discovers 
that he had been speaking in prose his whole life, social psychology can, perhaps, claim to have been 
speaking about morality its whole life.”   
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established the most influential line of moral research of the last 50 years with his 
cognitive-developmental approach to morality. For Piaget, the constructive processes 
through which children develop respect for rules (their moral understanding) and their 
ability to justify their moral judgments is explained through the progressive 
development of psychological mechanisms for information processing. Thus, children’s 
social knowledge is akin to their knowledge of physics: it is self-constructed through 
their social interactions. In other words, developmentalists believed that children were 
active actors who constructed much of their morality by themselves. Such an approach 
is largely empiricist, in the sense that it leaves little room for moral concepts that are 
operative before social learning.  
 
The work of Piaget was developed (never better expressed) by Lawrence 
Kohlberg (1969), who built the most influential theory of moral development. Based on 
Piaget’s assumptions, Kohlberg incorporated the new paradigms from the cognitive 
revolution—with its special attention to mental models and information processing— 
with the aim of creating a new model of moral development. Thus, Kohlberg identified 
“role taking” or the ability to consider a given problem from different perspectives as 
the central factor for improving moral reasoning, which was understood as reasoning 
about justice. From Kohlberg’s perspective, moral reasoning was developed through a 
progressive and fixed sequence of stages in which children improve their reasoning 
abilities. Consequently, this model explains children’s ability to reason philosophically 
about moral (justice) problems.  
 
Turiel’s (1983) work contributed to a more descriptive account of moral 
development. Turiel identified a methodological problem in previous developmentalists’ 
approaches: they assumed that children’s responses measure their moral development. 
However, children of different ages differ largely in their capacity for articulate 
responses, which requested a new technique for measuring moral development that does 
not require much verbal skill. Thus, Turiel discovered that children knew more about 
moral functioning than was previously assumed. For instance, he found that children as 
young as 5 years old recognize that rules about food, clothing and many other aspects of 
life are social conventions (context-dependents rules), whereas rules about justice, rights 
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
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or welfare are moral rules (which are not context-dependent).  
 
 Despite the fact that developmentalists’ approaches made important 
contributions to the study of morality, such a rationalist view of our moral life clearly 
undermines the role of emotional processes in the moral domain. Wilson (1975/2000) 
argued that biology plays a leading part in moral life by providing our species with 
brain structures that allow us to experience moral emotions in the presence of certain 
events. However, it was not until the shift of the “affective revolution”—with its 
emphasis on the study of the automatic affective systems of the mind—and the rebirth 
of sociobiology as evolutionary psychology that the study of the psychological 
processes underlying our moral sense showed whether an emotional explanation of 
morality was indeed possible. This assumption gained more support after the 
neuroscientific revolution, which allowed the design of a variety of experimental 
paradigms aimed at locating the neural correlates of moral cognition.  
 
In particular, the “affective revolution” implied the vindication of emotions as a 
key part of the process of moral judgments. This perspective was further complemented 
with the concept of automaticity, which characterizes much of our mental processes as a 
result of automatic intuitions. Indeed, since the modern cognitive sciences, the idea that 
many of our social behaviors can be explained as the result of automatic processes has 
found several theoretical and empirical supports (Bargh, 1994; Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 
1996). Thus, it is argued that automatic stimulus evaluation occurs at a very early stage 
in information processing, and that the process is fast, unintentional, efficient and 
occurring outside of awareness (Öhman, 1987). For instance, Bargh (1994) argues that 
the psychological processes involved in human behavior must be understood as a 
continuum from those processes that are fully automatic to those processes that are fully 
controlled. This claim has direct evolutionary connotations: automatic processes are 
phylogenetically older than controlled processes, which are slower, effortful and often 
conscious. Moreover, the possibility that certain moral behaviors are the result of 
automatic processes is suggested by Bargh and Chartrand (1999): 
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“So it may be, especially for evaluations and judgments of novel people and 
objects, that what we think we are doing while consciously deliberating in 
actuality has no effect on the outcome of the judgment, as it has already been 
made through relatively immediate, automatic means" (p. 475). 
 
 
This perspective was reinforced by neuroimaging research and the results 
obtained from inter-species comparative studies. Thus, from the field of neuroscience, 
Damasio (1994) showed that patients who suffer lesions in specific brain regions 
display social deficits. The case of Phineas Gage, who suffered a lesion in his 
left frontal brain lobe and reported a subsequent alteration of his personality and social 
behavior (in particular, in his capacity for social decision making), was a central tenet of 
this emergent field. For Damasio (1994), this finding supports his “somatic marker” 
hypothesis, which claims that emotional processes are based on physiological changes 
(both in the body and the brain) that depend on neural systems and present specific 
correlates in certain brain regions.  
 
According to the field of primatology, inter-species comparative studies have 
contributed to a better understanding of the cognitive-affective structures that are 
involved in morality. As we will review in the next section, research by de Waal (1996) 
and collaborators has proved to be prolific, making it possible for Darwin’s seminal 
theories about the “moral sense” to finally find empirical support.  
 
 
1.2.2. Current state of research on moral psychology  
 
 
Over the last ten years, discoveries about intuitions, emotions and the particular 
ways in which automatic mechanisms interact with rational processes have led to the 
beginning of a new era in the study of morality. Although there is a broad agreement 
that morality is an exclusively human phenomenon, the absence of a standard 
comprehension about the innateness of the moral sense is still an object of scientific 
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debate. Therefore, this section is organized around a preliminary distinction between the 
study of morality at the level of capacity and the study of moral cognition at the level of 
content.  
 
 
1.2.2.1. The study of morality at the level of capacity  
 
Consequently, there are two different ways in which the innateness of morality 
can be accounted for. Firstly, there is the level of the cognitive and affective 
mechanisms that are involved in moral cognition (the capacity level). Secondly, there is 
a different level that refers to the psychological predispositions that bias the content of 
moral judgments and moral systems (the content level).  
 
According to the first perspective, the fact that H. sapiens is the only living 
species that can be considered a moral being has been a central claim in biological 
approaches to morality. Certainly, this point can be tentatively explained by considering 
the evolutionary account of the evolution of organisms: each species―and, of course, 
we are no exception―is born with a specific cognitive/affective “toolkit” that drives its 
particular experiences and emotions (see 1.1.1). These mechanisms are the biological 
prerequisites or “innate hardware” that makes it possible for each species to develop a 
particular set of potential behaviors. In the case of morality, it seems that we have 
evolved some psychological mechanisms that are not fully present —that is, at least not 
to the same degree—in any other animal species.  
 
This prediction has found support in findings from inter-species comparative 
studies (Nadat et al., 2009). Hence, modern sophisticated cognitive faculties appear to 
be structured on more basic mental capacities that we share with other primate species. 
With regard to this issue, parsimony suggests that, if some psychological mechanisms 
involved in moral cognition are also present in our closest biological relatives, it is 
feasible that these mind traits evolved before the appearance of humans.  
Indeed, many non-human primates display human-like methods to deal with 
conflicts inherent to their social life. Specifically, behaviors such as reciprocity, 
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reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention or mediation are well documented in 
several comparative studies, to such an extent that they have been considered the 
“building blocks” of morality (Flack & de Waal, 2000). Each of these blocks appears to 
include different cognitive and affective mechanisms that seem to be correlated with the 
complexity of the behavior and, interestingly, the taxonomical place of the genre. For 
example, some non-human primates appear to be sensitive to effort (van Wolkenten, 
Brosnan, & de Waal, 2007) and capable of detecting and punishing cheaters, abilities 
that suggest the presence of retributive emotions toward inequity (Brosnan & de Waal, 
2003; de Waal & Berger, 2000; Nichols & Mallon, 2006). Likewise, behaviors such as 
reconciliation, consolation or conflict intervention are associated with an understanding 
of the distinction between self and other (de Waal, 2007), the ability to make some 
inferences from the physical world (Call, 2005; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 2003a, 2003b) 
and even a cognitive level of empathy, which implies an appraisal of the other´s 
contextual/emotional situation (Preston & de Waal, 2002). 
 
However, as noted by Darwin, humans’ and non-humans’ social behaviors differ 
substantially in their degree of complexity. For instance, it has been suggested that 
cognitive capacities, such as symbolic thought and the ability for abstraction, are 
fundamental in humans’ moral cognition. For example, Ulric Tse (2008) believes that 
the arbitrary symbol-referent association that characterizes symbolic thought implies the 
ability to make mental representations that transcend immediate perceptual cognition 
(abstract thinking). According to Tse (2008), both the capacity to symbolize and the 
capacity to mentally construct categorical abstractions favored a new scenario in which 
any event (or individual) that is symbolized could be reconceived as a categorical 
instance (e.g., good or evil, right or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable). Consequently, 
any act (e.g., steal/wrong/unacceptable) has the power to make its performer immoral 
(e.g., thief/wrong/unacceptable).  
 
In addition, neuroimaging results support this account. Moll and Schulkin (2009) 
found that ancient limbic-neurohumoral systems of social attachment and 
aversion―which are involved in non-human primate behaviors such as altruism or 
aggression―are tightly integrated with “newer” cortical mechanisms in the making of 
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
moral sentiments and values. This suggests that the motivational-emotional neural 
mechanisms that underlie prosocial behaviors in other species acquire a new dimension 
when they are integrated with brain regions associated with complex social knowledge 
(Moll, et al., 2005), supporting the hypothesis that morality is not a unified neurological 
phenomenon (Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008).  
 
Summarizing, our review of the literature has shown that part of the cognitive 
and neural underpinnings of morality were already in place millions of years ago in our 
primate ancestors. Thus, empirical evidence suggests that humans’ moral capacity can 
be explained as resulting from the interaction of basic and complex cognitive/affective 
mechanisms that are neither domain-specific nor exclusively human. Therefore, the 
innateness of morality should be understood from a dispositional manner, that is, at the 
level of evolved brain structures that acquired a new function in H. sapiens. Further, it 
seems that the psychological processes implicated in morality evolved originally for 
other purposes, which implies that, from the perspective of its evolutionary emergence, 
morality can be explained as a byproduct of other cognitive innovations (for discussions 
on this topic, see Prinz, 2007 and Sripada, 2007).  
 
 
1.2.2.2. Morality understood as a set of innately co-determined social concerns  
 
The debate about the innateness of morality becomes more controversial when it 
refers to the specificity of the biological influences in the content of morality. As 
Sripada (2008) points out, the discussion about “content nativism”—which refers to the 
specific set of actions that moral norms prohibit, permit or require—does not need to be 
reduced to a contraposition between the human mind as a blank slate versus the mind as 
fully programmed by genes. Additionally, even modern ethologists have vindicated the 
role of cultural experiences in the formation of ethical values, denying the possibility of 
a fully programmed human mind (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977). Although empirical evidence 
supports that the “ingredients” that make our moral life possible are indeed given by 
evolution (1.2.2.1), it has not yet delimited the precise extent to which biology can also 
constrain our moral “products.” In the present section, we review three approaches to 
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the innateness of the content of morality: (a) moral judgments understood as evaluations 
driven by innate principles; (b) moral judgments understood as automatic-affective 
evaluative processes; and (c) moral norms understood as psychologically constrained 
cultural constructions.  
 
1.2.2.2.1. Moral judgment understood as an evaluation driven by innate principles 
 
The first approach to the innateness of moral content argues that we are born 
with a moral faculty akin to the language faculty. Thus, it has been proposed that moral 
judgments are structured on a set of implicit principles that constitute our “Universal 
Moral Grammar” (Hauser, 2006; Rawls, 1971), understood as an innate device of 
morality acquisition (Mikhail, 2007a). In other words, the human mind is born equipped 
with a set of domain-specific rules, principles and concepts that can produce a wide 
range of mental representations. These implicit principles determine the deontological 
status of an infinite assortment of acts (and non-acts, see Mikhail, 2007b). As a result, 
moral intuitions are structured on these psychological guidelines that constitute the 
moral faculty.  
 
For instance, Hauser, Cushman and Young (2007) argue that, although there are 
domain-general mechanisms underlying our moral faculty, we can identify cognitive 
mechanisms that are moral-specific. These authors believe that such mechanisms work 
as a universal moral grammar that combines representations of actions, intentions, 
causes or outcomes and “translates” these general principles into specific moral 
judgments. Therefore, Cushman, Young and Hauser’s (2006) studies support the 
existence of three particular moral principles, each one of them is understood as “a 
single factor that, when varied in the context of a moral dilemma, consistently produces 
divergent moral judgments” (Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006, p. 1082): 
 
Action principle: People judged harm caused by action as morally worse than harm 
caused by omission. 
 
Intention principle: People judge intended harm as morally worse than foreseen harm.  
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Contact principle: People judge harm involving physical contact as morally worse than 
harm caused without contact.  
 
Research conducted by Knobe (2010) is an interesting counterpoint to this 
perspective. This author has found evidence suggesting that the “moral status” of an 
action (that is, whether it is judged as morally right or wrong) influences the perception 
of the intentionality of the action judged. For instance, Knobe and his team found that 
the same action was judged as intentional or unintentional depending on the wrongness 
or rightness of the action, respectively.  
 
Likewise, a growing body of studies from the field of neuroscience suggests that 
there might be some unconscious principles underlying moral judgments. For example, 
Greene and colleagues (2001) adopted an alternative “bottom-up” approach to the 
nature of moral judgments based on the “Trolley problem” (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 
1986). Consider the following scenario:  
 
A runaway trolley is going to kill five people if it continues its present course. 
The only way to avoid this tragedy is to hit a switch that will change the 
trolley course, of which the major problem is that, in its new side track, it will 
run over—and of course, kill—one person instead of the initial five. Is it 
morally acceptable to hit the switch? 
 
 
Diverse studies on this topic show a large inclination to immediately consider 
the affirmative response morally acceptable (Greene Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Interestingly, 
responses were quite different when participants were asked to evaluate a similar 
recreation of the trolley dilemma. In this second case (the “footbridge dilemma”), all the 
variables were controlled to be identical than in the trolley dilemma. Thus, in this 
second version, the only modification was that, in order to stop the train and save five 
people, participants have to push a “big” person instead of performing the action of 
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“hitting the switch.” Despite the obvious similarities—both possible consequences are 
the same—results show that people respond in an opposite way: they tend to 
immediately consider as “not permissible” to push one man off in order to save five 
(Greene et al., 2001).  
 
What makes it morally acceptable to sacrifice one life in order to save five in the 
first case but not in the second one? For Greene and collaborators (2001), the main 
distinction between the two situations is that the simple thought of pushing someone to 
certain death with one’s hands in an “close-up and personal” manner is likely to be more 
emotionally salient than the “impersonal” thought of hitting a switch, even if both 
responses have similar consequences. Therefore, dilemmas like the footbridge dilemma, 
in which the action can be structured in terms of ME (agency) HURT (action that leads 
to bodily harm) YOU (to an identifiable victim7) are considered “personal” moral 
dilemmas. Conversely, moral dilemmas that cannot be adjusted to this pattern are 
classified as “impersonal” (Greene et al., 2001; Greene 2009). It is noteworthy that, 
despite that the explanatory validity of this distinction has been seriously questioned 
(McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart & Mackenzie, 2009), it appears that there is something 
about the actions in the footbridge and the switch dilemma that elicits different 
behaviors. Interestingly, it seems that the evaluative divergence between the two 
dilemmas can also be corroborated at the neuropsychological level, as we will discuss 
below. 
 
1.2.2.2.2. Moral judgments understood as an automatic-affective evaluative process 
 
  The possibility that the evaluation of both types of dilemmas engage dissociable 
processing systems has been proposed as an explanation for this phenomenon. 
Neuroimaging studies have reported activity in several brain regions during the 
evaluation of moral events (Moll & Schulkin, 2009), which shows that the process of 
                                                 
7 This phenomenon, better known as the “identifiable victim effect,” suggests that identifiable victims 
elicit more potent emotional responses than do statistical victims. Small and Loewenstein (2003) have 
shown that, when harmful actions are not personal enough, they fail to arouse our emotional reactions 
despite their seriousness.  
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moral judgment involves several brain areas working integratedly8. Some of these areas 
are associated with emotional processes, and others areas are related to rational 
processing, a fact that has favored the discussion about the function of rational and 
emotional processes in moral judgments.  
 
For example, Greene (2009, 2011) proposes a dual-process theory of moral 
judgment, according to which automatic emotional responses drive characteristically 
deontological judgments, and controlled cognitive processes drive utilitarian judgments. 
Thus, Greene claims that moral cognition functions like a picture camera: there is an 
“automatic” (emotions-intuitions) and a “manual” (conscious reasoning) mode. 
Depending on the situation being judged, one setting could be more efficient than the 
other. However, as a general rule, the automatic mode is more efficient in everyday 
situations to which we are to some extent habituated. Conversely, in novel situations 
that require of more flexible responses, the manual mode is more efficient. These 
differentiated processes can enter into conflict in the moral situations where a rational 
evaluation clearly favors the “right” response, but the implication of such a choice 
elicits a negative emotional reaction (Greene et al., 2004). 
 
Supporting this claim, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) found that participants 
who experienced a positive feeling before the evaluation of a “personal” moral dilemma 
made more utilitarian judgments. They interpret these results as evidence for the link 
between deontological reasoning and strong negative affective responses to moral 
violations, which would be reduced through the experience of positive affect. Likewise, 
Bartels (2008) found that participants who rely more on intuitive than deliberative 
thinking styles have preferences that are more consistent with deontology. Additionally, 
a neuropsychological study by Koenigs et al. (2007) found that ventromedial prefrontal 
patients made about five times more utilitarian judgments than control subjects.  
 
The dual conception of moral cognition is amply shared among moral 
                                                 
8Moral cognition is not a unitary psychological construct. There is evidence that different cognitive and 
affective systems are involved in different types of moral judgments. Thus, dishonest, disgusting and 
harmful moral transgressions activate different brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective 
processing and action understanding, respectively (Parkinson et al., 2011). 
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psychologists. Moreover, a recent body of research favors the characterization of a 
typical moral judgment as an automatic process. For example, Jonathan Haidt (2001) 
found an important battery of evidence supporting his central claim that most moral 
judgments are caused by moral intuitions, which are understood as: 
 
 “(…) the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of 
consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike, good-bad) about the 
character or actions of a person, without any conscious awareness of 
having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a 
conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007a, p. 188).  
 
Based on this conception, Haidt (2001) proposes the Social Intuitionist Model of 
moral judgment (SIM), which, essentially, captures the interaction between moral 
intuitions, moral judgments and moral reasoning. Therefore, in daily life, affect-laden 
intuitions drive moral judgments, whereas moral reasoning―when it occurs follows 
these intuitions in an ex-post facto manner. From this perspective, moral judgment is 
much like aesthetic judgment: in the presence of a moral event, we experience an instant 
feeling of approval or disapproval (Greene & Haidt, 2002). Thus, moral reasoning also 
plays an important “social” role in moral cognition, being very common in conversation 
and moral decisions (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007b). In particular, moral arguments should 
be understood as attempts to trigger the right intuitions in others. As a consequence, 
moral discussions are understood as processes in which two or more people are engaged 
in a battle to push the rival´s emotional buttons.9  
 
 
                                                 
9 For example, Skitka (2002) has shown how moral positions or moral mandates regarding different moral 
objects can be extremely difficult to change once they are assumed.  
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Figure 1.  The social intuitionist model of moral judgment. The numbered links, drawn 
for Person A only, are 1) the intuitive judgment link, 2) the post-hoc reasoning link, 3) 
the reasoned persuasion link, and 4) the social persuasion link. Two additional links are 
hypothesized to occur less frequently: 5) the reasoned judgment link, and 6) the private 
reflection link. (Reprinted from Haidt, 2001)
6
 
 
Figure 1. The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral judgment  
 
The characterization of moral judgment as a response resulting from intuitive-
affective processes has found support in two central claims. Firstly, the fact that people 
often have the feeling that something is wrong but find it extremely difficult to find 
reasons that justify their evaluation. Thus, Haidt (2001) identified the cognitive 
phenomenon of “Moral dumbfounding,” which consists of the fact that, in the absence 
of a truly comprehension of a given moral judgment, we tend to search for plausible 
explanations about why anyone in a similar situation would have proceeded in the same 
way10. Therefore, we can say that in those situations, we intuitively “know” whether 
something is right or wrong, but faced with the lack of a logical understanding of our 
response, we tend to rationalize a justification for our initial intuition. In other words, 
the reason why we are often unconscious of the cognitive processes that influence our 
moral judgments is because our “moral mind” acts more like a lawyer trying to build a 
case rather than a judge searching for the truth (Haidt, 2001):  
 
                                                 
10 According to Nisbett and Wilson (1977), in some situations when people are asked to report their 
cognitive processes underlying their responses to a stimulus, they just apply or generate a priori implicit 
causal theories about how plausible it is for a specific stimulus to be the cause a specific response.  
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“People have quick and automatic moral intuitions and, when called upon to 
justify these intuitions, they generate post-hoc justifications out of a priori 
moral theories. They do not realize that they are doing this. (…). Rather, 
people are searching for plausible theories about why they might have done 
what they did. Moral arguments are therefore like shadow-boxing matches: 
each contestant lands heavy blows to the opponent’s shadow, then wonders 
why he doesn’t fall down.” (Haidt, 2001, p. 12-13)  
 
The second claim that supports the characterization of moral judgments as 
automatic-affective evaluative processes is the sensitivity of moral judgments to 
affective influences. Because this argument is enormously relevant to the present 
research, the influence of affective variables in moral judgments will be deeply 
analyzed in (1.4) and in Chapter III.  
 
 
1.2.2.2.3. Moral norms understood as psychologically constrained cultural constructions 
 
The affective-intuitive approach to morality is largely sustained by the claim that 
moral beliefs and motivations are ultimately derived from moral emotions. These 
emotions are understood as evaluations (good or bad) of persons or actions, with the 
particularity that the object evaluated can be the self or another. Thus, Haidt (2003) 
proposes that moral emotions can be divided into other-condemning emotions (like 
contempt, anger or guilt), self-condemning emotions (shame, embarrassment and guilt), 
other-praising emotions (gratitude, admiration and elevation) and self-praising emotions 
(pride and self-satisfaction). These emotions are typically triggered by the perception of 
a moral violation and normally motivate actions directed at the reestablishment of the 
“broken” moral value (Nichols, 2008).11 For example, in order to have a moral attitude 
                                                 
11 According to a new study, adults are much less likely than children to think someone should be 
punished for damaging an object, especially if the action was accidental. Moreover, the different 
responses correlate with the different stages of development. For Decety and colleagues (2012), negative 
emotions alert people to the salience of a moral situation by bringing on an unpleasant feeling that 
precedes moral judgment, and such an emotional response is stronger in young children. Particularly, 
morally salient scenarios elicited stronger empathic sadness in young participants and were associated 
with enhanced activity in the amygdala, insula, and temporal poles.  
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about stealing, it is necessary to experience a self-directed emotion (blame) at the 
prospect of committing a theft, and an other-condemning emotion (anger) when 
perceiving that someone is stealing.  
 
A distinctive feature of moral emotions is that their subjective experience is 
especially sensitive to cultural factors and social dynamics. For Shweder and Haidt 
(2000), cultural-social standards shape the experiencing of each moral emotion and its 
relationship with social elicitors. Thus, the fact that some moral emotions are associated 
with some social situations across different cultures suggests that there may be some 
psychological foundations underlying the development of moral systems (Shweder, 
Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). For instance, Haidt and Joseph (2004) argue that we 
are born with a “first moral draft” that is constituted of (at least) five sets of affect-laden 
intuitions, of which one is easily triggered by the perception of (at least) five sets of 
moral situations. In other words, the human mind has evolved these sorts of “social 
receptors” or “moral buds” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 57) that are sensitive to the 
recognition of social patterns (such as actions, relationships or intentions) and can 
“translate” the perception of these patterns into emotional states. Further, it is argued 
that evolutionary pressures structured the human mind to intuitively develop concerns 
about five moral foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007):  
 
1. Harm/care: associated with the emotion of compassion and concerns for other-
suffering, including virtues such as caring and compassion. 
2. Fairness/reciprocity: involves concerns about unfair treatment, inequity, and 
abstract notions of justice. Moral violations within this domain are associated 
with the emotion of moral anger. 
3. In-group/loyalty: involves concerns derived from group membership, such as 
loyalty, self-sacrifice and vigilance against betrayal. It is associated with 
emotions of group pride and rage against traitors.  
4. Authority/respect: concerns related to social order and obligations derived from 
hierarchical relationships, such as obedience, respect, and proper role 
fulfillment. These concerns are mediated by the emotion of fear.  
5. Purity/sanctity: involves concerns about physical and spiritual contagion, 
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including virtues of chastity, wholesomeness, sanctity, control of desires and is 
regulated by the emotion of disgust.  
 
 
Harm/Care Fairness/ 
Reciprocity 
Ingroup/ 
Loyalty 
Authority/ 
Respect 
Purity/ 
Sanctity 
Adaptive 
challenge 
Protect and care 
for young, 
vulnerable, or 
injured kin 
Reap benefits of 
dyadic 
cooperation with 
non-kin 
Reap benefits of 
group 
cooperation 
Negotiate 
hierarchy, 
defer 
selectively 
Avoid microbes 
and parasites 
Proper domain 
(adaptive 
triggers) 
Suffering, 
distress, or 
threat to one’s 
kin 
Cheating, 
cooperation, 
deception 
Threat or 
challenge to 
group 
Signs of 
dominance and 
submission 
Waste products, 
diseased people 
Actual domain 
(the set of all 
triggers) 
Baby seals, 
cartoon 
characters 
Marital fidelity, 
broken vending 
machines 
Sports teams one 
roots for 
Bosses, 
respected 
professionals 
Taboo ideas 
(communism, 
racism)  
Characteristic 
emotions 
Compassion Anger, gratitude, 
guilt 
Group pride, 
belongingness; 
rage at traitors 
Respect, fear Disgust 
Relevant 
virtues [and 
vices] 
Caring, 
kindness, 
[cruelty] 
Fairness, justice, 
honesty, 
trustworthiness 
[dishonesty] 
Loyalty, 
patriotism, self-
sacrifice 
[treason, 
cowardice] 
Obedience, 
deference 
[disobedience, 
uppitiness] 
Temperance, 
chastity, 
cleanliness [lust, 
intemperance] 
 
Figure 2. The five foundations of intuitive ethics (Haidt & Bjorklund 2007a) 
 
 
Moreover, an important aspect of this theory is that each moral foundation is 
understood as largely independent from an evolutionary perspective. That is, each set of 
psychological mechanisms (moral emotions and intuitions) can be explained as shaped 
by different selective social pressures. This hypothesis is derived from the fact that four 
of them (all but Purity-sanctity) appear to be built on psychological mechanisms that are 
present in non-human primates (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007). For instance, in the case 
of the harm/care foundation, the existence of psychological mechanisms that elicit 
aversion to harmful actions that are directed at a conspecific appears to be 
evolutionarily ancient (Preston and de Waal, 2002). The same applies for 
fairness/reciprocity, a building block of moral life that is built on social behaviors, such 
as inequity aversion or sensitivity to effort, found in other primates (Brosnan and de 
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Waal, 2003; de Waal and Berger, 2000; van Wolkental, Brosnan and de Waal, 2007). 
Additionally, the behavioral foundations of both in-group/loyalty and authority/respect 
have been widely documented in different social species (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977; de 
Waal, 1996).  
 
Interestingly, the only moral foundation that does not present correlates in the 
animal kingdom is purity/sanctity, a fact that is congruent with the absence of the fully 
developed emotion of disgust in any animal other than humans (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000). Consequently, because the relationship between disgust and morality 
is certainly complex, this will be the central theme of (1.3.3).  
 
These findings call attention to the significant influence of emotional processes 
in our moral life. Thus, the appearance of emotional approaches to explain the 
normative level of moral systems is not surprising. For instance, it has been proposed 
that the moral dimension of rules is psychologically grounded on moral emotions. For 
Nichols (2007, 2008), emotions permit us to treat certain social transgressions 
distinctively. Like Greene (2009) and Haidt and Joseph (2004), the author believes that 
we have evolved an innate psychological predisposition to feel negative affective 
responses when in the presence of an action that involves another’s suffering. According 
to his approach, this aversive mechanism constitutes the “emotional support” for the 
emergence and transmission of moral norms. In other words, for the “cultural fitness” of 
a moral norm, there must be some emotional congruence between the content of the 
norm and its implications. For example, Nichols (2007) argues that harm norms receive 
their special status because they prohibit actions that are inherently upsetting.12  
 
Therefore, affective mechanisms appear to constitute an important factor 
mediating the moral/conventional distinction. Nichols (2002) has shown that individual 
ratings for disgust-sensitivity are correlated with the propensity to judge disgusting 
conventional transgressions as morally wrong. Further, Rozin, Markwith and Stoess 
                                                 
12 That is why Nichols understands that: “Morality is conventional in the sense that the rules that we 
decided to elevate to special status vary across culture, but then the special status is what I think has the 
psychological basis” (Nichols, 2008). 
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(1997) proposed the concept of moralization to explain the phenomenon in which 
objects or activities that were originally neutral acquire a moral status. For example, 
they found that participants who reported avoiding meat for moral reasons (instead of 
for health reasons) found meat more disgusting and offered more reasons in support of 
their position. In the same line, Rozin and Singh (1999) found that participants’ disgust 
measures were highly correlated with their (negative) moral judgments against smokers, 
suggesting that disgust toward smoking is correlated with strong beliefs that smoking is 
immoral.  
 
 Summarizing, the approaches reviewed above suggest that emotional processes 
play a motivational role at the normative level of morality. Thus, Haidt and Bjorklund 
(2007a) argue that the process of moral development should be understood as an 
externalization process: we have evolved psychological mechanisms (the five moral 
foundations) that function as “learning modules,” which, when working together with 
cultural elements, facilitated the emergence of moral knowledge.  
 
Such a claim implies that there are no rigid parameters constraining moral 
norms, only innate predispositions that can potentially shape the content of those norms. 
As Sripada (2007) points out, although there are “high-level themes” in the content of 
moral norms that are nearly ubiquitous among moral systems―such as harm, incest, 
helping, sharing, social justice, and group defense―, the specific rules that operate 
within each theme are culturally idiosyncratic and highly variable.  
 
From this perspective, Sripada (2007) developed a theory that elegantly explains 
the interaction between biological and cultural factors in the emergence and 
transmission of moral norms. Given the complexity of such a process, she takes 
advantage of the “Westermarck mechanism” (Westermarck, 1891/1922) and its 
explanation of the incest taboo:  
 
• Sexual union between close genetic relatives has deleterious effects.  
• People who are associated in childhood tend to be close genetic relatives. 
• Our species has evolved an innate mechanism that produces powerful aversion 
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to the possibility of having sex with people with whom one was intimately 
associated during childhood.  
 
Although such an innate system certainly makes evolutionary sense, it seems 
also evident that such an innate aversion cannot totally account for the stability of a 
particular moral norm. Therefore, the innateness of moral systems should be understood 
in terms of a set of social preparedness―like a “universal menu of moral categories” 
(Prinz, 2007, p. 381) ―that constrains the construction and functioning of moral 
systems. In this context, the cuisine analogy created by Haidt and Bjorklund (2007a) 
might be illustrative: although cuisines are unique cultural products, they are also built 
on an innate sensory system that includes five different taste receptors on the tongue. 
These biological structures constrain cuisines while at the same time allow them a wide 
range of creativity in the final products, also constraining our preferences. In short, we 
can say that we are endowed with “conceptual moral seeds” that are typically 
externalized through individual development if the right “weather” (the cultural inputs) 
does its part.  
 
 
 
1.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISGUST AND MORALITY 
 
 
1.3.1.Conceptualization and description of disgust  
 
 
According to Darwin (1872/1965) disgust "...refers to something revolting, 
primarily in relation to the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly imagined; and 
secondarily to anything which causes a similar feeling, through the sense of smell, touch 
and even of eyesight" (p. 253). This section is conceived as a more detailed description 
of Darwin´s seminal definition. 
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1.3.1.1. Physiological component of disgust  
 
The emotion of disgust is accompanied by a number of physiological reactions 
that function all together to prepare the organism for the avoidance and (ultimately) the 
rejection of infectious substances. Thus, the experience of disgust differs from other 
“basic” emotions by featuring the physiological signature responses of nausea (Darwin, 
1872/1965) and—in extreme cases—vomiting (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Disgust has 
been positively correlated with higher activation of the autonomic nervous system, in 
particular, with parasympathetic activity (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). For 
example, some physiological responses associated with disgust are increased salivation 
(Angyal, 1941), heart rate deceleration (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990), reduced 
blood pressure (Sledge, 1978), decreased skin conductance (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, 
& Hamm, 1993) and reduced respiration rate (Curtis & Thyer, 1983).  
 
At the neurological level, the experience of disgust seems to be accompanied by 
the activation of certain brain areas. For example, areas of the anterior insula and the 
anterior cingulated cortex are activated when observing facial expressions of disgust 
(Wicker et al., 2003). Insula and amygdala also seem to be activated when individuals 
are exposed to displeasing tastes and odors (Small et al., 2003). Other brain areas 
associated with disgust are the medial and lateral posterior orbitofrontal cortex, orbital 
division of the inferior frontal gyrus, and some regions of the medial superior frontal 
gyrus (Moll et al., 2005). The occipital cortex, hippocampus, thalamus and amygdala 
have also been related to the processing of both disgust and erotic stimuli (Stark et al., 
2005). 
 
 
1.3.1.2 Expressive component of disgust  
 
Although there is no absolute theoretical consensus about a prototypical disgust 
face13 (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008), it has been commonly characterized by a 
furrowing of the eyebrows, wrinkling of the nose, closure of the eyes and pupil 
                                                 
13 Disgust has been also reported in the absence of any facial expression (Kraut, 1982).  
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constriction, a curled upper lip and gaping jaw, a set of facial features that are best 
known as the “gape face” (Darwin, 1872/1965; de Jong, Peters, & Vanderhallen, 2002; 
Ekman, 1982). This gape face has been empirically described as resulting from three 
distinctive components: parted lips or a dropped jaw, codified as Action Unit [AU]25 or 
26 in the Facial Action Coding System [FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978], retraction of 
the upper lip (AU10) and the nose wrinkle (AU9) (See also Rozin et al., 2008).  
 
The facial expression of disgust is readily identifiable across cultures (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1974) and it may be present even in congenitally blind individuals (Galati, 
Scherer, & Ricci-Bitti, 1997). In our species, the gape face also accompanies the 
reaction of distaste, which is described as a motivational response to the ingestion of 
unpleasant tasting substances (Rozin et al., 2008). The functional link between the gape 
face and rejection of unpleasant tastes is supported by two main facts. First, distaste is a 
common reaction among different non-human animal species. Second, the orofacial 
response (gape) in other species presents important similarities to their human 
equivalent (Bovbjerg 2006; Parker, & Limebeer, 2006).  
 
 
1.3.1.3 Phenomenology of disgust  
 
Disgust is a basic negative emotion the appraisal of which involves both a sense 
of offensiveness and revulsion accompanied by thoughts of contamination (Angyal 
1941; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). If an emotion is understood as a disposition 
towards an action (Lang, 1995), disgust is always linked with a motivation to avoid and 
reject any perceived offensive entity (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Compared to other 
emotions, the experience of disgust seems to be relatively short in duration (Sherer & 
Wallbott, 1994).  
 
One of the most distinctive features of the emotion of disgust is the 
heterogeneity of its elicitors, a fact that it is still the object of theoretical dispute (as will 
be discussed in the following section). For instance, for human adults, the sense of 
disgust is much broader than a sensory rejection to unpleasant tastes and particular 
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foods. Thus, disgust is elicited by certain animals (like rats, spiders, worms or 
cockroaches), bodily products (such as feces, sexual fluids, urine, saliva, nails, sweat, 
etc.14), death, bad hygiene, sexual elicitors, body envelope violations (such as blood, 
gore and mutilation), visible signs of infection (lesions, discoloration, abnormal body 
proportion) and even certain offensive social behaviors, beliefs, institutions and persons 
(see Angyal, 1941; Curtis & Biran, 2001; Douglas, 1966; Haidt et al., 1994; Marzillier 
& Davey, 2004; Miller, 1997; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin et al., 2008).  
 
The content of the disgusting is at times paradoxical: it can attract as well as it 
can repel. Even in the second scenario, it hardly ever repels without also capturing our 
attention (Miller, 1997). Curiously, there is a strong relationship between disgust and 
humor. Disgusting stimuli are often considered amusing, at least when the stimulus is 
not personally threatening (Rozin et al., 2008).  
 
A crucial feature of disgust is its association with the process of contamination. 
Thus, contact with certain cues that evoke disgust can turn a neutral object into 
something disgusting (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). 
Contamination can also occur without any physical contact (Rachman, 2004) and seems 
to operate in some irrational/ideational ways. For example, disgusting substances can 
render perfectly good food inedible by brief contact, even if there is no physical trace of 
the repulsive item: the idea (history) of contact is enough (Rozin et al., 1986). 
Consequently, Rozin and colleagues (1986) argue that, when applied to disgust, 
contamination effects follow two laws of sympathetic magic first introduced by Tylor 
(1871/1974), Frazer (1890/1959) and Mauss (1902/1972). The first law, which is known 
as “contagion,” states that when an offensive object touches a previously neutral object, 
some invisible essence/residue is transmitted, resulting in their permanent connection 
(“once in contact, always in contact”). The second law, known as “similarity,” holds 
that things that are similar in some properties are felt to be fundamentally similar. As 
Rozin et al. (2008) points out, superficial appearance is perceived as reality (“the image 
equals the object”).  
 
                                                 
14 Disgust is associated with every body-product except for tears (Miller, 1997).  
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1.3.1.4 Development of disgust  
 
The complete experience of disgust seems to be absent in either infants or 
nonhumans. The available evidence suggests that there are no innately disgusting odors, 
a fact that is congruent with the well known tendency of young children to put anything 
into their mouth (including feces). Additionally, rejection of decay odors (in the absence 
of a present referent object) typically appears between 3 and 7 years of age (Schmidt & 
Beauchump, 1988). Development of disgust is thus a complex process because it 
requires the development of complex cognitive notions. For instance, contamination 
sensitivity (which is not present in children under 3-5 years of age) is a sophisticated 
ability that demands considerable abstraction (Rozin et al., 2008).  
 
Then, the development of disgust seems to require enculturation, a thesis 
supported by Malson’s (1964/1972) review of approximately 50 feral humans, none of 
whom evidenced any sign of disgust. According to Tomkins (1963), children may 
“learn” to feel disgust by observing facial displays of emotions of adults to different 
stimuli. In any case, it seems that a fully developed disgust response is not in place until 
around the age of 5 to 7 years (Rozin, Hammer, Oster, Horowitz, & Marmora, 1986; 
Rozin, Fallon, & Augustoni-Ziskind, 1986; Siegal, 1988). Moreover, disgust toward 
body odors may appear later in development, around the beginning of adolescence 
(Stevenson & Repacholi, 2003).  
 
 
1.3.1.5 Disgust sensitivity understood as a psychological trait  
 
Sensitivity to disgust varies across individuals, cultures and maybe across 
geographical regions. This means that, for some people, the experience of disgust is 
more easily elicited—they find a wider array of stimuli to be disgusting—and can be 
felt with higher intensity. A crucial tool in the study of disgust sensitivity is the Disgust 
Scale (DS; Haidt et al., 1994), created to assess sensitivity to disgust in seven different 
domains15.  
                                                 
15 Subtypes of disgust will be reviewed in the next section.  
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For example, diverse studies show that women are more sensitive to disgust than 
men (Tybur, Bryan, Lieberman, Hooper, & Merriman, 2011), that sensitivity declines 
with age (Fessler & Navarrete, 2005), and that it is positively correlated with some 
personality traits (such as neuroticism) and negatively correlated with traits such as 
openness to experience or sensation seeking (Haidt et al., 1994).  
 
High sensitivity to disgust is also correlated with some psychiatric disorders, 
such as animal and blood-injury phobias, and also with contamination aspects of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Berle & Philips, 2006; Olantunji, Sawchuck, de Jong, & 
Lohr, 2006). Disgust sensitivity also appears to predict certain psychological 
syndromes, such as eating disorders (Davey, Buckland, Tantow, & Dallas, 1998) or 
religious obsessions (Olatunji, Tolin, Huppert, & Lohr, 2005), as well as social 
attitudes, such as xenophobia (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004), 
ethnocentrism (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006), restricted sociosexuality (Schaller & 
Murray, 2008), homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009, 2011; Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009), negative bias against obese individuals (Park, Schaller, & 
Crandall, 2007) or people with physical disabilities (Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003), 
or social stigma towards colostomy patients (Smith, Loewenstein, Rozin, Sherriff, & 
Ubel, 2007). 
 
 
1.3.2. Function of disgust  
 
 
1.3.2.1. Disgust understood as a pathogen-avoidance mechanism  
 
Then, the fact that H. sapiens is an omnivorous species implies an interesting 
adaptive challenge. As a generalist species16, humans have to deal with a wide range of 
combinations of food in order to achieve nutritional balance. In this context, the 
widespread presence of toxins and pathogens in nature makes it especially difficult to 
                                                 
16 Animal species that eat a wide range of food are called generalist (Rozin, 1999).  
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figure out the edibility of many potential foods on the basis of their sensory properties. 
For this reason, most of the times, in the presence of a novel food, the only way to 
identify its edibility is by ingestion (Rozin, 1999).  
 
As a consequence, dealing with pathogens has constituted an insidious and 
powerful selection pressure. Together with a physiological immune system that 
functions to detect and attack pathogens that intrude on our organism, disgust is 
understood as a biological adaptation serving to guide behavior away from substances 
and objects associated with pathogens and disease. Thus, from an evolutionary and 
functional perspective, disgust is, at its core, an information processing system that 
prevents contact with infectious threats; in other words, an affective signal of parasite 
infection (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Oaten, Stevenson, & 
Case, 2009, Park & Schaller, 2009).  
 
Consequently, disgust evolved to serve two crucial adaptive functions. First, 
disgust plays a crucial role in the process of food selection. The fact that disgust 
primarily evolved to function as a food-rejection mechanism is beyond any theoretical 
discussion (Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Haidt et al., 1994; Rozin & 
Fallon, 1987; Tomkins, 1963; for an exception, see Miller, 1997). For example, Andreas 
Angyal (1941) defines disgust as: "Revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of 
an offensive object.”  
 
The second adaptive function of disgust is disease avoidance. As mentioned 
above, the immune system is a complex set of adaptations that function to attack 
pathogens when they enter the body. Nevertheless, the immune system is a reactive 
system, which means that it cannot prevent an animal from coming into contact with the 
source of infection. Based on this fact, Schaller and Duncan (2007) have suggested that 
natural selection designed a second defensive response that relies on perceptual cues to 
detect the presence of potential sources of disease. In this second system, the perception 
of such “signals” can trigger aversive cognitive and emotional responses that lead to 
behavioral avoidance.  
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In this context, disgust is argued to play a central function. According to Park 
and Schaller (2009) this “behavioral immune system” uses heuristic signals, such as 
anomalous physical and behavioral features (e.g., skin lesions, spasms, coughing, 
behavioral tics), to detect the presence of disease in people. Certainly, there is a variety 
of evidence suggesting that there is correspondence between cues that evoke disgust and 
cues that signal disease (Oaten et al., 2009).  
 
According to Park and Schaller (2009), a crucial feature of this “behavioral 
immune system” is specially biased toward false alarms.17 The fact that most parasites 
are virtually invisible and that the biological consequences of an eventual infection are 
highly costly (illness or death) justify the viability of a system that is supersensitive to 
anything that superficially resembles disease. As a consequence, prejudicial responses 
may be directed at persons who are perfectly healthy but just look deviant.  
 
There is evidence supporting prejudicial reactions toward healthy people with 
physical disabilities or abnomalies (Clark, 1999; Harvey, Troop, Treasure, & Murphy, 
2002; Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007), and that vulnerability to disease (whether it is 
real or perceived) enhances disgust sensitivity (Fessler, Eng, & Navarrete, 2005) and is 
correlated with higher levels of ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Navarrete, Fessler, & 
Eng, 2007).  
 
 
1.3.2.2 The symbolic conception of disgust  
 
Although the findings recapitulated in this section favor a very concrete 
characterization of disgust as a phylogenetically ancient defensive mechanism designed 
to save us from physical threats, there are alternative accounts of the function of disgust 
that propose a more symbolic conception of this emotion. Therefore, a distinctive 
feature of humans is that culture biases all our interactions with the world, to the extent 
that we have reinterpreted much of our biology through symbolic systems. In the words 
                                                 
17 It is suggested that the behavioral immune system operates according the “smoke-detector principle” 
(Nesse, 2005). A smoke detector is calibrated to be supersensitive to anything that resembles smoke in 
order to minimize the possibility of a house fire.  
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of Clifford Geertz (1973), "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun, [and] I take culture to be those webs." 
 
Rozin, Haidt and McCauley (1993) then suggested that the function of disgust 
was redefined through the processes of biological and cultural evolution. These authors 
based their claim on the concept of “preadaptation” (Mayr, 1960) to describe the 
process through which an evolutionary “novelty” emerges by re-using existing 
structures. For example, although the human mouth clearly evolved as an eating and 
breathing organ, it was later “preadapted” to play a crucial role in the development of 
linguistic capacity (Rozin, 1999). According to this perspective, disgust expanded its 
original function as a disease-avoidance mechanism and now plays a much more 
ideational defensive function. In short, disgust was functionally recycled from a 
“guardian of the mouth” to function also as a guardian of the “temple of the body” 
(Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997, p. 114).  
 
In this context, Becker (1973) developed a theory that states that our own 
“creatureliness” (understood as our animal/material condition) is a critical source of our 
existential fear of death. In such a scenario, cultural systems can be understood as 
attempts to transcend our biology, in other words, as “antidotes” to the recognition of 
our “flesh-and-bone” animal nature and its symbolic implications. Because the human 
body constantly reminds us of our animal condition, disgust is proposed to play a role as 
an affective alarm against thoughts or experiences that remind us of human materiality. 
Thus, in this symbolic context, disgust functions as an affective assertion that says “I am 
fundamentally better than that.”   
 
This theory has been embraced by a line of research known as the Terror 
Management Theory (Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomom, 2000). 
Following Becker’s insights, the terror management perspective claims that some 
disgusting stimuli are threatening to human beings because they make salient people’s 
vulnerability to death. For example, Goldenberg and his team found that making salient 
mortality concerns increases the disgust reaction towards body products and animals 
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(Goldenberg et al.,2001) and that relative to neutral stimuli, disgusting stimuli led to 
higher death-thought accessibility (Cox, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, & Weise, 2007).  
 
There are, however, some arguments against this approach and the symbolic 
conception of disgust (Tybur et al., 2009; Oaten et al., 2009)18. For instance, if disgust 
functions as a psychodynamic defense mechanism, it might be expected to become 
progressively stronger, rather than progressively weaker, with successive exposure to its 
elicitors (in this case, the proximity of death). However, Fessler and Navarrete (2005) 
found a negative correlation between age and disgust sensitivity. Likewise, Royzman 
and Sabini (2001) argue that people engage in very permeable types of relationships 
with animals19 and that many behaviors that both humans and animals engage in do not 
elicit disgust (such as sleeping, breathing, jumping, and walking)20.  
 
 
1.3.2.3. Typology of disgust  
 
As reviewed in Section 1.3.1.3 (Phenomenology of disgust), one of the most 
outstanding features of disgust is the heterogeneity of its elicitors. This particularity has 
raised the question of how to best characterize the function of this emotion, leading to 
the formulation of diverse proposals. Therefore, this section reviews the ones that can 
be considered the three main taxonomies of disgust.  
1.3.2.3.1. The Disgust scale (DS; Haidt et al., 1994) 
The initial 32-item Disgust Scale (DS) included seven domains of disgust elicitors 
(food, animals, body products, sex, body envelope violations, death, and hygiene) and a 
domain of magical thinking, offering a total of eight subscale scores (each score is made 
up of four items). The original DS was later revised, and the four items measuring 
                                                 
18 Some disgust researches have suggested that there is no need for symbolism to explain disgust, and that 
a disease-eliciting taxonomy can subsume all disgust elicitors (Oaten et al., 2009; Curtis & Biran, 2001).  
19 For example, religions that rely on totemic constructions assume a mystical relationship between 
humans and animals (Lévi-Strauss, 1966).  
20 Interestingly, Miller goes further and suggests that human ambivalence about meat-eating can be 
explained as a perceived weaker form of cannibalism (for a different position, see Fessler & Navarrete, 
2003b).  
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reactions to sexual behaviors and the item measuring disgust towards a moral violation 
were removed21 (Olatunji, Williams, Tolin, Sawchuk, Abramowitz, Lohr, & Elwood, 
2007).  
Therefore, based on their revision of the elicitors, Rozin and colleagues (2000) 
proposed four-factor taxonomy of disgust. 
 
(a) Core disgust: Understood as the “guardian of the mouth,” it is a food-oriented 
disgust that works as a defensive mechanism against issues that can be 
offensive for the organism (Rozin et al., 2008; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). This 
rejection of food is based on its sensory properties and ideational qualities. The 
appraisal of core disgust involves: (1) a sense of potential oral incorporation, (2) 
a sense of offensiveness, and (3) the perception of contamination. Elicitors of 
core disgust include “bad foods,” certain animals (which are often associated 
with those foods), and all body products except tears.  
 
(b) Animal-nature disgust: this type of disgust functions as a defensive mechanism 
against the existential threat is generated from our animal/material (and mortal) 
condition. This is a much more symbolic variant than core disgust, and its scope 
is largely variable across cultures. Thus, this disgust guards “the temple of the 
human body” (Haidt et al., 1997) and is conceived as a “body and soul” 
emotion. Elicitors of animal-nature disgust include poor hygiene, inappropriate 
sex, gore or violations of body boundaries, and death.  
 
(c) Interpersonal disgust: this type of disgust is elicited by contact with undesirable 
people whose mere physical presence is thought to be contaminating. For 
example, individuals and groups that are perceived as unknown, ill, or objects 
of misfortune. Interpersonal disgust has been suggested to be adaptive by 
reducing risk of infection (Rozin et al., 2008).  
 
                                                 
21 In their study, they found that the four items measuring reactions to sexual behaviors did not covary 
with the other 7 sub-domains.  
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(d) Moral disgust: The expressive and subjective experience of disgust is used in 
many cultures and languages to condemn social transgressions that do not 
involve the body in any sensorially disgusting way. Moral disgust is a reaction 
to a subclass of egregious moral offenses, those that reveal that an individual is 
lacking the normal human motives (people and behaviors that are morally 
“sick” or “twisted”). At least for Westerners, moral disgust can be described as 
the guardian of the lower boundary of the category of humanity: those actions 
that expose people moving down, people who "de-grade" themselves, elicit 
disgust in others (e.g., stealing from one’s own mother, or exploiting the 
vulnerable). Historically, moral disgust appears to have been (and still is) a 
major force in the construction of religious and legal institutions. However, as 
will be analyzed in more detail in the next section, the expansion of disgust 
into the moral domain involves different issues in different cultures (Haidt et 
al., 1997).  
 
1.3.2.3.2 The Three-Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009) 
Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) have proposed an adaptationist 
perspective to the functional heterogeneity of disgust. According to their approach, 
natural selection has favored the evolution of three functionally specialized disgust 
domains that operate to solve three qualitatively different adaptive challenges: pathogen 
avoidance, mate choice, and social interaction.  
 
(a) Pathogen disgust: This type of disgust functions as a first-line of defense 
against objects that are likely to transmit disease (e.g., dead bodies, rotting 
foods, and bodily fluids such as feces, phlegm, vomit, blood, semen, etc.) or 
objects that resemble the source of disease, such as the stimuli that emit the 
same sensorial cues that are associated with pathogen presence (even if they 
are not infectious in any way)  
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(b) Sexual disgust: This type of disgust evolved as a response to the adaptive 
problem of avoiding sexual partners and behaviors that would impose net 
reproductive fitness costs. Sexual disgust requires a set of categorizations 
and decision rules to assess mate suitability (e.g., avoid unattractive features 
in a potential mate or avoid one´s close kin as mating partners).  
 
(c) Moral disgust: The fact that people kill, denigrate, rape, free ride, or perform 
socio-moral transgressions such as cheating, lying, or stealing implies a 
potential danger to the stability of cooperative relationships and group 
cohesion. As a result, this domain of disgust functions to motivate avoidance 
of individuals who inflict social costs at the individual and group level.  
 
1.3.2.3.3 Primary and complex disgust (Marziller & Davey, 2004) 
Based on Izzard’s (1972) perspective of emotions, these authors argue that 
emotions rarely appear on their own and we often experience “blends” of emotions. 
According to Marziller and Davey, the functional heterogeneity of disgust can be better 
explained in terms of the discreteness of the disgust experience. Thus, they argue that 
there is a main distinction between elicitors that generate exclusively disgust and 
elicitors that trigger a blend of disgust with other negative emotions.  
 
(a) Primary disgust: This emotional experience is the disgust reaction per se. 
Elicitors of primary disgust include objects of animal origin (e.g., animals, 
their parts and their products) that generate fear of oral incorporation. This 
type of disgust is suggested to function as a disease avoidance response 
(items that elicit primary disgust are disease vectors or can be associated 
with disease transmission) and because of the biological importance of its 
function, it is suggested to be universal.  
 
(b) Complex disgust: The experience of complex disgust is a multi-emotional 
negative experience. Elicitors of this type of disgust not only elicit disgust 
(although it seems to be the dominant emotion) but also high levels of other 
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negative emotions (e.g., fear, sadness, contempt, and anger). Complex 
disgust has been extended into the social domain as a means of instilling 
certain objects, individuals, and activities with negative affect. Thus, its 
immediate function appears to be informative, that is, to transmit evaluative 
and affective information about a social elicitor. Due to its sophisticated 
function, complex disgust is suggested to be highly variable and culturally 
dependent.  
 
Needless to say, these taxonomies reveal parallelisms and divergences. First, the 
three proposals admit the validity of a type of disgust associated with pathogens and 
diseases. However, Tybur et al. (2009) understands that there is no need for an 
independent “animal nature” disgust domain because it can be better explained in terms 
of pathogen avoidance. They point out that both “core” and “animal nature” domains of 
the DS have in common a variety of disease-related elicitors. Thus, from their 
perspective, “core disgust” and “animal nature disgust” can be more parsimoniously 
explained as pathogen disgust.  
 
The second major point of debate is the characterization of moral disgust. 
Although there is agreement that disgust (pure or “blended”) has a moral function, the 
qualitative nature of the emotional response and their elicitors seems less clear. Thus, 
Marzillier and Davey (2004) understand moral disgust as a “blended” negative emotion, 
which implies a theoretical distinction from the DS and the TDDS. Moreover, whereas 
the DS argues that moral disgust is only about behaviors that reveal cruelty or 
dehumanization, in the TDDS, the moral disgust domain is constituted by standard 
moral violations (e.g., stealing, cheating, and lying).22  
 
Furthermore, there is an alternative approach to the nature of moral disgust. For 
instance, Royzman and Sabini (2001) believe that the function of disgust in the moral 
domain is very much metaphorical, and that “moral” disgust elicitors are really anger 
                                                 
22 Chapman, Kim, Susskind, and Anderson (2009) found that moral violations activate the levator labii 
muscle of the face, associated with the facial expression of disgust. However, their moral items—like in 
Tybur et al.— are standard moral violations (e.g, stealing, cheating, and lying). However, Rozin, Lowery, 
Imada, and Haidt (1999) found evidence that suggests a link between violations of this type—individual 
rights—and the emotion of anger.
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
elicitors described with the vocabulary of disgust for greater rhetorical effects. Nabi 
(2002) also suggests that there is a difference between the theoretical and the lay 
meaning of disgust, and that the lay understanding of the word “disgust” is actually a 
combination of disgust and anger.  
 
Likewise, Lee and Ellsworth (in press) found that moral disgust and anger are 
characterized by a constellation of common features—the attribution of agency, the 
violation of social norm, the presence of judgment, and the behavioral tendency to 
approach and punish. This is not the case of physical disgust, which shares attributes 
with fear (no value-laden judgment, a sense of weakness/submissiveness, and the 
behavioral tendency to avoid). In a similar vein, Moll et al. (2005) argued that the moral 
dimension of disgust should be understood as a moral emotion (indignation) affiliated 
with disgust (rather than a variant of disgust). Interestingly, they found that disgust and 
indignation activated both distinct and overlapping brain areas.  
 
Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that disgust and anger are elicited by 
different cues of moral situations: whereas anger is associated with the perception of 
harm and intentionality, disgust is typically triggered by bodily norm violations (Russell 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, 2011b). Likewise, Paul Bloom (2004) believes that, although 
disgust is involved in some moral judgments, these judgments are always related to 
physical things rather than more abstract topics. In addition, this perspective is shared 
by Oaten and colleagues (2009), who argue that some moral violations are perceived as 
disgusting because they activate representations of primary disgust.  
 
 
1.3.3. The moral dimension of disgust  
 
 
1.3.3.1. The role of disgust in cultural notions about purity and contamination  
 
As reviewed above, a variety of evidence suggests that there is something about 
disgust that makes this emotion such a leading actor in everyday moral life. This 
extension of disgust from an “oral” to a “moral” emotion seems to be a ubiquitous 
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feature across cultures, and it appears to be persistent in widespread ideas of purity and 
pollution. For example, in ancient Greece, the condition of miasma—which involves a 
distancing from the divinity—is suggested to share important parallelisms with the 
concept of disgust (Parker, 1983). Whether literal or metaphorical, the association 
between physical and spiritual pollution is also recurrent in the Hebrew Bible. In 
ancient Israel, corpses were viewed as a source of ritual impurity, and priests were 
expected to limit their contact with them (Leviticus.21:1-4). Zoroastrians were also 
concerned about the impurity of corpses and developed a number of measures in the 
process of caring for corpses in order to minimize the spread of impurity: the pairing of 
corpse-bearers, special dress, and the presence of a dog (Boyce, 1975). Likewise, the 
Bedouin consider men and only postmenopausal women to be pure23.  
 
Disgust appears to function very well to define boundaries in the social world. In 
the words of William Ian Miller, “Disgust (…) paints the world in a particular way.” 
(Miller, 1997, p.18). For Miller, disgust is a social and moral feeling that makes social 
ordering possible by ranking people and objects in a sort of cosmic order. According to 
Miller (1997), the phenomenology of disgust makes this emotion competent to police 
the boundaries of the self, the sacred and the profane, the violable and the inviolable, or 
in-group and out-group relationships. Likewise, Douglas’ (1966) symbolic approach to 
the role of purity and pollution in culture suggests that things that are anomalous, 
ambiguous, or deviant within a given category are experienced as polluting.  
 
In any case, the influence of disgust in different cosmovisions is still in force. 
For instance, many ideas and behaviors involving hygiene and food choice are regarded 
as personal issues in the United States, but as moral subjects among many Hindu 
Indians (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). Even in modern western culture, Haidt, 
Koller and Dias (1993) found that disgusting but harmless actions were judged as moral 
violations by people in the lower social classes from Brazil and United States, whereas 
                                                 
23 “The religious basis of the purity/impurity distinction and the intensity of feelings on this subject were 
vividly exposed when I unthinkingly threw an item of women´s clothing into a washtub of men´s 
clothing. The women gasped and rushed to remove the item, scolding me for mixing men´s and women´s 
clothing. They told me that women were unclean, and that their clothes and children´s clothes were 
washed separately from those of men and of postmenopausal women (whose clothing—other than 
underwear— could be washed with men´s)” (Abu-Lughod, 1986, p.131). 
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students from high socioeconomic status in the U.S judged these actions to be a matter 
of social convention or personal preference. 
 
Thus, it has been suggested that some cultures are especially sensitive to purity 
concerns in their elaboration of moral systems. Shweder, Much, Mahaptra, and Park 
(1997) claim that there are three groups of ethics underlying moral systems. Whether 
the moral system resembles a particular group of ethic depends on the different 
conceptualizations of the person. Thus, the ethics of community is based in an 
interdependent conception of the individual as a member of a group and emphasizes 
community/hierarchy violations. The ethics of autonomy are based on an individual 
conception of the self and are especially sensitive to individual rights and freedom. 
Finally, the ethics of divinity conceives persons as divine creatures who bear a bit of 
God within. Further, Rozin et al. (1999) suggested that, across cultures, violations of 
these three ethics typically elicit three moral emotions: contempt, anger, and disgust, 
respectively. 24  
 
In particular, the ethics of divinity—or the “purity” domain (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004)—are articulated around the emotion of disgust, which appears to make people 
feel that some behaviors and beliefs are higher, more spiritual, and less carnal than 
others. In the same way that disgust guards the “temple of the body” (Haidt et al., 
1997), the moral domain of purity involves values and principles directed at protecting 
the sanctity not only of the body, but even primarily, the sanctity of the soul. In a purity-
based morality, people should strive to live in a divine, sacred way.25 Thus, from a 
purity perspective, it is virtuous to be clean, chaste, to reject contaminating entities or 
hedonistic pleasure, to cleanse the soul, and to act in accordance with the “natural 
order” of things. It is immoral to behave in a way that is self-polluting, filthy, profane, 
carnal, hedonistic, unnatural, animal-like, or ungodly; in other words, every behavior 
that causes the degradation and spiritual defilement of an individual is immoral26 (Haidt 
& Joseph, 2007; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999).  
                                                 
24 As mentioned in the review of the Moral Foundations Theory (1.2.2.2.3), Shweder´s ethics of divinity 
was the theoretical basis for the moral domain of purity/sanctity.  
25 It does not require, however, the belief in a deity (Haidt, 2006).  
26 “Cleanliness is next to godliness.” 
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In the industrialized world, the realm of the morally disgusting is also 
remarkably variable. For instance, when U.S. and Japanese participants were asked to 
name acts eliciting disgust, most of the mentioned acts were moral offenses (70 and 
61% respectively, from Haidt et al., 1997). But the particular things that elicited moral 
disgust in the two groups were indeed different. Students from Chicago named acts of 
senseless violence or cruelty, especially toward weak or defenseless people (e.g., 
genocides, mass murders), and ugly or offensive beliefs and attitudes (e.g., racism). 
Students from Hiroshima reported feeling ken'o (disgust) in everyday social interactions 
when people—or they themselves— failed to satisfy their needs, or when other people 
abused or shamed them (e.g., “When I did not find my name on the board where the 
names of the people who passed the entrance exam are posted," or “when punks tried to 
pick a quarrel with me.").  
 
 
1.3.3.2. On the interplay between disgust and moral judgments 
 
The particular connection between disgust and morality has raised a debate 
about its normative implications. One theoretical position is that disgust cannot be 
considered a reliable source of information about the wrongness of an action. For 
example, Nussbaum (2004) understands that disgust cannot interfere with the legal 
system. From her perspective, disgust sometimes serves as the primary or sole reason 
for making some acts illegal, such as the consideration of some materials as obscene or 
in debates over gay marriage. Moreover, she points out that disgust has been used as an 
aggravating factor applicable to already illegal acts. Thus, judges or juries can feel 
disgust when gory or bloody aspects of a murder are described vividly, which eventually 
can bias the final verdict.  
 
On the other hand, disgust has been proposed to serve as a supra-rational source 
of information, a sort of innate wisdom that can guide human behavior in some 
ambiguous situations. According to Kass (1997), revulsion toward the prospect of 
human cloning might be seriously considered at the moment of legislating cloning 
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issues. For Kass, disgust embodies a wise repugnance to evil, which cannot be 
dismissed.  
 
Nevertheless, the validity of disgust as a trusty moral guide seems to be at least 
questionable. As mentioned above, disgust is an emotion of extraordinary inclusiveness; 
it is susceptible to be triggered by cues that are perceived as a source of disease or 
degradation even in the absence of any real threat. Thus, it has been suggested that, 
when the feeling of disgust is attributed to a social topic, it is imbued with defective 
moral status.27 For Miller (1997), disgust as a social emotion often involves a moral 
judgment that operates rather like an aesthetic judgment. In his words: “Disgust makes 
beauty and ugliness a matter of morals” (p. 200), because it is the means by which we 
feel the bad and the ugly. Yet, when it is applied to moral issues, disgust is not 
experienced as simple aversion: it has the capacity to degrade its object in some moral 
way28.  For Miller (1997),  
 
“Disgust evaluates (negatively) what it touches; proclaim the meanness 
and inferiority of its object. And by so doing, it presents a nervous claim of 
right to be free of the dangers imposed by the proximity of the inferior.” 
(Miller, 1997, p. 9) 
 
 
According to this perspective, the feeling of disgust can eventually confirm the 
moral wrongness of its object. Thus, disgust appears to provide reasons for 
withdrawing. For example, Miller (1997) claims that disgust motivates the construction 
of justifications in order to make stigmatized people blamable.29 Further, he concludes 
that sickness is often perceived as a punishable offense: both mundane illnesses and 
AIDS are blamable as failures to take care of oneself appropriately.  
 
                                                 
27 For Miller (1997), disgust and contempt “assert a superior rank against their objects”. 
28 For example, “When we respond to a homeless person with disgust, we avoid considering the person’s 
mind,” says Fiske. “We treat the person as equivalent to a pile of garbage” (Jones, 2007). 
29 In his historical analysis of high Middle Age Europe, he found that physical disgust toward lepers led to 
a belief in their moral loathsomeness. On the reverse side of the coin, Jews’ assumed moral 
loathsomeness led to a belief that their bodies must be as disfigured as their souls, so they were associated 
with excrement and menstrual blood. 
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Interestingly, various studies suggest that there is an interdependent causal nexus 
between disgust and moral judgments. For instance, there is evidence supporting that 
people use their feelings of disgust as embodied information about social events. Thus, 
some studies suggest that incidental disgust can lead to more negative attitudes toward 
an entire social group. It has been shown that disgust induced by pictures and 
autobiographical writing increased implicit bias against homosexuals, but anger did not; 
whereas anger exclusively increased bias against Arabs (Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, 
& Hunsinger, 2009). Similarly, Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom (2011) found that participants 
who were exposed to a noxious ambient odor reported more negative evaluations of gay 
men.30  
 
In particular, the more prevalent claim in research on disgust and morality is that 
disgust increases the severity of moral judgments. Thus, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) 
hypnotized participants to feel a flash of disgust whenever they saw an arbitrary word in 
the context of a moral story. They found that when participants encountered the 
arbitrary word in the story, they reported higher disgust and greater condemnation of the 
moral violation. In the same line, Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) found that 
the feeling of disgust, even when it is extraneous to the action being judged, can shape 
moral judgments by making them more severe in people with high sensitivity to their 
own visceral reactions.31  
 
Horberg, Keltner, Oveis, and Cohen (2009) found that disgust, but not other 
negative emotions (e.g., anger and sadness), predicted stronger moral condemnation of 
behavior violating the purity domain, but not the moral domains of harm/care or justice. 
Likewise, Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011) found that gustatory disgust influenced 
moral judgments by making them more severe. In their study, participants evaluated a 
variety of moral transgressions after consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or 
water. Thus, participants in the “bitter” condition (who reported feeling disgust) made 
harsher moral judgments. In a different experimental paradigm, Moretti and di 
                                                 
30 Unlike Dasgupta et al. (2009), they found no effect of incidental disgust on participants’ implicit 
evaluations of gay men.  
31  This effect is not limited to “disgusting” moral dilemmas. Nor is it broad enough to influence non-
moral judgments.  
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Pellegrino (2010) found that, relative to sadness, induced disgust increased rejection 
rates of unfair offers32.  
 
It seems that the reverse of this pattern also mediates moral cognition. Thus, a 
growing body of research suggests that we think about morality in terms of cleanliness; 
in particular, moral violations are experienced as dirty and elicit the desire to cleanse. 
For instance, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that, when people think about a past 
immoral action they displayed a greater desire for cleansing products, and increased 
mental accessibility of cleansing-related concepts, and a greater likelihood of using 
antiseptic wipes. Likewise, they found evidence suggesting that physical cleansing 
reduced the upsetting consequences of immoral behavior. 
 
Similarly, Ritter and Preston (2011) found that disgust towards rejected religious 
beliefs was eliminated when participants were allowed to wash their hands. 
Furthermore, this embodied relationship may be indeed specific. Lee and Schwarz 
(2010) found that participants who had to lie orally (“dirty mouth” condition) preferred 
mouthwash over hand-sanitizer, whereas those who typed the same lie with their hands 
preferred the hand-sanitizer. Finally, Linkenquist, Zhong, and Galinsky (2011) found 
that clean scents (induced by a spray of citrus-scented Windex) promote reciprocity and 
charity. Interestingly, in their study, perceived cleanliness did not differ by condition nor 
did it correlate with the effect, which suggests that its influence was unconscious.  
 
In addition, Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) found evidence supporting that 
the cognitive concept of cleanliness and the sensation of physical cleanliness can make 
moral judgments less severe. However, it seems that when the cleanliness prime 
implicates the self, feeling clean enhances moral self-perception and can, in turn, license 
harsher moral judgments (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2010).  
 
These studies suggest that there is an implicit psychological link between 
physical dirt and immorality. Nevertheless, David and Olatunji (2011) found evidence 
that questions the reliability of disgust as an amplifier of moral judgments. In their 
                                                 
32 For a contradictory finding, see Bonini, Hadjichristidis, Mazzoco, Demettè, Zampini, Magon and 
Sbarbati (2011).  
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study, participants were asked to rate some moral transgressions that either contained a 
disgust-conditioned word or a neutral word. They found that transgressions containing 
the conditioned disgust elicitor were perceived as more disgusting, but not more morally 
wrong than transgressions containing the neutral word. Likewise, Olatunji, David, and 
Ciesielski (2012) found that disgust experienced specifically toward the self predicts 
less disgust and lower punishment ratings of severe offenses, a finding that reinforces 
the researchers’ suspicion that the influence of disgust in moral judgments is more 
complex than previously assumed.  
 
 
 
1.4 THE INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL AFFECTIVE VARIABLES IN SOCIAL 
EVALUATIONS 
 
 
1.4.1 The influence of meta-cognitive experiences in evaluations  
 
Several cognitive psychologists have argued that we use information from our 
own affective and cognitive phenomenology to learn about what we prefer, like, or 
behave. For Wilson (2004), our conscious mind is only the tip of the iceberg in deciding 
how we deal with complex cognitive problems, to the point that we are, in many ways, 
“strangers to ourselves.” In fact, an enormous amount of research shows that people’s 
evaluations of stimuli are influenced by elementary perceptual and affective 
mechanisms.  
 
For example, we might perceive letter “A” as being closer to letter “B” than to 
letter “Z.” If so, it is also possible that we perceive that “A” somehow shares a deeper 
connection with “B” than with “Z.” Gestalt psychology explains this perceptual trick 
through the principle of contiguity: The stimuli that are perceived in spatial or temporal 
proximity are experienced as connected. Furthermore, the closer together these stimuli 
are perceived, the stronger the link between them (Heider, 1958). This principle appears 
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to remain operative at more sophisticated cognitive levels, like in situations when we 
attribute our cognitive responses as being about stimuli perceived in temporal 
contiguity. Higgins’ (1998) research accounts for this phenomenon, proposing that there 
is an “aboutness” principle mediating our implicit cognition: People do not interpret 
their cognitive responses as being accidental; in contrast, their responses are understood 
as being “about” something, and this “something” is inferred to be the cause of the 
cognitive response.  
 
Consequently, cognitive responses are commonly perceived as informative in 
their own right. For instance, if a person experiences fear, the cognitive evaluation 
(appraisal) of this emotion will be attributed as being about “something” and that 
“something” will be understood to be the cause of the fearful response (Higgins, 1998). 
Likewise, when people experience unexplained arousal, they will seek the best available 
explanation, and salient aspects in the current situation can be used to explain the bodily 
response. Thus, Schachter and Singer (1962) found that participants may interpret any 
ambiguous arousal (e.g., from an injection of epinephrine) as happiness or anger 
depending on the available contextual cues.  
 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) suggest that introspective access to our own 
sophisticated cognitive processes is virtually impossible because we are not prepared to 
cope with all the stimuli that influence our cognitive responses. Indeed, people are 
frequently unaware of the real variables influencing their evaluations. With regard to 
this issue, one line of studies examines how preferences reflect the ease with which 
information comes to mind. Based on the aesthetics theory, researchers noted that 
people can like stimuli not only because of their content but also because they are “easy 
on the eyes” as a result of their particular features (Tatarkiewicz, 1970).  
 
In this context, people’s evaluations appear to be especially susceptible to the 
influence of meta-cognitive factors. Thus, human reasoning is accompanied by meta-
cognitive experiences that function as subjective information, influencing people’s 
“objective” evaluations. There is evidence showing that the subjective ease or difficulty 
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with which information is processed (processing fluency) can be informative in its own 
right. 
 
For example, a certain argument is more persuasive when it is perceived as easy 
to remember (Wänke & Bless, 2000). The easy with which an argument is remembered 
is proportional to the trust in its content (Haddock, Rothman, & Schwarz, 1996). 
Likewise, Reber and Schwarts (1999) found that the same statements were endorsed as 
more true when presented in highly visible colors, suggesting that perceptual fluency 
increases judgments of truth. McGlone and Tofighbakhsh (2000) found that rhyme 
affords statements an enhancement in processing fluency, which can be misattributed to 
heightened conviction about their truthfulness. Interestingly, there is also evidence 
showing that discrepancies in processing fluency influence the perceived wrongness of 
moral violations. Specifically, Laham, Alter, and Goodwin (2009) found that 
participants rated moral violations that were processed with discrepant fluency as less 
morally wrong than processes with discrepant disfluency.  
 
 
1.4.2. The influence of incidental affective experiences in evaluations  
 
 
The current state of research suggests that there is a positive correlation between 
the ease of information processing and preference for its content. For instance, the 
perceptual fluency-preference link was complemented by research into the “mere-
exposure effect” (Zajonc, 1968), which is the observation that repeated exposure to an 
initially neutral stimulus facilitates its processing and also enhances liking for that 
stimulus. Thus, the fact that an increase in processing fluency results in more positive 
evaluations—instead of increasing the extremity of judgments in both directions—
suggests that some meta-cognitive experiences may be hedonically marked. In other 
words, the ease of processing elicits a positive affective response that influences 
subsequent evaluations (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, Schwarz, 
Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).  
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In experimental psychology, this particularity has been accounted for as a part of 
the phenomenon of cognitive misattribution, in which people mistake an effect of one 
source for the effect of another. Typically, people misattribute their responses to a 
stimulus perceived above the awareness threshold instead of to a stimulus perceived 
below the awareness threshold. Following Higgins’ (1998) approach, it might be argued 
that the affective response elicited by the meta-cognitive experience (such as the ease of 
processing) is perceived as being about the target-object. In such situations, people 
might use their affective responses to form their evaluations and judgments, even when 
these affective responses are incidental, that is, are not elicited by properties of the 
target-object.  
 
Schwarz and Clore (1983) developed the “affect-as-information” approach to 
explain this cognitive phenomenon. According to this perspective, affective feelings can 
influence cognition by providing evaluative information about the momentary status of 
objects and situations. Thus, people use their affective responses as “embodied 
information” about a certain event. Given that feelings tend to take as their object 
whatever is on one’s mind at the time they are experienced, people often rely on their 
feelings at the moment of forming a judgment because, in those situations, feelings are 
perceived as just another available criterion relevant to the judgment. In short, people 
rely on their feelings as if they were asking themselves: How do I feel about it? 
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007).  
 
According to this perspective, feelings are a source of information in their own 
right. For instance, the fact that sometimes people find it difficult to distinguish integral 
feelings—elicited by the perceived target—from incidental feelings—which happen to 
be present at the time—is an important feature of this phenomenon. Thus, mood-
congruent judgments arise because people misread incidental moods (such as “I feel 
happy”) as a part of their perceived affective reaction to the target (“then, it must be 
good”). In other words, people misread incidental moods as integral moods. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the influence of incidental affective 
responses on evaluations depends on diverse variables. Schwarz and Clore (1983) think 
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that the influence is only operative when the affective response is perceived as relevant 
for the evaluative task. Thus, if the influence is perceived as irrelevant, it will not exert 
any influence on subsequent evaluations (Higgins, 1998; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
Following this line of reasoning, some authors argue that people use their incidental 
affective reactions when they lack both the ability and the motivation to “think” about 
the task requirements (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Petty, Schumann, Richman, & 
Strathman, 1993). Other authors sustain a different position in which incidental affects 
influence evaluations in those situations when people exert moderate amounts of 
thought, because in such situations, they identify their affective reactions as potential 
criteria but fail to discount them as irrelevant (Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003).  
 
Moreover, there is a variety of evidence suggesting that the influence of 
incidental affective responses on evaluations is not restricted to mood-based effects. For 
instance, in Section 1.3.3.2, we reviewed diverse studies on the influence of feelings of 
disgust and cleanliness on the severity of moral judgments. Because this theme is 
central for the present research, we will address this issue in more detail in the General 
Discussions.  
 
 
1.4.3 The affective priming experimental paradigm as a technique of affective 
induction  
 
 
In the previous section, we pointed out the fact that people are not prepared to 
cope with all the stimuli influencing their cognitive responses (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). 
This finding especially matches research on the automaticity of social cognition. In 
Section (1.2.2), it was mentioned that the idea of automatic stimulus evaluation is one of 
the fundamental tenets of several modern cognitive theories. Thus, it is argued that 
automatic stimulus evaluation occurs at a very early stage in information processing and 
that the process is fast, unintentional, efficient, and occurring outside of awareness 
(Öhman, 1987). Interestingly, the concept of automaticity has certainly proved to be 
relevant in research on emotions and evaluations. Different studies show that emotional 
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information processing is initiated and can proceed without conscious awareness 
(Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998). Relative to non-emotional stimuli, there is an 
attentional bias for processing emotional stimuli (Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008). 
Furthermore, negative stimuli appear more salient and can evoke stronger responses and 
brain activation than neutral stimuli when presented outside of awareness (Le Doux, 
1996; Liddell, Williams, Rathjen, Shevrin, & Gordon, 2004).  
 
The fact that the influence of incidental affects on evaluations appears to be 
largely automatic and that we are often not aware of the underlying processes mediating 
our evaluations has favored affective priming as a popular research topic and a major 
experimental tool in modern cognitive psychology. Indeed, affective priming appears to 
be based on a relatively unconditional process, which can be understood as automatic, 
in the sense that it is relatively efficient and might occur independently of evaluative 
intention and of awareness of the affective stimulus (Hermans, Houwer, & Eelen, 2001). 
Thus, priming can be described as the impact of activated knowledge structures on 
subsequent reactions (Fiedler, 2003). In this experimental paradigm, participants are 
requested to evaluate very quickly an object (target), which is typically preceded by an 
affective stimulus (prime). For instance, in the typical affective prime task, it is 
expected that processing of an evaluative polarized target (e.g., the word “love”) is 
processed faster and more accurately when it is preceded by an evaluatively consistent 
prime (“sunshine”) (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Klauer & Mush, 
2003).  
 
The priming paradigm has been adapted to evaluative judgment research in 
several experiments33. For example, mood priming was shown to influence evaluative 
judgments (Forgas, 1991). Priming of positive and negative words consistently 
influenced the evaluation of ambiguous targets (Ferguson, Bargh, & Nayak, 2005). 
Words related to social cooperation enhanced cooperation in dilemma games (Neuberg, 
1988). Subliminal exposure to primes of threatening images increased avoidance (Wyer 
& Calvini, 2011). Priming the African American stereotype was shown to increase 
participants’ hostility to a request of the experimenter (Barg, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). 
                                                 
33 For a review on priming on evaluative judgment research, see Fiedler (2003).  
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Priming with adjectives related to morality made individuals behave more cooperatively 
in a dilemma game34 (Hertel & Fiedler, 1994).  
 
Finally, studies on consumer psychology showed that goal priming succeeded in 
eliciting behaviors related to those goals (Bargh, 1992; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 
2002). For instance, subliminally priming a behavioral concept and linking it to positive 
affect motivated need-related consumer behaviors (Veltkamp, Custer, & Aarts, 2011) 
and positively influenced the assessment of a persuasive message (Légal, Chappé, 
Coiffard, & Villard-Forest, 2012). Likewise, it seems that brand exposure elicits 
automatic behavioral responses, as does exposure to social primes. Fitzsimons, 
Chartrand, and Fitzsimons (2008) found that participants primed with Apple and Disney 
logos behave more creatively and honestly than participants primed with IBM and E! 
logos, respectively.  
 
It is noteworthy that various studies on affective priming have revealed the 
complexity of this process. For instance, Murphy and Zajonc (1993) compared the 
effects of “cognitive” and “affective” primes on neutral targets and found that using a 
suboptimal exposure time (4ms), only the affective prime influenced evaluations. 
Interestingly, when the exposure time was longer (1000ms) and optimally perceived, 
only the cognitive primes influenced participants’ evaluations. In particular, they found 
that participants preferred and judged as more positive the targets (Chinese ideograms) 
that were preceded by a positive suboptimal prime; conversely, a negative suboptimal 
prime decreased the ratings of the targets. This pattern of evaluation is known in 
priming literature as the assimilation effect, which can be described as making positive 
judgments after positive priming and vice versa. Conversely, contrast effects appear 
when negative judgments are preceded by positive priming and vice versa. That is, 
contrast effects results when there is affective incongruence between the valence of the 
prime and the direction of the judgment (Fiedler, 2003).  
 
In the context of evaluative judgment, these vicissitudes imply that the particular 
                                                 
34 Interestingly, it seems that priming by words related to morality reduces cooperative behavior among 
certain individuals oriented toward maximizing individual outcomes (Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, 
Corneille & Yzerbyt, 2003).  
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effect of affective priming on social judgments depends on subtle manipulations. For 
instance, Murphy and Zajonc’s (1993) results have been explained in terms of the 
degree of consciousness with which participants perceived the extraneous influence 
(prime)35. Thus, Petty and Wegener (1998) and Schwarz and Clore (1996) argue that the 
stimuli that are perceived visibly or consciously do not influence judgments because 
they are discounted as irrelevant for the target task. This response would not take place 
in the case of subliminal affective stimuli because participants would not be able to 
discount them as irrelevant and interpret them as information relevant to the judgment 
of the target36.  
 
Additionally, in large part due to the conceptual complexity surrounding these 
issues, Stapel, Koomen and Ruys (2002) propose an alternative explanation to the 
pattern observed in Murphy and Zajonc’s (1993) findings. According to their 
perspective, the effects of (affect-laden) information may be diametrically opposite 
(assimilative vs. contrastive), depending on how many milliseconds have ticked by. 
Thus, the effect of a certain affect-laden stimulus on the evaluative judgments of neutral 
target stimuli may be contrastive as well as assimilative. Supporting their hypothesis, 
they found that when affective primes were perceived during extremely short exposure 
times (30ms), they generated assimilation effects on judgments of the target. 
Conversely, when prime exposure was longer (100ms), these authors found evidence of 
a contrast effect.  
 
For Stapel et al. (2002), this pattern of results can be explained in terms of a 
difference in the perceived distinctiveness of the prime. According to the theory of 
affective primacy (Zajonc, 1980, 2000), the affective qualities of stimuli are processed 
more readily than are their non-affective attributes, which means that evaluative 
                                                 
35 The terminology of suboptimal and optimal, instead of subliminal and supraliminal, was adopted by 
Murphy and Zajonc (1993) because the absence of an effect on a task measuring awareness is not 
sufficient to categorically determine whether there are differences in the perceptibility of the primes 
(Rotteveel et al., 2001). Thus, when determining whether a stimulus has been subliminally processed, the 
conclusion may specifically depend on which test of perceptual sensitivity is employed (Maxwell & 
Davidson, 2004).  
36 Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz (1997) found that subliminal affective priming resists attributional 
interventions. They found shifts in judgments of neutral targets as a result of affective primes even when 
participants were aware that their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgment at hand. Because 
participants’ judgments did not show the predicted pattern of discounting and augmentation, these results 
do not support the form of affective influence that is explained by the affect-as-information approach.  
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information is picked up prior to non-evaluative information. Moreover, a crucial 
difference between early and late reactions to affective stimuli is that early affective 
reactions are diffuse and unspecified because they are not cognitively appraised. For 
instance, Paulmann and Pell (2009) found that affective information is only accessible 
to neocortical processes within 200ms after stimulus onset. Further, they also found that 
the full semantic value of the affective stimulus (facial expression) is detected in 
approximately 400ms. 
 
Thus, Stapel and colleagues (2002) argue that when prime exposure is super-
quick, it results in assimilation, because diffuse information (e.g., an abstract construct 
such as positive/negative) is more likely to be used as an interpretation frame when 
encoding a stimulus. On the other hand, when primes are flashed for somewhat longer 
(rapid exposure time), distinct information is activated and, because this type of 
information has clear object boundaries (e.g., a sad, dark-haired woman), it is more 
likely to be used as a specific comparison standard in the construction of judgments.  
 
Further, for the occurrence of contrast effect, in addition to the distinctiveness 
criterion, some degree of categorical overlap between prime and target might be also 
necessary. This “similarity” criterion is based on the assumption that stimuli that belong 
to the same category more readily invite comparison processes than do stimuli that 
belong to dissimilar categories. Likewise, Stapel, Koomen, and van der Pligt (1997) 
found that primed friendly or hostile animals (e.g., puppy vs. shark) do not result in 
contrastive effects when people judged an ambiguous human target (friendly/hostile). 
Interestingly, priming friendly or hostile persons (e.g., Gandhi vs. Hitler) did result in 
contrastive comparison effects when participants judged the same target. Regarding this 
issue, Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1983) found that the emergence of contrast effects 
occurred after extreme exemplars were primed and ambiguous targets judged and, in 
addition, when—irrespective of the extremity of the prime—unambiguous targets were 
judged.  
 
In addition, there is evidence suggesting that priming of a social category (e.g., 
professor) led to an assimilation effect, whereas priming of a specific exemplar from the 
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category (e.g., Einstein) produced contrast (Stapel, Koomen, & van der Pligt, 1997). 
According to the authors, this finding is explained because priming of the category 
professor led participants to judge their own intellectual ability higher, resulting in the 
assimilation effect. Conversely, priming of a specific exemplar such as Einstein led 
participants to judge their own intelligence lower, resulting in the contrast effect.  
 
 
Moreover, the degree to which a prime can be perceived as “extreme” is another 
important factor influencing the direction of its effect on judgments. For example, using 
Hitler (extremely hostile) as the affective prime typically results in a contrast effect, 
whereas using Joe Frazier (moderately hostile) as the prime results in an assimilative 
response (Herr, 1986). Further, there is evidence suggesting that participants’ mindset is 
a variable mediating the effect of the priming. Thus, accessible knowledge is more 
likely to produce assimilative interpretation effects when this knowledge serves as an 
interpretation frame, whereas contrastive comparison occurs when the knowledge serves 
as a comparison standard (Stapel & Koomen, 2001) 37.  
 
Alternatively, Fiedler (2003) suggests that one should not understand 
assimilation and contrast effects as alternative outcomes of a unitary priming influence 
on judgments. They argue that the prime will presumably activate several categories 
simultaneously. For instance, when judging the intelligence of a target person, priming 
Einstein may be associated both with the target category and the comparison standard 
category. Thus, there is always assimilation (when the prime is used to construe the 
target category) and contrast (when the prime is used to construe the comparison 
standard) at the same time. From this perspective, whether the final judgment seems 
assimilative or contrastive depends on the relative strength of the two associative 
effects.  
 
                                                 
37 As Maringer and Stapel (2009) point out, divergent explanations have been offered for contrast effects 
that occur as a result of prime awareness. From their perspective, the fact that incidental information 
could be consciously perceived should not be confused with the conscious perception of its 
“contaminant” influence on evaluations. Thus, whereas awareness of the prime leads to comparison 
contrast (which occurs mainly in comparison-relevant dimensions of the target), awareness of the 
influence of the prime typically results in correction contrast (which influences several dimensions on 
which the target is judged).  
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Several studies that used the affective priming in evaluative judgments paradigm 
have confirmed the inductive potential of emotional facial expressions (Maxwell & 
Davidson, 2004). Facial expression of a certain emotion possesses the quality of an 
emotional elicitor and activates an emotional response that is similar to other stimuli of 
the same emotion (Dimberg, Thumberg, & Elmehed, 2000).38 Facial expressions appear 
to follow a similar time course involving two or three distinct stages. First, facial 
expressions activate global, valence-based, affective responses that are lately 
complemented with semantic information about the communicative message of the 
expression (Paulmann & Pell, 2009; Ruys & Stapel, 2008a). Zajonc (1980) has 
suggested that the sequence of this process is critical from an adaptationist perspective, 
because quickly detecting the affective valence of an emotional expression of an 
opponent might be crucial for survival in a tribal context.  
 
Consequently, facial expressions have proven to function as reliable affective 
primes in evaluative judgment research. For instance, Rotteveel, de Groot, Geutskens 
and Phaf (2001) replicated Murphy and Zajonc’s (1993) results and found stronger 
suboptimal than optimal affective priming (primes were happy and angry faces) 
influencing affective ratings of ideographs. Yang, Xu, Du, Shi, and Fang (2011) found 
that priming facial expressions of fear influenced immediate judgments of emotion (the 
target was a neutral face) only when participants were unaware of their presentation. 
Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger (2005) found that subliminally induced smiles 
caused thirsty participants to pour and consume more beverages and also increased their 
willingness to pay more for them. Interestingly, they also found that subliminal frowns 
had the opposite effect on participants, suggesting that affective reactions to emotional 
                                                 
38 It is noteworthy that there is also evidence suggesting that subliminal presentation of emotional faces 
can fail to elicit the emotional response. Andrews, Lipp, Mallan, and Konig (2011) requested participants 
to evaluate pleasant and unpleasant target words that were preceded by masked or unmasked emotional 
facial expressions (schematic or photographic and happy or angry). Their results fail to provide evidence 
of affective congruence between the valance of the prime and the evaluation of the target. Phillips et al. 
(2004) designed an fMRI experiment and found that unconscously perceived facial expressions of fearful 
faces (30ms) did not activate the amygdala, the brain structure thought to be integral in the processing of 
fearful responses. The same pattern was found for suboptimally perceived facial expressions of disgusted 
faces and the no-activation of the insula (a brain area that is normally activated during the experience of 
disgust). On the other hand, for the overt condition (170ms), they found evidence of amygdala activation 
to fearful faces, and insula activation to disgusted faces. Similarly, Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, and 
Ungerleider (2006), found that subliminal presentation of emotional faces does not activate the amygdala, 
results that suggest distinct neural correlates of conscious and unconscious emotion perception. 
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facial expressions may be unconscious and influence the assessment of value and 
behavior toward certain objects.  
 
In another study, Yang and Tong (2010) exposed participants to either angry or 
sad faces and found evidence for subliminal emotion-specific cognitive effects. In 
particular, participants who were in the anger condition were more likely to appraise 
negative events as caused by other people, whereas those who were in the sadness 
condition were more likely to appraise the same event as resulting from situational 
factors. In a recent study, Lee, Kang, Lee, Namkoong, and An (2011) found a stronger 
subliminal priming effect for fear compared to disgust, suggesting that there are 
important differences in priming effects within the emotions that have negative valence.  
 
In addition to facial expressions, emotion research commonly utilizes an 
alternative visual stimulus format: complex evocative pictures. The International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Ohman, & Vaiti, 1988) was developed to 
provide ratings of affect for a large set of emotionally-evocative photographs that 
include contents across a wide range of semantic categories (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008). In particular, the standardized set of IAPS pictures has been rated in terms of its 
average ability to induce subjective valence (unpleasant/pleasant) and arousal 
(calm/excited) changes. IAPS ratings have also been correlated with physiological 
measures, such as heart rate and skin conductance changes, complementing the 
subjective ratings with more objective measures.  
 
Relative to facial expressions, IAPS pictures are known to have some 
particularities. For instance, although IAPS pictures and facial expressions both activate 
some similar brain structures (such as the amygdala, posterior hippocampus, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and visual cortex), there are some subjective differences 
in the processing of both types of stimuli. Thus, there is evidence suggesting that 
subjective ratings of IAPS images are higher in arousal and valence when compared to 
ratings of facial expressions. For Britton, Taylor, Sudheimer, and Liberzon (2006), IAPS 
pictures may be more intense and potent than facial expressions as affective primes, 
even though facial expressions appear to be more easily identified on discrete emotion 
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labels. Moreover, with respect to novelty, facial expressions can be viewed as relatively 
unchanging stimuli, whereas IAPS pictures are perceived as more complex and novel, 
which seems to reduce habituation effects compared to facial expressions. Finally, 
exposure to IAPS pictures is typically accompanied by higher reaction times than 
exposure to expressive faces, which suggests that evocative pictures might be processed 
more slowly than facial expressions.  
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2.1 STUDY 1 
 
 
In sections (1.4.2) and (1.4.3), we reviewed various studies on the automaticity 
of social judgments. Coherently, in the emergent science of moral psychology, a strong 
case is made that most moral judgments are the result of automatic processes. In 
particular, moral judgments appear to be quite flexible, being sensitive to influences 
from a set of situational (Greene, 2001), perceptual (Laham et al., 2009), and personal 
(Bartels, 2008; Inbar et al., 2009) variables which might be evaluated through some 
evolved psychological intuitions (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and/or maybe 
even unconscious principles (Hauser, 2006, Mikhail, 2007). Therefore, recent studies 
suggest that moral judgments can be influenced by incidental factors. As reviewed in 
(1.3.3.2), research on the incidental influence on moral judgments have found new 
possibilities through the study of disgust, taking advantage of what appears to be a 
special relationship between this emotion and the moral domain (Chapman et al., 2009; 
Haidt et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 2000). 
 
 In sum, current evidence suggests that affective responses triggered by 
incidental variables can shape moral judgments. In particular, studies on this topic 
showed that disgust exerts a special influence on moral judgments by making them 
more severe (Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). However, the nature 
of the causal relationship between disgust and moral judgment remains unclear. For 
instance, in Wheatley and Haidt (2005), a striking finding was that induced disgust 
increased the perceived wrongness of a non-moral story. Then, it cannot be concluded 
from this study that disgust influences only moral judgments; instead, it is much more 
accurate to conclude that disgust has a “moralizing” effect (it helps to turn a neutral 
behavior into a moral issue). In addition, even though Schnall, Haidt et al.’s (2008) 
finding (“disgust makes moral judgments more severe) was restricted to moral 
situations, their effect was also restricted to participants who were highly sensitive to 
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their internal physical reactions, which leaves open the possibility that their effect is 
mediated by participants’ oversensitivity.  
 
Hence, the possibility that certain induction paradigms are more likely to 
influence perceived immorality has been suggested by David and Olatunji (2011). They 
found that the level of disgust induced via evaluative conditioning increased the disgust 
ratings of transgressions, but did not influence the perceived wrongness of the same 
actions. Thus, whether disgust exerts a domain-specific influence on moral judgments is 
still an empirical question. In addition, whether different types of disgust inductions will 
influence moral judgments in the same direction is an open question. The present 
studies are designed primarily to answer these two questions. We hypothesize that 
incidental disgust will influence only moral judgments and that the direction of this 
influence will be in the same line as the one observed in previous research (disgust 
increases the severity of moral judgments).  
 
The present research introduces two methodological innovations. First, none of 
the previous studies has examined the influence of disgust on moral judgments through 
the experimental paradigm of affective priming. Although affective priming has been 
successfully applied to an enormous amount of studies (Fiedler, 2003) this technique 
has never been applied to moral experiments39. Second, in order to evaluate whether 
moral and non-moral dilemmas differ in their affective dimensions, we introduced the 
Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980; Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985) to measure 
participants’ subjective ratings. This datum was crucial to complement the explanation 
of priming effects because the affective neutrality of the target plays a role in the final 
effect of the primes (see 1.4.3). To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to look for 
intrinsically dimensional differences between the two types of dilemmas.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39  As mentioned in (1.4.3), in the affective priming paradigm, it is typically expected that the 
affective nature of the prime (e.g., a happy face) will alter the subject’s evaluation of the target 
stimulus (e.g., a moral dilemma). Primes are normally presented for very short times, thus their 
influence is understood to be largely automatic. 
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2.1.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
 
 
To address these considerations, a first experiment was designed to meet the 
following specific objectives: 
 
a) To test whether incidental disgust induced through affective priming influences 
participants’ moral judgments. It was predicted that the effects of incidental disgust are 
specific to moral judgments and, therefore, would not influence non-moral dilemmas.  
 
b) To test whether affective priming by disgust influences moral judgments by 
making them more severe. Based on previous studies on this topic, it was predicted that 
incidental disgust would shift moral judgments toward the negative pole.  
 
c) To test whether affective priming by disgust influences the moral judgments that 
a particular participant makes about a particular situation. Because there were no 
references to affective influences on moral judgments at an intra-subject level in the 
literature, we made no specific prediction on this test.  
 
 
2.1.2. Method 
 
2.1.2.1. Pilot Study 
 
2.1.2.1.1 Participants 
 
First, a pilot study was designed to determine which pairs of dilemmas present a 
higher correlation in their scoring. For this purpose, we designed a paradigm in which 
56 participants (13 males) were asked to evaluate a set of dilemmas. A majority of 
participants (45) were Psychology students who were invited to join the experiment as a 
part of their practice credits.  
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2.1.2.1.2. Material and stimuli 
 
The complete set of dilemmas comprised 30 pairs of moral dilemmas (in total, 60) 
and 30 pairs of non-moral dilemmas (in total, 60). Although most of these dilemmas 
were the author´s creations, some moral dilemmas were modified on the basis of 
previously formulated dilemmas.40 A version of Direct RTv2006 was used to register 
participants´ scores. We used twenty computers with Windows XP Professional V2000, 
with an Intel processor (R) Pentium (R) Dual CPU E 2160 @ 1.80 GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 
GB RAM.  
 
2.1.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
During five different sessions that took place in the computer room of the Guillem 
Cifre Building (Faculty of Psychology, Universitat de Les Illes Balears, UIB), 32 
participants rated 30 pairs of moral dilemmas and 24 participants rated 30 pairs of non-
moral dilemmas.  
 
Before the battery of dilemmas, we introduced four vignettes with instructions, 
followed by four vignettes with dilemmas (three of them “moral” and one of them “non-
moral”) in order to familiarize participants with the dynamic of the experiment. The 
ratings of these four dilemmas were not considered in the subsequent analysis. Both 
moral and non-moral dilemmas were presented in experimental vignettes that were 
accompanied with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 7 (perfectly OK) to 1 (completely 
wrong)41. Thus, higher ratings corresponded to more permissibility (less severity) in the 
evaluations of the vignettes. This paradigm was a self-paced task, designed so that the 
next dilemma was not presented until the subject had responded to the previous one, so 
reaction time was not measured here.  
 
                                         
                                                 
40 For experimental purposes, a moral dilemma is usually a short story about a situation involving a 
moral conflict (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). The complete set of dilemmas tested in this study is 
added at the end of this section (Appendices).   
41  The original 7-point Likert scale ranged from 7 (muy apropiado) to 1 (muy inapropiado).  
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Figure 3. Experimental paradigm for the pilot study 
 
2.1.2.1.4. Results  
 
After the pilot experiment, we selected the pairs of dilemmas with higher rating 
correlations. As a result, 27 pairs of dilemmas (a total of 54 dilemmas) made up of 15 
pairs of moral dilemmas (from r = 0.65 to r = 0.89) and 12 pairs of non-moral dilemmas 
(from r = .45 to r = .81) were selected as targets for Study 1. The numerical difference 
between the pairs of both types of dilemmas was based on the finding that only 12 of 
the non-moral pairs of dilemmas were significantly correlated.  
 
 
2.1.2.2. Main study  
 
2.1.2.2.1. Participants 
 
In the present study, we tested our hypothesis using a paradigm in which 40 
participants (15 males) rated 27 pairs of vignettes. The results of 1 participant were 
excluded from further analysis because his punctuations significantly deviated from the 
mean of the group for several factors. As in the pilot study, most of the participants were 
Psychology students (28) who were invited to join the experiment as a part of their 
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practice credits and who received a snack in the cafeteria of the Psychology building.  
 
 
2.1.2.2.2 Material and stimuli 
 
We considered as target the pairs of dilemmas that presented higher rating 
correlations. Thus, 27 pairs of dilemmas were finally selected after the pilot study (15 
pairs of moral dilemmas and 12 pairs of non-moral dilemmas; a total number of 54 
trials), following the premise that they differed in “irrelevant” characteristics42. A 
version of Direct RTv2006 was used to register participants´ scores. We used twenty 
computers Windows XP Professional V2000 with an Intel processor (R) Pentium (R) 
Dual CPU E 2160 @ 1.80 GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 GB RAM. Disgusting pictures from 
IAPS43 were used as affective primes (SOA 500ms). All disgust pictures were selected 
following the thematic pattern of mutilations, blood, and human flesh, a sub-class of 
disgust that has been referred to in the literature about disgust and morality under the 
category of “envelope violations/animal nature” disgust (Rozin et al., 2000, 2008). We 
chose a gray square to serve as neutral prime (see below). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Neutral prime 
 
                                                 
42This material was selected taking account the results previously obtained from the pilot study.  
43Lang, Ohman, & Vaiti, (1988), adapted to Spanish population by Moltó, Montañés, Poy, 
Segarra, Pastor, Tormo, Ramírez, Hernández, Sánchez, Fernández, & Vila (1999) and Vila, 
Sánchez, Ramírez, Fernández, Cobos, Rodríguez, Muñoz, Tormo, Herrero, Segarra, Pastor, 
Montañés, Poy, & Moltó (2001).  
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Figure 5.  Affective primes by disgust (IAPS pictures)  
      
   
2.1.2.2.3 Procedure 
 
Study 1 was conducted in five different sessions that took place in the computer 
room of the Guillem Cifre Building (Faculty of Psychology, UIB). As in the pilot study, 
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before the battery of dilemmas, we introduced four vignettes with instructions followed 
by four vignettes with dilemmas (three of them “moral” and one of them “non-moral”) 
in order to familiarize the participants with the dynamic of the experiment. The ratings 
of these four dilemmas were not considered in the subsequent analysis.  
 
Additionally, in order to explore the moral-specificity of the results, non-moral 
situations were introduced and tested in the same conditions. As in the pilot study, moral 
and non-moral dilemmas were both presented in experimental vignettes that were 
accompanied with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 7 (perfectly OK) to 1 (completely 
wrong). Thus, higher ratings corresponded to more permissibility (less severity) in the 
evaluations of the vignettes. Variations of the same dilemma were presented pseudo-
randomly. This paradigm was self-paced task, designed so that the next dilemma was 
not presented until the subject had responded to the previous one. Each participant rated 
the two versions of each dilemma; one rating for the version after disgust prime and one 
for the version after neutral prime. Thus, responses to each dilemma were tested in two 
conditions: disgust prime condition and neutral condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Experimental paradigm for Study 1 
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2.1.3. Results 
 
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of morals and non-moral dilemmas: Moral dilemmas were rated higher in 
appropriateness after affective priming than after neutral priming (T = 11, N = 36, z = -
2.078, p = .038). Interestingly, this was not the case for non-moral dilemmas (T =13, N = 
32,  z = -.234, p = .815)44 (see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the ratings of moral and 
non-moral dilemmas 
 
 
With regard to the specific analysis of the differences in the ratings of the pairs 
of dilemmas45, we found that the pairs of moral dilemmas M_4a/M_4b, M_21a/M_21b, 
and M_27a/M_27b were rated higher in appropiateness after the affective priming than 
in the neutral priming condition (T = 3, N = 20, z = -3.245, p = .001, T = 2, N = 24, z = -
                                                 
44 Wilcoxon’s signed ranks test.  
45 In this investigation, moral dilemmas are named as (M) and non-moral dilemmas are named as (NoM). 
Variations of the same dilemma are differentiated by the later “a” or “b”.  
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3.731, p < .001; and T = 7, N = 20, z = -2.331, p = .024, respectively). This was not the 
case for the pair of moral dilemmas M_26a/M_26b (T = 4, N = 20, z = -2.588, p = .01), 
which was rated lower in appropriateness after the affective priming than after the 
neutral priming. Non-moral dilemma NoM_6a was rated higher in neutral condition 
than NoM_6b after affective priming (T = 9, N = 32, z = -3.022, p = .003). Non-moral 
dilemma NoM_18b was rated higher in affective condition than NoM_18a after neutral 
priming (T = 4, N = 16, z = -2.331, p = .02). 
 
 
2.1.4. Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
We have shown that affective priming by disgust (SOA 500ms) slightly reduced 
the severity of moral judgments (p = .038). Importantly, this effect occurs only in the 
case of participants’ appropriateness ratings of moral dilemmas. Additionally, we found 
that affective priming by disgust influenced a particular participant’s moral judgment 
depending on the pair of the moral dilemmas, i.e. depending on the particular situation. 
This result was observed in 4 pairs of moral dilemmas, and 3 of them revealed a 
reduction of moral severity.  
 
Therefore, we found support for our first hypothesis: incidental disgust 
influences participants’ ratings only when they judged moral dilemmas. We also found 
support for our third hypothesis: affective priming by disgust can influence the moral 
judgments that a particular participant makes about a particular situation.  
 
Unexpectedly, the analysis of the influence of affective priming by disgust in 
moral judgments revealed that the particular direction of the effect was contrary to our 
predictions. It was hypothesized that the induction of incidental disgust through 
affective priming exerts a special influence on moral judgments by making them more 
severe. However, we found the opposite effect: incidental disgust influenced moral 
judgments by making them less severe. As mentioned above, studies on the influence of 
disgust on moral judgments favored that the experience of disgust increases the severity 
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of moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; but see David 
& Olatunji, 2011, for a contradictory finding).  
 
At this point, there were different possibilities to explain this conflicting finding. 
After a discussion of these results, we delimited the range of possible variables to two 
main options: (a) the content of the primes (associated with a gore-“animal nature” 
disgust or the affective dimensions underlying this emotional construct), and (b) the 
SOA of the primes.  
 
 
- Affective priming:  
 
We used IAPS’ pictures of human mutilations as affective primes. In section (3.1), 
we mentioned that the emotion of disgust is a heterogeneous emotion, with different 
sub-classes that appear to serve different adaptive functions (Haidt et al., 1994; Rozin et 
al., 2000; Tybur et al., 2009). In particular, the pictures used as primes in Study I can be 
considered examples of the “envelope violations/animal nature” type of disgust. These 
pictures present low ratings in negative valence, which can be understood as a reliable 
measure of their unpleasant content. As mentioned in (1.4.3), there is evidence that, 
when the content of the prime is especially distinctive and it is perceived as belonging 
to the same category as the target, the result is that the primes are used as a comparison 
standard and produce a contrast effect (Maringer & Stapel, 2009; Stapel et al., 2002). 
 
 
- Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA):  
 
We selected a 500-ms SOA for affective priming, which is a relatively long onset. 
There is evidence that the exposure time of the prime influences its final effect on the 
target. For example, in section (1.4.3), we mentioned that affective priming results in 
assimilation when the prime is flashed “super-quick” (30ms) and that contrast occurs 
when the same prime is flashed for somewhat longer (100ms). Specifically, it has been 
proposed that, at very short exposure times, an affect-laden stimulus elicits only diffuse 
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information, which leads to assimilation. However, when the exposure time is longer, 
the same stimulus elicits distinctive information and contrastive comparison is a more 
likely outcome (Stapel, Koomen & Ruys, 2002).  
 
We decided to explore the second possibility because it represented a potential 
problem for the interpretation of the current results. It might be erroneous to attribute 
the effect found in Study 1 to a particular emotional response elicited by the content of 
the prime. In other words, participants’ responses could be explained in terms of a 
general contrast effect due to the “distinctiveness” of the primes.  
 
Therefore, if there is, in fact, a contrast effect mediating these results, the finding 
that participants judged moral dilemmas as more positive (less severe) after disgusting 
primes cannot be attributed to the influence of a specific emotional response. Instead, 
we should look into methodological considerations and explain this effect in terms of a 
general reaction to standard negative stimuli.  
 
 
 
2.2. STUDY 2 
 
 
2.2.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
 
To address these considerations, a second experiment was designed to meet the 
following specific objectives: 
 
d) To test whether the main result obtained in Study 1 (affective priming by disgust 
reduces the severity of moral judgments) can be explained as a contrast effect. It was 
predicted that this effect cannot be understood in terms of a contrast effect.  
 
e) To test whether the influence of disgust in moral judgments remains stable 
through the time course of affective priming. Because there were no references to the 
influence of time course of affective priming on moral judgments in the literature, we 
made no specific prediction on this test.  
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2.2.2. Method 
 
In Study 2, we tested the influence of super-quick exposure time (SOA 20ms) 
and quick exposure time (SOA 250ms) on the direction of the effect of affective priming 
by disgust on moral judgments.  
 
2.2.2.1 Participants 
 
In the present study, we tested our hypothesis using a paradigm in which 81 
participants (14 males) rated 27 pairs of vignettes. Forty participants (10 males) were 
randomly assigned to the super-quick condition (SOA 20ms) and 41 participants (4 
males) were assigned to the quick condition (SOA 250ms).  As in Study 1, most of the 
participants were Psychology students (in total, 69) who were invited to join the 
experiment as a part of their practice credits.  
 
2.2.2.2 Material and stimuli 
 
We considered as target the same 27 pairs of dilemmas used in Study 1 (15 pairs 
of moral dilemmas and 12 pairs of non-moral dilemmas; a total number of 54 trials), 
following the premise that they differ in “irrelevant” characteristics46. A version of 
Direct RTv2006 was used to register participant´s ratings. We used twenty computers 
Windows XP Professional V2000 with a processor Intel (R) Pentium (R) Dual CPU E 
2160 @ 1.80 GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 GB RAM.   
 
Primes were the same used in Study 1: disgusting pictures from IAPS were used as 
affective primes, and a grey square was chosen to serve as neutral prime.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 This material was selected taking into account the results previously obtained from the pilot study.  
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2.2.2.3. Procedure 
Study 2 followed the same procedure as used for Study 1, except that, this time, 
we ran the sessions in the “Cognitive Laboratory” that is located in the Guillem Cifre 
Building (Faculty of Psychology, UIB). Importantly, in this study, we manipulated SOA 
as a second independent variable (20-ms SOA and 250-ms SOA). Thus, each participant 
rated the two versions of each dilemma; one rating for the version after the disgust 
prime and one for the version after the neutral prime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Experimental paradigm for Study 2: 20-ms SOA and 250-ms SOA  
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2.2.3. Results 
 
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA. Moral dilemmas were 
rated higher in appropriateness after affective priming (M = 3.54) than after neutral 
priming (M = 3.35) (T = 9, N = 37, z = -3,657, p < .001). Interestingly, this was not the 
case for non-moral dilemmas (M = 4.15 and M = 4.13 for non-moral dilemmas after 
affective and neutral priming, respectively, T = 14, N = 34, z = -,798, p = .425).  
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA. Moral dilemmas were 
rated higher in appropriateness after affective priming (M = 3.61) than after neutral 
priming (M = 3.46) (T = 12, N = 39, z = -2,026, p = .043)47. This was not the case for 
non-moral dilemmas (M = 4.15 and M = 4.26 for non-moral dilemmas after affective 
and neutral priming, respectively, T = 14, N = 38, z = -1,395, p = .163).  
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas48. Moral dilemmas were rated higher in 
appropriateness after affective priming (M = 3.57) than after neutral priming (M = 3.40, 
T = 21, N = 76, z = -3,832, p < .001). In the same line, this was not the case for non-
moral dilemmas (T = 34, N = 72, z = -,562, p = .574). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Strictly speaking, it cannot be said that there is statistic significance in this comparison. Because we 
made multiple comparisons, we should apply the adjusted alpha. However, there is an evident tendency 
towards the direction found in our T-test (p = .018) 
48 This analysis did not take SOA distinctions into account.   
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Figure 9. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the ratings of moral and 
non-moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA  
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Figure 10. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the ratings of moral and 
non-moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA  
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2.2.4. Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
The results of Study 2 support the previous finding: Affective priming by disgust 
(pictures of human mutilations) reduced the severity of moral judgments, Thus, SOAs 
of different characteristics (20ms, 250ms, and 500ms) resulted in the same effect. 
Altogether, these results strongly suggest that the effect exists, either when the prime is 
perceived as more “diffuse” (20-s SOA) or when it is perceived as more “distinctive” 
(250-ms and 500-ms SOAs).   
 
Interestingly, the analysis of the influence of affective priming by disgust in 
moral judgment revealed that the strength of the effect was susceptible to SOA 
manipulations. In short, when the SOA was super-quick, the effect of the prime was 
stronger than when the SOA was quick. This finding suggests that the more 
diffuse/unspecific the prime is perceived, the greater is the effect on the target. As 
mentioned in (4.3), it seems unlikely that a discrete emotion can be elicited at such 
extremely short exposure times (20ms), which suggests that the particular effect of the 
affective prime in moral judgments cannot be attributed to a sophisticated cognitive 
response (such as a discrete emotion). Instead, results from Study 2 suggest that the 
main effect is caused by a more basic affective response (quicker and probably 
unappraised).   
 
In sum, there are two main conclusions to this state of the research. Thus, results 
from Study 1 and Study 2 have shown that: (i) the observed effect of affective priming 
is restricted to moral judgments; and that (ii) this effect cannot be explained as a 
contrastive effect.  
  
First, results from Study 1 and Study 2 are consistent with a central claim of 
moral psychology: typical moral judgments are the result of automatic affective-laden 
responses (Haidt, 2001). The fact that affective priming only influenced moral 
judgments can be interpreted as new evidence supporting this theoretical position.  
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Second, these results support the characterization of moral judgments as flexible 
evaluations. In the last few years, diverse studies have shown that moral judgments are 
susceptible to different types of influence. For example, it seems that moral judgments 
can be influenced by metacognitive variables (such as processing fluency, see Laham, et 
al., 2009), dispositional variables (thinking style or disgust sensitivity, see Bartels, 
2008, and Inbar et al., 2009, respectively) or incidental/contextual variables (see also 
Section 1.4).  
 
Additionally, these results are in the same line with a central claim of cognitive 
and social psychology: people often rely in their affective reactions to function as 
guides when they are about to make a judgment (see 1.4.2).   
 
However, the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 are more conflicting if we focus 
on the specific direction of the main effect of affective priming on moral judgments 
(reduction of their severity). As mentioned above, previous studies on the causal 
relationship between disgust and moral judgments favored the opposite effect: disgust 
increases the severity of moral judgments. This effect can be described as basically 
“assimilative” (in the sense that the judgment is moving in the same direction as the 
valence of the prime).  
 
For instance, in Wheatley and Haidt’s (2005) study, disgust induced by hypnosis 
had an effect on moral judgments. However, as mentioned in the overview of Study 1, 
their disgust induction also increased the severity with which participants judged a non-
moral story49. Consequently, this study did not show a domain-specific influence of 
disgust on moral judgments (as suggested by the authors); instead, it appears to show 
that disgust has a “moralizing” effect or that this emotion influenced affective 
judgments.   
 
                                                 
49 ‘‘Dan is a student council representative at his school. This semester, he is in charge of scheduling 
discussions about academic issues. He [tries to take/often picks] topics that appeal both to professors 
and students in order to stimulate discussion’’ (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005, p. 782).  Furthermore, there 
is an interesting alternative explanation of this finding: it is possible that by introducing a name (Dan) 
in their story, authors might have affectively “charged” this particular situation. 
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 The second study on the influence of disgust on moral judgments by Schnall, 
Haidt et al. (2008) consists of four different experiments. As admitted by the authors, in 
all conditions, they sought disgust inductions that were “low-level”. Coherently, their 
main effect (“disgust makes moral judgments more severe”) was restricted to 
participants who were highly sensitive to their internal physical reactions.50  
 
In opposition, our disgust induction was not restricted to participants who were 
highly sensitive to their own bodily reactions. Further, the facts that we selected pictures 
of human mutilations51 as affective primes and that participants perceived these primes 
at short exposure times, suggest that our disgust induction might be more intense than 
those of Schnall and colleagues’ studies. Nevertheless, whether or not the “intensity” of 
the negative affect moderates the direction of the effect on moral judgments is still an 
empirical question that we will address later in the General Discussion.  
 
As mentioned above, the possibility that certain experimental paradigms are 
more likely to influence perceived immorality than others has also been suggested by 
other authors (David & Olatunji, 2011; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2011). We believe that 
their findings support our previous speculation about the importance of methodological 
particularities in the final effects of incidental emotions on moral judgments. As a 
consequence, we considered that it was necessary to design a new experiment aimed at 
addressing this question.  
 
 
 
2.3. STUDY 3 
 
A second analysis of the results suggested a new possibility. It might be that the 
target was not affectively neutral. Although it seems like an obvious claim—after all, 
moral judgments are understood to be largely based on affective processes—, it is 
                                                 
50 These participants scored higher in the Private Body Consciousness (PBC) scale.  
51According to IAPS ratings, prime affective ratings are M = 1.73 for the dimension of valence and M 
= 6.91, for the dimension of activation.   
Effects of the time course of negative affective priming on moral judgment: the shortest the SOA, the lesser the severity. 
 
 
 
 
89 
 
surprising that this fact has not been controlled in previous studies on the influence of 
disgust on moral judgments. Therefore, we considered that we needed to test whether 
some affective properties of the target were interfering with the effect of the affective 
priming. If, as we had so far assumed, our target was affectively neutral, then we can 
uphold the claim that the observed effect is generated by the affective induction. 
Conversely, if our target is not affectively neutral, this finding would raise a new range 
of possible explanations.  
 
 
2.3.1. Objectives and hypotheses  
 
 
(a) To test whether the target (moral and non-moral dilemmas) was affectively 
neutral. It was predicted that only moral dilemmas would not be affectively neutral.  
 
(b) To test whether the target presents intrinsic differences in the affective 
dimensions of valence and activation. It was predicted that moral and non-moral 
dilemmas differ in both dimensions. Specifically, it was predicted that moral dilemmas 
would be experienced as more unpleasant in the dimension of valence and more 
activating in the dimension of activation.  
 
 
2.3.2. Method 
 
 
Based on the above-mentioned objectives, we conducted a study in which 
participants evaluate moral and non-moral dilemmas in the affective dimensions of 
valence and activation. For this purpose, we introduced in this research the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM; created by Lang, 1980; and Hodes, Cook, & Lang, 1985). 
This instrument was designed on the basis that all emotional phenomena can be 
described in terms of a tridimensional space, which consists of three independent and 
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bipolar dimensions: pleasure-displeasure, degree of arousal, and dominance-
submissiveness.  
 
For instance, Mehrabian and Rusell (1977) found that these dimensions are 
autonomous, in the sense that differing values along any of these particular dimensions 
can occur at the same time, without necessarily affecting each other. Thus, the SAM can 
be understood as a visual representation of the pleasure, arousal, and dominance model 
(PAD). Because it does not require verbal expressions, the SAM is considered an 
intuitive instrument that can measure subjective experiences of people from different 
cultures and ages. Although all the SAM dimensions are psychometrically consistent, it 
is important to note that the dimension of dominance is the least consistent and, 
certainly, the least used in emotional research.  
 
 
2.3.2.1. Participants 
 
In the present study, we tested our hypothesis using a paradigm in which 35 
participants (7 males) rated 27 pairs of vignettes. Fifteen participants were randomly 
assigned to a version of the paradigm in which they were asked to rate all the dilemmas 
in the activation dimension first, and then in valence. The next 20 participants were 
assigned to a different version of the paradigm in which they were asked to rate all the 
dilemmas in the opposite order (first in the dimension of valence and later in activation). 
As in Study 1 and Study 2, most of the participants were Psychology students who were 
invited to join the experiment as a part of their practice credits.  
 
 
2.3.2.2. Material and stimuli 
 
We considered as target the same 27 pairs of dilemmas used in Study 1 and 
Study 2 (15 pairs of moral dilemmas and 12 pairs of non-moral dilemmas; a total 
number of 54 trials). In order to measure participants’ subjective responses, we 
introduced the SAM. In particular, we selected the scales of Valence and Activation. 
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Direct RTv2006 was used to register participant’s scores. We used twenty computers 
Windows XP Professional V2000 with a processor Intel (R) Pentium (R) Dual CPU E 
2160 @ 1.80 GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 GB RAM.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. SAM scales of valence and activation  
 
 
2.3.2.3. Procedure 
 
During six different sessions that took place in the computer room of the Guillem 
Cifre Building (Faculty of Psychology, UIB), 35 participants rated 54 dilemmas. 
Participants were asked to express their sensations after reading each dilemma. We were 
very clear in our instructions that we were not asking them for their judgments. Before 
they started each session, we gave them a brief explanation of what valence or 
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activation means.52 Before the battery of dilemmas, we introduced four vignettes with 
instructions, followed by four vignettes with short texts. The ratings of these four texts 
were not considered in the subsequent analysis.  
 
As in previous studies, variations of the same dilemma were presented pseudo-
randomly. Both moral and non-moral dilemmas were presented in experimental 
vignettes. This paradigm was a self-paced task, designed so that next dilemma was not 
presented until the subject had responded to the previous one. Thus, after the subject 
had read each dilemma, he/she pressed the space key, and the SAM appeared 
accompanied by a 9-point Likert scale (for the valence dimension, the response scale 
ranged from 1 (very pleasant) to 9 (very unpleasant); for the activation dimension, it 
ranged from 1 (very activating) to 9 (not at all activating)53. In this study, reaction time 
(RT) was measured as a second dependent variable. Each participant rated the two 
versions of each dilemma in valence and activation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
52  This explanation varied depending on their version of the paradigm. For example, in the 
Activation/Valence version, we started by explaining the meaning of activation. Later, when the entire 
group had finished their activation ratings, we proceeded with the explanation of the concept of 
valence.  
53  The original 9-point Likert scales, in the case of valence, ranged from 1 (muy agradable) to 9 (muy 
desagradable). Activation was measured ranging from 1 (muy activante) to 9 (nada activante). 
Importantly, the scale did not incorporate any text, so these equivalences were provided to participants 
as a part of the instructions.  
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Figure 12. Experimental paradigm for Study 3 (Activation and Valence) 
 
 
2.3.3. Results 
 
 
Comparison of ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension 
of valence.  Moral dilemmas were rated higher in valence than non-moral dilemmas (M 
= 6.76 and M = 5.03, respectively, for moral and non-moral dilemmas, T = 1, N = 35, z 
= -5,143, p < .001). Higher scores in this scale mean that participants experienced more 
unpleasant sensations after reading the moral vignettes.54  
 
Comparison of ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension 
of activation. Moral dilemmas were rated lower in activation than non-moral dilemmas 
(M = 4.52 and M = 7.02, respectively, for moral and non-moral dilemmas, T = 0, N = 35, 
z = -5,160, p < .001). Lower scores in this scale mean that participants experienced more 
activating sensations after reading moral vignettes.  
                                                 
54  Surprisingly, our analysis of this comparison showed an effect of the order of the dimensions in the 
evaluations. In particular, those participants who rated first their activation and later their valence gave 
also higher scores in valence than participants that were asked to respond in the opposite order. 
However, the fact that U Mann-Whitney value is 120 suggests that this difference might be due to 
random variables.   
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
Comparison of RT of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension of 
valence. Participants took longer to rate moral dilemmas than non-moral dilemmas in 
the dimension of valence (M = 1537 ms and M = 1307 ms, respectively, for moral and 
non-moral dilemmas, T = 6, N = 35, z = -2,883,  p = .004).  
 
Comparison of RT of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension of 
activation. Participants took longer to rate moral dilemmas than non-moral dilemmas in 
the dimension of activation (M = 1562 ms and M = 1389 ms, respectively, for moral and 
non-moral dilemmas, T = 13, N = 35, z = -1,834, p = .067)55.  
 
Comparison of RT of moral and non-moral dilemmas56. Participants took 
longer to rate moral dilemmas than non-moral dilemmas (M = 1549 ms and M = 1348 
ms, respectively, for moral and non-moral dilemmas, T = 7, N = 35, z = -3,014, p = .003). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension of valence 
                                                 
55 Without  outliers (p  = .031) 
56 This analysis did not take dimensional distinctions into account.   
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Figure 14. Comparison of ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas in the dimension of activation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Analysis of the reaction times (RT)  
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2.3.4. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
Results from Study 3 show that moral dilemmas are experienced as more 
affectively negative (unpleasant) and more activating than non-moral dilemmas. To the 
best of our knowledge, these results constitute the first evidence of intrinsic dimensional 
differences between the two types of dilemmas. As mentioned above, although research 
on moral psychology has assumed that moral dilemmas recruit affective processes, there 
was no evidence about dimensional ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas. We 
believe this finding redefines the nature of the influence of affective priming on moral 
judgments. Specifically, the results of Study 3 suggest that the influence of affective 
primes on the target cannot be understood as unidirectional. Instead, the documented 
effect must be understood as a result of the interaction between affective features of the 
primes and dimensional-affective features of the target.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Dimensional interaction between affective prime and the target (moral dilemmas)  
 
 
Additionally, these results suggest a possible explanation of the fact that 
affective priming only influenced participants´ moral judgments. Therefore, it seems 
that moral dilemmas are intrinsically affective, which constitutes a main distinction 
between this type of dilemmas and dilemmas that do not imply moral considerations. 
This prediction is supported by the analysis of the RT differences in the two types of 
dilemmas. Participants took longer to rate their subjective experiences—both in valence 
and activation—after reading moral dilemmas than after non-moral dilemmas.  
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One possible explanation for this pattern of results can be found in the 
Emotional Stroop Effect (ESE)57, an experimental paradigm that predicts a general 
increase in RT for responses to affective stimulus. Despite that the ESE has been 
primarily demonstrated with participants with clinical disorders (Becker, Rinck, 
Margraf, & Roth, 2001), there is evidence that the ESE is also operative with non-
pathological subjects. For example, McKenna and Sharma (1995) presented participants 
with affective words with frightening connotations (e.g., death, failure) and neutral 
words. They found that RT was longer for naming the color of frightening words when 
compared with neutral words. Likewise, the fact that participants in Study 3 took longer 
to express their feelings after reading moral dilemmas strongly suggests that the 
“affective negativity” of moral dilemmas is a critical factor mediating participants’ 
responses.  
 
 
 
2.4. STUDY 4 
 
 
Results from Study 2 suggested that the influence of affective priming by disgust 
on moral judgments (“disgust” makes only moral judgment less severe) required further 
examination. Thus, the fact that this effect was obtained at extremely short prime 
exposure time (super-quick condition, 20-ms SOA) implies that the influence of the 
prime on moral judgments can hardly be attributed to a discrete emotion like disgust 
(see 4.3). Instead, this finding suggests that the observed effect is caused by a more 
basic affective computation (quicker, implicit, and probably un-appraised) that is 
involved in the complete experience of disgust.  
 
Following this premise, Study 4 started out from an affective-dimensional point of 
view that could contribute to clarify this intriguing question. In this study, we selected 
                                                 
57 The "emotional Stroop paradigm” works by examining participants´ RT to emotional or 
neutral words. A typical finding is that naming the color of words with emotional connotation is 
performed slower than that of neutral words, a difference that is called the "Emotional Stroop 
Effect." This paradigm is a variation of the original Stroop test, which creates a conflict between 
an incongruent color and word (for a review, see MacLeod, 1991).  
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affective primes that resemble the previously used ones in their dimensional values 
(both in valence and activation) but that, at the same time, differ in their thematic 
content. Because we were seeking differences in priming effects between primes that 
are similar in their dimensional values but are known to elicit different emotions, we 
selected stimuli that cannot be included within any taxonomy of disgust elicitors (see 
Section 1.3.2.3).  
 
From this conceptual approach, we tested the way different affective primes 
(disgust and fear/horror pictures), previously matched in valence and arousal, modify 
participants’ moral judgments. Fearsome pictures were selected as a contrast to the 
disgust stimuli because both emotions have very similar profiles in the dimensional 
model (negative valence, high ability to arouse, and the withdrawal motivational 
function), but nonetheless distinct qualities.58 In particular, it is well documented that 
the experience of fear can elicit extremely negative affective responses and a higher 
ability to arouse than other negative emotions (Russell, 1980). As a result, if the present 
study replicates the main effect obtained in Study 1 and Study 2, it would be necessary 
to redefine the specificity of the link between disgust and moral judgments and attribute 
the influence of this emotion to the affective dimensions of valence and/or activation. 
 
 
2.4.1. Objectives and hypotheses 
 
 
(a) To test the dimensional explanation of affective priming effect on moral judgments 
by using stimuli that elicit a different discrete emotion (fear-horror) than disgust but 
that, at the same time, share similar dimensional values in valence and activation. It was 
predicted that affective priming by fear-horror would replicate the same effect 
previously observed by priming by disgust.  
 
                                                 
58 For instance, there is evidence suggesting that processing fear-related stimuli produces greater 
inhibitory responses on distractors relative to processing disgust-related stimuli (Vermeulen, Godefroid, & 
Mermillod, 2009). In addition, there is neurophysiological evidence showing that fear and disgust are 
associated with partially distinct neural substrates (Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001).  
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(b) To test whether variations of prime exposures influences participants’ moral 
judgments. It was predicted that both SOAs (20ms and 250ms) would influence 
participants’ moral judgments in the same direction previously documented.  
 
(c) To compare whether a super-quick prime exposure (SOA 20ms) and a quick 
prime exposure (SOA 250ms) influence the strength of the effect on moral judgments. It 
was predicted that the influence of affective priming would be stronger in the super-
quick condition.  
 
(d) To test whether affective priming by fear-horror influences participants’ RT. It 
was predicted that affective priming by fear-horror would influence participants’ RT 
only when they evaluate moral dilemmas.  
 
 
2.4.2. Method 
 
 
The central purpose of Study 4 was to test the way different affective primes 
(disgust and fear-horror pictures), previously matched in valence and arousal, modify 
participants’ moral judgments. However, in our attempt to find fear pictures that can 
serve as affective primes, we found that there were no IAPS fearful pictures with 
dimensional values that can match the values of the mutilation pictures. Consequently, it 
was crucial to create our own set of fear-relevant images.  
 
2.4.2.1 Pilot Study 
 
2.4.2.1.1 Participants 
 
First, a pilot study was designed to determine which pictures present higher 
ratings in negative valence and activation. For this purpose, we designed a paradigm in 
which 53 participants (10 males) were asked to rate a set of pictures. Twenty-seven 
participants (3 males) were randomly assigned to a version of the paradigm in which 
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
they were asked to first rate all the pictures in the dimension of activation and then in 
valence. The next 26 participants (7 males) were assigned to a different version of the 
paradigm in which they were asked to rate all the pictures in the opposite order (first in 
the dimension of valence and later in activation). As in the previous studies, most of the 
participants were Psychology students who were invited to join the experiment as a part 
of their practice credits. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.2 Material and stimuli 
 
The complete set of pictures comprised 68 fearful pictures and 126 neutral 
pictures (in total, 194). All fearful pictures were first obtained from the Internet and later 
edited, in order to make them less recognizable and also to increase their potential 
impact. Neutral pictures were selected from the IAPS following the criterion that they 
presented middle values in both valence and activation. A version of Direct RTv2006 
was used to register participants’ scores. We used six computers Windows XP 
Professional V2000 with a processor Intel (R) Pentium (R) Dual CPU E 2160 @ 1.80 
GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 GB RAM.   
 
 
2.4.2.1.3 Procedure 
 
The procedure was similar to the one used in Study 3. In order to measure 
participants’ responses, we introduced the SAM (Lang, 1980; and Hodes, Cook, & 
Lang, 1985). Participants were asked to rate their sensations after briefly watching each 
picture (both fearful and neutral). Before they started each session, we gave them a brief 
explanation of what valence or activation means.59 We were very clear in the 
experimental instructions that we were asking them for their first reactions and that it 
was important to respond quickly.  Before the battery of dilemmas, we introduced four 
vignettes with instructions, followed by four neutral pictures. The ratings of these four 
                                                 
59 This explanation varied depending on their version of the paradigm. For example, in the 
Activation/Valence version, we started by explaining the meaning of activation. Later, when the entire 
group had finished their activation ratings, we proceeded to explain the concept of valence.  
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pictures were not considered in the subsequent analysis. Both fearful and neutral 
pictures were presented pseudo-randomly, which means that all pictures were randomly 
presented first for one dimension, and then randomly presented for the other dimension.  
As in the previous experiments, this paradigm was a self-paced task, designed so 
that next picture was not presented until the subject had responded to the previous one. 
Thus, once the subject had looked at each picture he/she pressed the space key and the 
SAM appeared, accompanied by a 9-point Likert scale (in the valence dimension, 
responses ranged from 1 (very pleasant) to 9 (very unpleasant); in the activation 
dimension, responses ranged from 1 (very activating) to 9 (not at all activating)60. Each 
participant rated the complete set of pictures both in valence and activation. After the 
pilot study, we selected the 27 fearful pictures that did not differ significantly from the 
IAPS mutilations pictures in their values of negative valence (t= -,785, p= ,440) and high 
activation (t= -1,017, p = ,319) (see figures 17 and 18). 
 
 
  
Valencia baremada IAPS Valencia Horror DEF
1,4
1,5
1,6
1,7
1,8
1,9
2,0
95
% 
CI
 
Figure 17. Comparison of ratings of IAPS and horror pictures in the dimension of valence  
             
 
                                                 
60  The original 9-point Likert scales, in the case of valence, ranged from 1 (muy agradable) to 9 (muy 
desagradable). Activation responses ranged from 1 (muy activante) to 9 (nada activante). Importantly, 
the scale did not incorporate any text, so these equivalences were given to participants as a part of the 
instructions.  
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Activacion baremada IAPS Activacion Horror DEF
6,6
6,8
7,0
7,2
7,4
95
% 
CI
 
Figure 18. Comparison of ratings of IAPS and horror pictures in the dimension of activation  
 
 
2.4.2.2 Main Study 
 
 
2.4.2.2.1 Participants 
 
 
In the present study, we tested our hypothesis using a paradigm in which 78 
participants (14 males) rated 27 pairs of vignettes. Thirty-eight participants (11 males) 
were randomly assigned to the super-quick condition (20-ms SOA) and 40 participants 
(18 males) were assigned to the quick condition (250-ms SOA). Results of 3 
participants (2 of them originally assigned to the quick condition) were excluded from 
further analysis because their ratings significantly deviated from the mean of the group. 
As in previous studies, most of the participants were Psychology students invited to join 
the experiment as a part of their practice credits.  
 
2.4.2.2.2 Material and stimuli 
 
We considered as targets the same 27 pairs of dilemmas used in previous studies 
(15 pairs of moral dilemmas and 12 pairs of non-moral dilemmas; a total number of 54 
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trials), following the premise that they differ in “irrelevant” characteristics61. A version 
of Direct RTv2006 was used to register participants’ scores. We used twenty computers 
Windows XP Professional V2000 with a processor Intel (R) Pentium (R) Dual CPU E 
2160 @ 1.80 GHz 1.79 GH.z 0.99 GB RAM.  Twenty-seven fear-horror pictures, 
selected after the pilot study, were used as affective primes, and a grey square was used 
to serve as neutral prime. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Neutral prime 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 This material was selected taking into account the results previously obtained from the pilot study.  
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Figure 20.  Affective primes by fear-horror 
 
 
2.4.4.4.3. Procedure 
 
 
Study 4 followed the same basic procedure used for Study 1 and Study 2. As in 
Study 2, in this study, we manipulated SOAs as a second independent variable (20-ms 
SOA and 250-ms SOA). Thus, each participant rated the two versions of each dilemma; 
one rating for the version after the fear prime and one for the version after neutral 
prime. In addition, in Study 4, RT was considered and measured as a second dependent 
variable. 
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2.4.3. Results 
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA. Moral dilemmas were 
rated higher in appropriateness after affective priming than after neutral priming (M = 
3.67 and M = 3.39, respectively, for affective and neutral priming, T = 8, N = 35, z = -
3,373, p = .001). Interestingly, this was not the case for non-moral dilemmas (M = 4.17 
and M = 4.16, respectively, for non-moral dilemmas after affective priming and after 
neutral priming, T = 15, N = 35, z = -,534,  p = .594).  
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
ratings of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA. Moral dilemmas were 
rated higher in appropriateness after affective priming than after neutral priming (M = 
3.69 and M = 3.49, respectively, for affective priming and neutral priming, , T = 13, N = 
36, z = -2,655, p = .008). Interestingly, this was not the case for non-moral dilemmas (M 
= 4.19 and M = 4.05, respectively, for non-moral dilemmas after affective priming and 
after neutral priming, T = 15, N = 33, z = -,976, p = .329).  
Media Moral Priming Media Moral Neutro Media No-Morales 
Priming
Media No-Morales 
Neutro
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
32
35
4
32
 
Figure 21. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the ratings of moral and 
non-moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA. 
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Media Moral Priming Media Moral Neutro Media No-Morales 
Priming
Media No-Morales 
Neutro
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
4,50
5,00
5,50
21
34
 
Figure 22. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the ratings of morals and 
non-moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA.  
 
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the 
RT62 of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA. Participants took longer to 
rate moral dilemmas after affective priming than after neutral priming, t(36)=2,795, p = 
.008. Interestingly, this was not the case for non-moral dilemmas, t(36)= -0.510, p = 
0,613.  
 
Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the RT 
of moral and non-moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA. Participants took longer to rate 
moral dilemmas after affective priming than after neutral priming, t(37)=2,51, p = .017. 
This was not the case for non-moral dilemmas, t(37)= -0.206, p = 0,838.  
 
                                                 
62 In the analysis of RT, outliers were eliminated for both SOA’s (3 participants in the 20-ms SOA 
condition and 2 participants in the 250-ms SOA condition). For the analysis of the data, the 
conventional logarithmic transformation of the reaction time scores was made after the scores had been 
properly coded to avoid negative logarithms.When Rts are transformed, a fitted general linear model 
provides coefficients and fitted latencies in another scale than the millisecond time scale. This way, in 
many cases it may be necessary or convenient to visualize partial effects on the original millisecond 
scale (see figures 23 and 24).  
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Figure 23. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the RT of moral and non-
moral dilemmas with 20-ms SOA 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Comparison of affective priming condition and neutral condition in the RT of moral and non-
moral dilemmas with 250-ms SOA 
 
 
2.4.4. Conclusions and Discussion 
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Results from Study 4 replicated the main finding of this research: affective priming 
reduces the severity of moral judgments. As in Study 2, we found that SOAs of different 
characteristics (20ms and 250ms) resulted in the same effect on moral judgments. The 
analysis of the interaction between SOA duration and priming effects on moral 
judgments showed that the strength of the effect was again susceptible to the SOA 
manipulations. As in Study 2, when the SOA was super-quick, the effect of the prime on 
the target was stronger.  
 
Therefore, the effect of affective priming by fear-horror pictures on moral 
judgments was surprisingly similar to the effect previously found by primes of 
disgusting pictures. This evidence is crucial for the argument concerning the specificity 
of the affective response that is causing this effect. For instance, the fact that a fearful 
prime replicated the previous effect, casts serious doubts on the emotional-specificity of 
the effect. Certainly, it is difficult to assume that both disgust and fear exert a domain-
specific influence on moral judgments that is, at the same time, consistent between both 
emotions.  
 
With regard to this issue, it is noteworthy that the pilot study was designed in order 
to obtain fear primes that matched the disgust primes in the affective dimensional values 
(both in valence and activation). Therefore, because both affective primes are 
characterized by the extreme subjective ratings of valence (very unpleasant) and 
activation (very activating), it is possible that these two particular dimensions are 
mediating the effect obtained. 
 
Finally, the analysis of the RT confirmed our initial prediction: affective priming by 
fear-horror influenced participants’ RT only when they evaluated moral dilemmas. In 
particular, affective priming by fear-horror increased RT when the SOA was super-
quick, whereas the quick SOA also increases RT, but without reaching statistical 
significance. Consequently, results from Study 4 and Study 3 show a consistent 
tendency in the RT to affective stimuli.  
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3.1 EXPLAINING THE EFFECT OF AFFECTIVE PRIMING ON MORAL 
JUDGMENTS  
 
The aim of the present research was to examine whether disgust (as a discrete 
emotion) exerts a domain-specific influence on moral judgments. Results showed that 
affective priming by disgusting and fearful images induced at SOAs of different 
characteristics (20ms, 250ms, and 500ms) produced the same effect: affective primes 
made moral judgments less severe. Altogether, these results strongly suggest that the 
effect exists either when the prime is perceived as unspecific or “diffuse” (20-ms SOA) 
or when it is perceived as more “distinctive” (250-ms SOA and 500-ms SOA).  
Interestingly, the analysis of the influence of affective priming in moral judgments 
revealed that the strength of the effect was indeed susceptible to SOA manipulations. In 
short, when the SOA was super-quick, the effect of the prime on the target was stronger. 
This suggests that the more diffuse/unspecific the prime is perceived, the greater is the 
effect on the target.  
 
Certainly, it seems unlikely that a discrete emotion can be generated at such 
extremely short exposure times (20ms), which suggests that the particular effect of the 
prime in moral judgments lies in a more basic affective response (quicker and probably 
un-appraised) and, therefore, cannot be attributed to a sophisticated cognitive response 
(such as a discrete emotion). The implications of this argument in the context of 
research on the influence of incidental emotions in evaluative judgments—with special 
emphasis on moral judgments—are discussed below.  
 
3. 1.1. The effect of affective priming on moral judgments understood as an effect 
of the valence and/or the arousal dimensions 
 
As mentioned above, the effect of affective inductions on moral judgment 
was found at extremely short exposure times (super-quick condition, 20-ms SOA). 
Moreover, it was found that the strength of the effect was susceptible to SOA 
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manipulations. Thus, when the SOA was extremely short (super-quick condition), the 
effect of the prime on moral judgments was stronger than when the SOA was 
moderately short (quick condition). This indicates that the shorter the SOA, the lesser 
the severity with which participants judged moral dilemmas. Previous studies on the 
effects of extremely short exposure times in affective priming shows that early affective 
reactions are generated at these type of SOAs, whereas more complex and cognitive-
demanding responses are known to involve more time in their elicitation (Paulmann & 
Pell, 2009; Stapel et al., 2002). Moreover, early affective reactions are understood as 
being “diffuse” and unspecific basic computations because they are unappraised 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). In the particular case of this research, this suggests that the 
more diffuse/nonspecific the affective prime is perceived, the greater is the effect on 
participants’ evaluations of moral dilemmas.  
 
This finding is relevant to the possible attribution of the observed effect to the 
experience of a discrete emotion. Thus, an intriguing question that arises from this work 
concerns the specific nature of the psychological response that is mediating this effect. 
As mentioned in the Discussion of Study 4, the effect of affective primes of fearful 
images on moral judgments was surprisingly similar to the effect previously found with 
disgusting images. This evidence is especially crucial for the present argument, 
concerning the specificity of the affective response causing this effect. Accordingly, 
because a fearful prime replicated the previous effect by making participants’ moral 
judgments less severe, this latter finding implies that the influence of the affective 
primes on moral judgments cannot be attributed to discrete emotions like disgust or fear. 
Instead, results from the influence of the time course of affective priming on the 
strength of the effect (Study 2 and 4) and from the content of the affective prime (Study 
4) suggest that the documented effect of affective primes on moral judgments is caused 
by a more basic affective computation (quicker, implicit, and probably unappraised) that 
is involved in the dynamic of the experience of disgust and fear.  
 
One explanation for the consistency of the effect of affective primes on moral 
judgments, across the different experimental paradigms, is that the effect is obtained as 
a result of some dimensional properties that are common to disgust and fear. According 
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to IAPS ratings, our disgusting primes (together with other mutilation images that did 
not form part of our set) are rated as very unpleasant in the valence dimension, and very 
activating in the activation dimension. Certainly, as mentioned in the overview of Study 
4, the extremity of these ratings was a potential problem when searching for new stimuli 
that could match the disgusting ones in their dimensional properties. Therefore, because 
both affective primes are characterized by the extremity of their values on the 
dimensional ratings both of valence and arousal, it could be that these two particular 
dimensions are mediating the effect obtained.  
 
However, despite that our results support the dimensional explanation of the 
effect obtained, the results of this research cannot delimit the specific weight of the 
influence of each dimension on moral judgments. Further empirical research is needed 
in order to test the proportion in which a negative valence and/or a highly aroused 
feeling is biasing this response. Therefore, in principle, it might be that any unappraised, 
negative affective response influences moral judgments by making them less severe. 
Likewise, it is equally possible that affective priming of any unappraised, affective 
stimuli that is highly activating (regardless of the valence) will influence moral 
judgments in the same way. It is intriguing that, although the influence of incidental 
emotions on moral judgments has been the focus of recent empirical attention (see 
Section 1.3.3.2), there is no evidence in the literature of the influence of specific 
affective dimensions on moral judgments that can predict the likelihood of the two 
possibilities.  
 
A complementary possibility remains open. Given the fact that we 
intentionally matched both sets of primes (disgusting and fearful) in order to avoid 
significant differences in their subjective ratings of valence and arousal, we believe it is 
certainly plausible that the similarity in the effect of both affective inductions on moral 
judgments can be attributed to the similarity of their dimensional ratings of valence and 
arousal. If this prediction is correct, it might be expected that a different unappraised, 
negative affective response that is also high activating will generate the same effect on 
moral judgments. Nevertheless, future studies are needed to definitively rule out this 
concern. In sum, on the basis of the experiments conducted in this research, we argue 
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that because of (i) the particular strength of the effect of affective primes at short SOAs; 
and (ii) the similar effects on moral judgments obtained with fearful and disgusting 
primes, the documented effect can be explained as the result of an early unappraised 
affective response that involves both the dimensional values of negative valence and 
high arousal.  
 
 
 
3.1.2 The effect of affective priming on moral judgment understood as an effect 
mediated by the withdrawal motivational function 
 
There is an alternative possibility, which suggests a higher degree of 
specificity in the dimensional explanation of this effect. It has been postulated that 
emotions are founded on brain states that organize behavior along a basic appetitive-
aversive dimension. From this perspective, all affects are associated either with a 
behavioral set favoring approach or a set disposing the organism to avoidance (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). Thus, different investigators have proposed the existence of 
two basic systems mediating different forms of motivation and emotion (Davidson, 
1995; Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Therefore, in the context of moving towards a desired 
goal, there is an approach system that facilitates appetitive behavior by generating 
certain types of affect that are approach-related. Likewise, there is a second system that 
facilitates the withdrawal of an individual from aversive sources and generates 
particular forms of negative affect that are withdrawal-related. Further, empirical 
evidence indicates that both systems are implemented in partially separable neural 
circuits, and that asymmetrical prefrontal activation might reflect such motivational 
differences, rather than valence (Davidson, 2003).  
 
This accumulating evidence of the importance of the approach-withdrawal 
motivational function in our understanding of affective responses suggests that the  
dimensional characterizations of an emotional response that are only based on the 
dimensions of valence and arousal may be missing some important affective properties. 
In the particular cases of disgust and fear, both emotions are associated with increasing 
the distance between the organism and a perceived source of aversive stimulation 
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(Davidson & Irwin, 1999). Interestingly, there is evidence suggesting that the behavioral 
effects of different emotions are better understood from their approach-withdrawal 
distinction (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Rosselló, Gálvez, Homar & Munar, 2011).  Thus, 
the fact that disgust and fear share a basic aversive dimension might be mediating this 
effect. In particular, it is possible that, in addition to the involvement of extreme 
subjective values such as negative valence and high arousal, the withdrawal 
motivational function might be also implicated in the elicitation of the specific effect of 
our affective inductions on moral judgments.  
 
 
3.1.3 The effect of affective priming on moral judgment understood as an effect of 
discrete emotions  
 
It is important to acknowledge that there is a third possible explanation to the 
documented effect. Thus, it might be that the affective inductions used in this research 
indeed elicited discrete emotions. Although the current analysis of these results and the 
literature on emotional processing strongly suggest that this possibility is certainly 
unlikely, there is some research arguing that emotions can be elicited at very short 
exposure times. According to this approach, for an emotion to be unconscious, people 
must not be able to report their emotional reaction at the moment it is caused. Yet 
evidence of the emotional reaction is needed either in their physiological or behavioral 
response, or subsequent cognitive evaluations of an affect-laden event (Winkielman & 
Berridge, 2004).  
 
Interestingly, there is also some empirical data suggesting that emotions may also 
exert their “cognitive” effects when they are not consciously experienced. Supporting 
this view, Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, and Fitzsimons (2007) found that participants 
subliminally primed with sad or guilty emotion adjectives (60ms) did not report any 
conscious difference in their emotional state, yet they behaved differently (congruently 
with appraisals of their specific emotion-prime condition) on an indulgence and helping 
task.  
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Likewise, as mentioned in (1.4.3), Yang and Tong (2010) found that specific 
emotional appraisals can be differentially influenced by subliminal emotional primes. In 
their two studies, participants exposed to subliminal angry facial expressions were more 
likely to appraise negative events as caused by other people, and participants exposed to 
subliminal sad facial expressions were more likely to appraise the same events as 
caused by situational factors. In both studies, participants exhibited distinctive patterns 
of agency appraisal as a function of the subliminal primes (26-28ms in Experiment 1 
and 16-18ms in Experiment 2) despite that the anger and sadness subjective ratings did 
not differ between prime conditions.  
 
Ruys and Stapel (2008b) used quick (120ms) and super-quick (40ms) subliminal 
affective primes of disgust and fear and cognitive, feelings, and behavioral measures to 
test the possibility of unconsciously evoked emotions. They found that quick (120ms) 
exposure to disgusting and fearful pictures resulted in emotion-specific effects by 
increasing cognitive accessibility of disgust/fear words and feelings of disgust/fear. It is 
intriguing, however, that, although they argue that they found evidence for unconscious 
emotion, they also found that their emotional inductions influenced participants’ 
subjective feelings, which contradicts the theoretical conception of what an unconscious 
emotion is, defended by Yang and Tong (2010) and Zemack-Rugar et al. (2007). More 
importantly, they found that, when exposure to the emotional primes was super-quick 
(40ms), global mood, rather than a specific emotion, was elicited.  
 
Another intriguing finding was obtained by Lee et al., (2011). In this study, they 
found differential priming effects for subliminal (10-ms SOA) fear and disgust facial 
expressions. In one task, participants judged 50% happy target faces to be more 
unpleasant when they were primed by fear faces than when primed by disgust or neutral 
faces. In another task, participants judged targets more “not genuine” when they were 
primed by fear and disgust faces than when primed by controls.63  
 
                                                 
63 Indeed, it is especially difficult to explain the first result in the context of existing literature on 
emotional dynamics (see Chapter I, 4.3). They found differential priming effects for disgust and 
fear at a 10-ms SOA, which is known to elicit only valence-based responses.  
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We are skeptical about the likelihood of this emotional-specific explanation of the 
documented effect. For one thing, direct effects of time course were found in this 
research, such as that the particular strength of effect of the affective prime was 
especially salient at short SOAs. As mentioned above, a variety of evidence suggests 
that only early affective reactions are generated at these types of SOAs, whereas more 
complex and cognitive-demanding responses (such as discrete emotions) are known to 
require more time for their elicitation (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Paulmann & Pell, 2009; 
Stapel et al., 2002).  
 
Second, a similar effect in moral judgments was obtained with fearful and 
disgusting primes. Because it is difficult to assume that both disgust and fear exert a 
domain-specific influence on moral judgments, that is, at the same time, consistent 
between both emotions and inconsistent with other studies on the influence of discrete 
emotions in moral judgments (1.3.3.2). We reject this explanation. Consequently, we 
argue that such an effect must be explained as a result from an early unappraised 
affective response, in particular, as a result of (at least) the dimensional values of 
negative valence and high arousal.  
 
 
 
3.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH ON THE 
AFFECTIVE PRIMACY ON MORAL JUDGMENTS  
 
 
 
The first aim of the present research was to examine whether disgust (as a discrete 
emotion) exerts a domain-specific influence on moral judgments. The results of this 
investigation showed that the influence of disgust on moral judgments is moral-specific, 
in the sense that it is exclusively limited to moral dilemmas. No effect of disgusting 
priming on non-moral judgments occurred either in super-quick or quick conditions. 
However, results from Study 4 with fear stimuli revealed that the documented effect on 
moral judgments cannot be attributed (at least not exclusively) to the discrete emotion 
of disgust. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous discussion, it appears that the 
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documented effect is caused by more basic affective computations that are involved in 
the complete experience of disgust and fear. In particular, results from Study 2 and 
Study 4 strongly suggest that the influence of our affective inductions in moral 
judgments should be attributed to (at least) the dimensions of negative valence and/or 
high activation.  
 
An intriguing question that arises from this work concerns the specificity of the 
obtained effect on moral judgments. Considering this problematic, results from Study 3 
suggest a possible explanation of the fact that affective priming only had an effect on 
participants´ moral judgments. Thus, our findings indicate that the specificity of this 
effect on moral judgments relies on core affective dimensional properties that are in 
some way inherent to moral dilemmas. Particularly, moral dilemmas seem to be 
intrinsically affective, in the sense that their mere perception elicits activating negative 
feelings.64 This finding constitutes a crucial distinction between moral dilemmas and 
dilemmas that do not imply moral considerations.  
 
Conversely, the perception of non-moral dilemmas did not elicit any significant 
affective reaction in participants. Such a finding was supported by the analysis of the 
differences in RT between the two types of dilemmas. Thus, participants took longer to 
rate their feelings—in valence and arousal—after reading moral dilemmas than after 
reading non-moral dilemmas. This finding is in line with the assumption that there is a 
general increase in RT for responses to affective stimulus (McKenna & Sharma, 1995). 
  
The results of this research have direct implications for the study of the causal 
relationship between incidental emotions and moral judgments. For instance, the present 
investigation provides new insights into the growing research on disgust and moral 
judgments. Therefore, we suggest that the influence of disgust on moral judgments 
needs to be redefined in terms of an interaction; in particular, effects of disgusting 
inductions in moral judgments need to be understood in the context of an interaction 
                                                 
64 It must be acknowledged that if we argue that the affective nature of moral judgments is 
mediating the specificity of the affective priming effect, then any affective judgments might be 
influenced in the same particular way. Our data cannot support this prediction, but we will return 
to this issue when discussing future directions of this research.  
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between the particular dimensional-cognitive properties of this emotion and the 
affective dimensional properties of moral dilemmas.  
 
As reviewed in Section (1.2.2), there is strong evidence supporting that emotions 
are a significant driving force of moral judgment. A variety of evidence suggests that 
moral judgment is more a matter of emotion and affective intuition than of deliberate 
reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 2002). According to the Social Intuitionist Model of moral 
judgment (Haidt, 2001), the perception of a social event automatically elicits an instant 
feeling of approval or disapproval. These feelings can be understood as affect-laden 
intuitions, as they appear automatically in consciousness with an affective valence 
(good/bad) but without any feeling of having gone through a fine-grained inference 
process.  
 
For instance, neuroscientific studies show that emotional structures are recruited 
when making moral judgments (Blair, 1995; Greene & Haidt, 2002). Moreover, as 
mentioned in Section (1.2.2.2.2), studies on “moral dumbfounding”—a cognitive state 
where a person knows that something is morally wrong, but cannot find reasons to 
justify this belief—suggest that sometimes, moral preferences need no inferences65. 
Further, knowing that something is morally wrong and explaining why appear to be 
completely separate psychological processes. Consequently, affective-laden intuitions 
play a crucial role in the knowing, while reasoning (argumentative function) is crucial in 
the explaining.  
 
In this context, the fact that affective priming inductions only influenced moral 
judgments can be interpreted as new evidence supporting this theoretical position. On 
the basis of the above-mentioned literature, results from this investigation suggest that 
feelings of activating negative affects influence moral judgments because the processing 
of this type of judgments recruits participants’ affective responses. A further clue came 
from the results of Study 3. Interestingly, unlike non-moral dilemmas, moral dilemmas 
share the same dimensional properties (negative affect and high activation) with the 
affective primes used in this research. It is to some extent intriguing that, although 
                                                 
65 We apologize to Robert Zajonc for having modified the title of his classic article, “Feeling and 
thinking: Preferences need no inferences” (1980).  
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moral judgments are known to involve affective processes (Section 1.2.2), previous 
research on the influence of incidental disgust in moral judgments have omitted the 
methodological implications of this fact.  
 
Thus, literature on affective priming suggests that a variant of the Stroop 
mechanism (MacLeod, 1991) might be underlying the moral-specificity of the 
documented effect. This mechanism accepts evaluative information just like any other 
available information. Then, in order to be operative, the Stroop mechanism only 
requires some amount of overlap between task-relevant features of targets, on the one 
hand, and features of irrelevant distracters-primes, on the other hand (Klauer & Mush, 
2003). 
 
 Indeed, results from Study 3 show that this requirement seems to be fulfilled in our 
experimental paradigms. Thus, the mentioned match in the dimensional properties of 
target (moral dilemmas) and affective primes suggests that such a mechanism might 
explain the mechanics underlying the specificity of the documented effect of affective 
priming on moral judgments. This issue can be appropriately addressed in future 
investigations of this nature, so we will come back to its consideration in the discussion 
of the Limitations and Future Directions of this investigation (3.4).  
 
 
3.3. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS FOR RESEARCH ON THE 
INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL DISGUST ON MORAL JUDGMENTS  
 
 
These results seem to contradict some important claims of the literature on 
the effects of incidental affects (such as disgust) on evaluative judgments (such as moral 
judgments). As reviewed in Section (1.3.3.2), literature on this topic supports that 
disgust makes moral judgment more severe, an effect that can be described as basically 
“assimilative” (in the sense that a negative judgment results from a negative affect). 
This claim fits the affect-as-information approach (Schwarz & Clore 1983; see Section 
1.4.2)—which predicts that affective feelings provide evaluative information about the 
current status of objects and situations—particularly well. Moreover, because feelings 
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tend to take as their object whatever is on mind at the time they are experienced, people 
often rely on their feelings at the moment of forming a judgment as if asking 
themselves: How do I feel about it? (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). From this perspective, 
affective priming can be understood as a misattribution process in which participants 
“use” incidentally induced affects as information relevant to their task (Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). Because research from this framework has focused on valence-based 
inductions of positive and negative affects, a typical finding is hedonic congruence 
between affect and judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  
 
It is important to acknowledge that, although the scope of the present research 
has the explanatory limitations mentioned in Section (3.1), any of the three possible 
explanations of the documented effect discussed above contradict the typical finding 
predicted by the affect-as-information approach: misattribution of an incidental feeling 
to the perceived target, with the resulting hedonic-congruent evaluations. Thus, even if 
the effect of affective priming on moral judgments is explained as an effect of (a) the 
valence and/or the arousal dimensions, (b) the valence and/or arousal and the appetitive-
aversive dimension, or (c) a discrete emotion, the effect cannot be characterized in 
terms of a mood-congruent judgment.  
 
The most likely explanation is that methodological differences contributed to 
the disparate results. Specifically, the current study assessed the influence of affective 
priming at different time points along the time course. Conversely, other studies have 
tested their affective induction at a single time point measure of emotional experience. 
Therefore, it could be that the latter methodology is not capturing important temporal 
differences in the dynamics of emotion. 
 
When discussing the results from Study 2, we mentioned, as a first possible 
explanation for this problematic, a difference in the intensity of our negative affective 
inductions compared with the disgusting inductions used in other experimental 
paradigms. There are, however, other explanations that can address the peculiarity of 
our effect. Consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of the affective inductions in 
moral judgments found in this research is caused by dimensional properties (as 
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considered in 3.1.1 and 3.1.2), there is (at least) another possible explanation for these 
results that deserves to be analyzed.  
 
In order to test these ideas, the next section is aimed at analyzing what we 
think are the two most possible explanations for the apparent divergence between the 
current results and previous studies on disgust and moral judgment. Therefore, we 
consider that: (a) the difference between the direction of our affective induction on 
moral judgments and that of previous studies might be mediated by the “intensity” 
factor; or (b) the difference in the direction of our effect on moral judgments and that of 
previous studies might be attributed to the absence of disgust-specific cognitions in our 
inductions. Because results from the present research do not receive support from data 
that can rule out any of these alternative explanations, the ultimate rejection of any of 
these hypothesis should be matter of further empirical treatment.  
 
 
3.3.1 Option A: Intensity of the affective induction  
 
As mentioned in the Discussion of Study 2, Schnall, Haidt et al.’s (2008) 
study provides some clues to the intensity hypothesis. First, their finding was restricted 
to participants who were highly sensitive to their internal physical reactions, leaving 
open the possibility that their participant’s oversensitivity is in some way mediating 
their results.66 Our disgust induction was not restricted to participants who were highly 
sensitive to their bodily reactions67. Also, the former authors explicitly admitted that 
they were looking for “low-level” disgust inductions (Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008, p. 
1106). We believe that this might be a possible point of divergence. Certainly, the facts 
that we selected human mutilation images as disgusting affective primes and that 
                                                 
66  Indeed, it is worthy to note that the restriction of Schnall, Haidt et al.’s (2008) findings can be 
interpreted in different ways. For instance, it is possible that participants’ oversensitivity biases 
their affective judgments negatively, regarding the particular affective induction. However, it is 
also possible that their oversensitivity is mediating the intensity of their disgusting experience, 
which will increment their severity of moral judgments. This latter alternative would not support 
the hypothesis that the difference in the intensity of the affective inductions between our research 
and other studies is mediating the apparent discrepancy in the direction of the effect.   
67 Despite we did not control private body consciousness (which is a measure of attunement to 
bodily sensations) for our participants, it certainly seems unlikely that the effect of our inductions 
was restricted to people with high scores on this scale.  
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participants perceived these primes at short and very short exposure times suggest that 
the experimental paradigms used in this research are characterized by intense affective 
inductions. Therefore, either (a) the thematic content of the primes and/or (b) the time 
course of affective priming can potentially elicit the argued affective intensity.  
 
 
3.3.1.1. Thematic content of the primes 
 
As previously mentioned, for affective priming of disgust, we selected a set of 
images that have in common the topic of human mutilations. According to IAPS ratings, 
these images (together with other mutilation images that did not form part of our set) are 
rated as very unpleasant in the valence dimension, and very activating in the activation 
dimension. In fact, the extremity of these ratings was a potential problem when we 
looked for new stimuli in Study 4. Therefore, Reisenzein (1994) argues that the intensity 
of the affective response may be the result of the contribution of both valence and 
arousal. From this perspective, whereas the emotion quality—or at least, the “affective 
core”68—is determined both by the proportion of Pleasure-Displeasure (P) and the 
proportion of Activation-Deactivation (A), the intensity of the emotion is determined by 
the absolute degree of P and A. For example, because disgust is an activating unpleasant 
feeling (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Reisenzein, 1994), increasing 
intensity of this emotion is accompanied by increasing arousal and decreasing valence.  
 
Interestingly, recent research has proposed an “affective impact” (Croucher, 
Calder, Ramponi, Bernard, & Murphy, 2011) as a factor mediating the processing of 
negative emotional images. Impact is understood as an undifferentiated emotional 
response to a stimulus that relates to the extent to which the self is affected69, a factor 
that is associated with the “core affect” of the emotion and with more sophisticated 
cognitive attributes, such as immediate relevance-significance, distinctiveness, or 
incongruity. Based on this concept, Ewbank, Barnard, Croucher, Ramponi, and Calder 
(2009) found increased amygdala activation to high-impact when compared to low-
                                                 
68 According to Russell (2003), core affect is a neurophysiological state that is experienced as a 
nonreflective feeling, a blend of hedonic (good or bad) and arousal (energized or enervated) 
values. 
69 In other words, it is not conceived to measure the quality of this reaction. 
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impact images. In their study, both sets of images were matched for ratings of arousal, 
valence, distinctiveness, visual complexity, and approach-avoidance but differed on 
subjective ratings of impact. More important to the present discussion, affective 
“impact” and arousal are two feelings that are positively correlated (Croucher et al., 
2011), which, applied to this research, suggests that it is very unlikely that highly 
arousing stimuli (such as human mutilation and fear-horror pictures) are not also high 
on impact.   
 
3.3.1.2. Time course of affective priming  
 
 
The standard theoretical model of consciousness in psychology considers the 
boundary between conscious and unconscious to be a temporal linear continuum 
(Greenwald, 1992). For Marcel (1983), this model holds that the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious must be understood as a matter of degree, in the sense that 
unconscious processes are considered to be limited in cognitive complexity and an early 
version of what happens consciously. Because representations that constitute conscious 
and unconscious experiences are indeed the same, the importance of unconscious 
processes is argued to be structural but not qualitative.  
 
However, it appears that there are some differences in the processing of 
conscious and unconscious affective stimuli (Wong & Root, 2003). As reviewed in 
Section (1.4.3), current research on emotional processing suggests that, relative to non-
emotional stimuli, there is an attentional bias for processing negative emotional stimuli 
in unconscious conditions (Le Doux, 1996; Liddell, Williams, Rathjen, Shevrin, & 
Gordon, 2004). For instance, clinical research on phobias has found that fear-relevant 
images presented outside of awareness activated stronger galvanic skin response 
(Öhman & Soares, 1994) and caused spider-fearful participants to come significantly 
closer to a live spider (Siegel & Weinberger, 2009) than when they were presented 
consciously.  
 
More important, literature on affective priming shows that SOA is a crucial 
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moderator of affective priming effects (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986). 
SOA studies have provided insights into the time course of the affective processes 
underlying automatic feelings and evaluations. For instance, there is evidence 
suggesting that extremely short exposure times can increase the strength of the affective 
induction. Results from Ruys and Stapel (2008a) revealed that participants experienced 
more negative moods when facial expressions of negative emotions were flashed super-
quickly (40ms), but no effect of the same primes on moods when they were flashed 
quickly (120ms). Interestingly, as mentioned in the Discussion of Studies 2 and 4, in the 
present research, we found that the effect of the affective primes on moral judgments 
was indeed susceptible to SOA manipulations. Although the tendency of effect of the 
prime on moral judgment was consistent across the three different exposure times, in 
both studies, the strongest effect of the prime was found in the super-quick condition 
(20-ms SOA).   
 
A possible explanation to the current results can be found in the analysis of the 
time courses of affective processes, in particular, in the distinction between early and 
late affective reactions. According to the theory of affective primacy (Zajonc, 1980, 
2000), a crucial difference between early and late reactions to affective stimuli is that 
early affective reactions are diffuse and unspecified because they are cognitively 
unappraised. Given previous results arguing that early affects are “free-floating” and 
“undedicated” (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), it is possible that the tendency observed 
across the different SOA manipulations of this research can be explained in terms of the 
dynamic variations in affective priming.  
 
Drawing on the recapitulated evidence, it is plausible that, along the time course 
of the current affective inductions, extremely short SOAs elicited only diffuse 
unappraised reactions, whereas longer SOAs (250ms and 500ms) facilitated the 
progressive activation of knowledge-based responses. Specifically, using a longer SOA 
enhances the likelihood that semantic features of the prime are carried over the target 
(Paulmann & Pell, 2009; Stapel et al., 2002).Thus, longer SOAs might reduce the 
intensity of affective effects on evaluations by re-directing selective attention to more 
“semantic” aspects of the primes (such as the communicative function of facial 
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expressions in Ruys and Stapel’s study of 2008b).  
 
As mentioned in Section (1.4.3), such a pattern may be explained as a result of 
the time course of emotional experience, suggesting that more specific evaluative 
responses (appraisals) are progressively generated with an increase of the time course of 
affective perception. Notably, in the case of the current affective primes, both disgusting 
and fearful images seems to be notably “catching”70, which provides additional support 
to the hypothesis that, at extremely short SOAs, participants were unaware of possible 
semantic distractions (like the complexity of the images), being unable to make 
evaluations that involved semantic inferences or other sophisticated evaluative 
responses.  
 
The finding that the tendency of effect of the prime on moral judgment was 
consistent across the different SOAs but that the strongest effect was found in the 
shortest SOA is important to explain this result within the context of the majority of 
studies, which indicate an opposite influence of disgust in moral judgments. Those 
studies were conducted by using experimental paradigms that differ substantially from 
the one used in the present research. Thus, the most likely explanation is that 
methodological differences contributed to the disparate results. Indeed, the fact that, in 
the current research, the lesser severity of moral judgments was found at the shortest 
SOA—which, on the basis of the mentioned literature, is assumed to be more intense—
and that longer SOAs showed a more marginal (although still significant) effect on the 
reduction of the severity of moral judgments is somewhat suggestive. Based on this 
finding, it seems feasible that this tendency can account for the apparent discrepancy in 
the particular direction of the effect of affective inductions on moral judgments obtained 
in other studies. This alternative is, however, complex and will be discussed further in 
the following section.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 Anecdotic reports from participants.  
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
3.3.2 Option B: Cognitive simplicity of the induced affective response  
 
 
As noted previously, both types of primes (human mutilation images and 
fear/horror images, respectively) caused their strongest effects at extremely short 
exposure times (super-quick condition, 20-ms SOA). Literature on emotional processing 
and affective priming effects favored that a super-quick exposure time typically 
triggered global, unappraised, valence-based reactions (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Stapel 
et al., 2002). This suggests that the influence of the prime on moral judgments found in 
Study 2 cannot be attributed to the discrete emotion of disgust.  
 
In addition, in the Methods section of Study 1, we mentioned that the current 
experimental paradigm was a self-paced task, designed so that the next dilemma was not 
presented until the subject had responded to the previous one (see Figure 6). That is, in 
the current paradigm, targets (moral and non-moral dilemmas) appear immediately after 
affective primes, functioning as backward masking71.  As mentioned in (1.4.3), there is 
evidence suggesting that the full semantic value of an affective stimulus is detected 
approximately 400ms after the onset of stimulus (Paulmann & Pell, 2009). Moreover, 
because the appearance of each dilemma immediately demands a judgment response, 
this task appears to function like a cognitive load72 that blocks the elicitation of 
elaborated appraisals. Based on these considerations, we argue that the time course of 
the current experimental paradigm rules out the possible emergence of emotional 
appraisal in the participants’ experience.  
 
Consequently, these results suggest that the documented effect is caused by a 
more basic affective response (probably unappraised) that is involved in the experience 
of disgust. Indeed, it seems likely that particular appraisals of disgust demand more time 
than 20 ms for their constitution. Further, it might be that, for the activation of the more 
                                                 
71 Backward visual masking refers to a phenomenon wherein presenting one 
visual stimulus ("masking stimulus") immediately after a brief "target" stimulus leads to disruption 
of the target processing (Maxwell & Davidson, 2004). Consistent with the definition of this 
technique, in our experimental paradigm, the SOA equals the exposure time of the prime.  
72  Cognitive load theory argues that people’s working memory is limited in the amount of 
information it can hold and the number of operations it can perform on that information. Thus, it is 
assumed that cognitive processing performed with a “load” task tends to rely on more automatic 
processes (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007).  
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complex components of disgust, participants also require more time than the moderate 
SOAs (500ms and 250ms) used in our research. As a consequence, if it is the case that 
all affective inductions were too brief to activate complex cognitions involved in the 
complete experience of disgust, it might be that this lack of “cognitive” disgust 
dimensions in participants’ experience is implicated in the apparent incongruence 
between our results and other experiments.  
 
In the following discussion, we address the viability of this hypothesis by taking 
insights from two complementary theoretical frameworks with acknowledged 
explanatory power: (i) embodiment theories of cognition, and (ii) the appraisal-tendency 
framework (ATF). With this aim, we will consider different theoretical and empirical 
findings in order to explain whether a possible lack of disgust cognitions may result in 
an absence of a disgust-specific effect on moral judgments. 
 
 
3.3.2.1 Embodiment theories of cognition  
 
 Embodiment theories claim that human cognition is mapped within our sensory-
motor system (Barsalou, Barbey, Simmons, & Santos, 2005; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Because cognitive 
processes take into account physical sensations and information from the body, there are 
psychological correspondences between concrete physical experiences and complex 
social cognitions. Particularly, embodiment in emotion processing predicts that 
emotional experiences and bodily reactions are involved in the conceptual 
representations of emotion (Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
 
Hence, diverse empirical evidence has shown that embodiments also function as 
potent causes influencing behavior.73 For instance, there is evidence showing that when 
the face adopts a particular expression, it triggers the associated emotion, which in turn 
                                                 
73Conversely, there is a variety of evidence suggesting that the reverse effect is also operative. For 
example, it has been shown that the activation of specific emotional concepts, such as pride and 
disappointment, differentially influenced body posture (Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer; & Hess, 
2009). 
Antonio Olivera La Rosa 
 
 
 
 
 
128 
 
influences social judgments. Thus, induced facial expressions have an effect on the 
perceived funniness of a joke (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) and the perceived fame 
of a face (Strack & Neumann, 2000). Both nodding (associated with positive affect) and 
shaking (associated with negative affect) actions have been shown to differentially 
influence judgment (Wells & Petty, 1980). Arm actions that pull something towards a 
person (associated with approach behavior) generate more positive judgments than arm 
actions that push something away (associated with avoidance behavior) (Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Bernston, 1993).  
 
In the same line, Williams and Bargh (2008a) showed that participants who briefly 
held a hot beverage judged an ambiguous person as having a warmer personality, 
compared to participants who held an iced beverage. People primed with physical 
closeness reported a stronger negative emotional response to violence in the media, 
compared to people primed with physical distance (William & Bargh, 2008b). More 
precisely, all these results converge in the conclusion that, when a particular bodily state 
occurs, it activates patterns of social knowledge that contain it. Once these patterns (or 
cognitions) become active, they trigger related emotional states that can influence a 
wide range of different cognitive processes.  
 
Disgust is experienced as a particularly visceral feeling; in fact, it is suggested that 
the physically embodied component of disgust is especially pronounced (Schnall, 2011). 
For example, in Schnall, Haidt et al.’s (2008) study, participants’ ratings in private body 
consciousness did not mediate the influence of sadness inductions on their moral 
judgments, whereas in the disgust condition, individuals’ ratings in private body 
consciousness were a strong moderator factor.  
 
Certainly, as mentioned in Section (1.3.3.2), a variety of studies showed a 
bidirectional link between physical disgust-cleanliness and moral cognition. If this 
relationship is indeed domain-specific, this assumption implies that the particular 
phenomenology of disgust—which is claimed to play a key role in its co-adaptation to 
social functions (Rozin et al., 2008)—can be mediating this phenomena. Therefore, if 
the embodiment of the disgust-morality connection cannot be understood in terms of 
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basic affective dimensions of disgust—just as the embodiment of the physical-
psychological distance connection cannot be explained in valence-terms—,  it is 
possible that the lack of a complete disgusting experience in our participants is 
impeding the disgust specific cognitions (the embodied knowledge) from exerting their 
expected influence on moral judgments. For this reason, whether the difference in 
outcomes can be attributed to the absence of some important disgust-relevant 
information in the response to our affective inductions is an intriguing possibility that 
deserves a complementary explanation.  
 
 
3.3.2.2. Appraisal-tendency framework (ATF) 
 
From the appraisal theory perspective, emotions are understood as patterns of 
perception or interpretation and their correlates in the central and peripheral nervous 
systems (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 2001). Among appraisal theorists, it is 
widely accepted that the organism’s evaluation of the circumstances plays a crucial role 
in the elicitation and differentiation of emotions. Therefore, the nature of an emotional 
reaction can be predicted on the basis of the subjective appraisal of the significance of 
an antecedent situation (Frijda, 1986; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
 
According to the ATF (Lerner & Keltner, 2001), the experience of an emotion 
gives rise to an implicit cognitive predisposition to appraise subsequent stimuli in line 
with the central appraisals characterizing the emotion. This perspective assumes that 
emotions are associated with specific appraisals that reflect the core meaning of the 
event that elicits each emotion (Lazarus, 1991). Further, the specific pattern of 
appraisals of each emotion determines how it influences judgments in domains that are 
thematically related to the eliciting appraisal. Thus, the ATF has helped illuminate how 
different negative and positive emotions influence social cognition. For example, 
whereas fear is associated with appraisals of uncertainty and situational control, anger 
arises from appraisals of certainty and individual control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
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Guided by this approach, Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) examined risk 
perception among dispositionally fearful and angry individuals and found that fearful 
people made pessimistic risk assessments, whereas angry people made optimistic risk 
assessments.  Moreover, according to appraisal theories, anger can be elicited when an 
undesirable event is appraised as caused by other people (agency) and sadness results 
when the same event is appraised as caused by uncontrollable circumstances (Lazarus, 
1991; Scherer, 1999). In fact, Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) induced anger 
and sadness via facial muscle movements and found that, when compared to sad 
participants, angry participants were more likely to attribute negative events to other 
people and were less likely to attribute them to situational factors. Likewise, jurors that 
were incidentally primed to feel anger (which involves agency) made more punitive 
attributions in a fictional tort case than jurors in a neutral state (Lerner, Goldberg, & 
Tetlock, 1998). 
 
In a recent study, Oveis, Horberg, and Keltner (2010) examined how pride and 
compassion produce contrasting judgments of self-other similarity. They found that the 
experience of compassion—which involves concern for those who suffer and motivates 
care-taking behavior—increased feelings of similarity with weak others. On the other 
hand, pride —which is a rank-elevating emotion centering on appraisals of strength—
enhanced the sense of self-other similarity to strong others. Moreover, there is some 
evidence suggesting that appraisal tendencies influence depth of thought. Tiedens and 
Linton (2001) predicted that incidental emotions associated with certainty appraisals 
(such as anger) would result in heuristic processing, whereas emotions associated with 
uncertainty appraisals (such as anxiety) would result in systematic processing. Indeed, 
they found that angry participants evidenced greater reliance on a heuristic source cue 
than did anxious participants.   
 
An important assumption of the ATF is that the effect of distinct emotions on 
judgment and choice are domain-specific. That is, the influence of emotion is restricted 
to fields of judgment related to appraisals of the emotion. Moreover, emotional effects 
on judgment are constrained by a match between the core appraisal dimensions/themes 
of the emotion and the salient cognitive dimensions of the judgment at hand. Applied to 
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the study of emotion-morality associations, the ATF predicts that experiencing certain 
emotions will influence moral judgments primarily in moral situations that involve 
cognitive dimensions that match the emotion-specific appraisals (Horberg, Oveis, & 
Keltner, 2011).  
 
As reviewed in Section (1.3.1.3), the core of the disgust phenomenology is a sense 
of offensiveness and revulsion accompanied by thoughts of contamination (Angyal, 
1941; Haidt et al., 1994), a knowledge structure that makes this emotion a good 
candidate to function as a defensive mechanism against different sorts of offensive 
entities. Indeed, disgust is an emotion of extraordinary inclusiveness; it is susceptible to 
be triggered by a wide range of “offensive” entities that are perceived as contaminants 
even in the absence of any real physical threat. As mentioned earlier, biological and 
cultural evolutionary processes appear to have extended disgust appraisals: disgust has 
expanded its scope to police not only what gets eaten but also how things get eaten; to 
guard the body from oral threats and to guard the soul from moral threats; in other 
words, from preserving physical health to preserving spiritual health. As Rozin and 
colleagues (2008, p. 771) point out: “The elicitors of disgust may have expanded to the 
point where the only thing they have in common is that decent people want nothing to 
do with them”.  
 
Of special relevance to the present discussion is the fact that the experience of 
disgust is accompanied by an implicit degradation of the elicitor, resulting in the 
establishment of a superior rank against the object (Miller, 1997). Moreover, as 
mentioned in (1.3.3), moral violations that expose people who “de-grade” themselves, 
in other words, that reveal the cruelty or monstrosity of persons who lack normal human 
motivations, appear to elicit moral disgust (Haidt et al., 1994; Rozin et al., 2008; Rozin, 
Haidt, & Fincher, 2009). Because the ATF claims that the experience of an emotion 
gives place to implicit cognitions that influence the evaluation of subsequent events 
congruently with appraisals of the emotion, it seems possible that the “offensive” and 
“degrading” cognitions that are involved in the appraisal of disgust influence the 
perception of moral situations congruently. This mechanism can elegantly explain the 
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moralization phenomena in which morally neutral acts that turn out to be disgusting 
enter the moral sphere (Inbar et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1997).  
 
From all this evidence, our position is that the current findings do not contradict 
previous studies on the influence of incidental emotions in moral judgments. Therefore, 
the apparent divergence between the particular effect of affective priming found in the 
present research (a decreasing in the severity of moral judgments) and previous studies 
seems to be a matter of methodological differences between experimental paradigms. 
One radical implication of this difference is the cognitive complexity of the induced 
affective response. Thus, several findings reviewed in this section show that a hallmark 
of the experience of a discrete emotion is the associated appraisals. As noted above, 
there is substantial literature showing that fully experiencing an emotion implies 
experiencing the cognitive appraisals that comprise the emotional state (Han et al., 
2007). On the basis of (a) the particular strength of the effect of affective primes at 
extremely short SOAs, and (b) the similar effects in moral judgments obtained with 
fearful and disgusting primes, we argue that the influence of affective primes on moral 
judgments cannot be explained as a result of specific emotional appraisals.  
 
In conclusion, based on a variety of research that shows the critical influence of 
time course on the effects of affective priming, we suggest that the documented effect 
can be explained as a result of an early unappraised affective response, in particular, a 
response involving (at least) the dimensional values of negative valence and high 
arousal. Further, we propose this insight as a fundamental distinction between this 
research and previous studies of the influence of incidental emotion on moral 
judgments. Consequently, if we adopt a dynamic conception of the effects of incidental 
emotion on moral judgments, then both lines of research are complementary rather than 
exclusive (temporal dynamics of affective elicitation)  
 
As previously mentioned, it is plausible that, along the time course of the current 
affective inductions, extremely short SOAs elicited only diffuse unappraised reactions, 
whereas longer SOAs facilitated the progressive activation of knowledge-based 
responses. The finding that the tendency of the effect of the prime on moral judgment 
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was consistent across the different SOAs, but that the strongest effect was found in the 
shortest SOA, is important in this context. More interesting, activation of more 
sophisticated specific cognitions appears to be inversely correlated with the strength of 
the effect on moral judgments (Olivera La Rosa, Rosselló, & Munar, 2011).  
 
From the present point of view, it might be that, across the time course of affective 
priming, an increase in the SOAs leads to the activation of more fine-grained emotional 
appraisals, which in turn leads to the attenuation of the affective priming effect 
(reduction of the severity of moral judgments). Finally, it is important to acknowledge 
that this is the first study to investigate the temporal course of emotional influences on 
moral judgments in the experimental domain. We believe that assessment of the 
influence of the time course of affective priming across different SOAs enhances our 
understanding of emotion dynamics and the affective influences on moral judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.4. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 
On the basis of the current analysis, we believe that these findings regarding the 
influence of emotion time course on the severity of moral judgments reveals important 
contributions to research of the influence of incidental emotions on moral judgments. 
There are, however, many blossoming lines of research that can be framed within the 
context of these results. Although not all these lines are directly related to our central 
hypothesis, future studies that are considered in this section are consistent with, and 
perhaps intrinsically related to, the central themes analyzed in the General Discussion. 
Based on unanswered questions derived from this research that demand further 
empirical treatment, here, we outline some important directions for future work. 
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3.4.1. To test the particular weight of the dimensions of valence and arousal in the 
effect of affective priming effect on moral judgments  
 
 
Although results from this research support the dimensional explanation of 
the obtained effect, our data do not allow us to delimit the specific weight of the 
influence of each particular dimension on moral judgments. As mentioned in the 
General Discussion section, it is possible that the reduction of the severity of moral 
judgments is caused by: (a) any negative unappraised affective response; (b) any 
unappraised affective stimulus that is highly activating (regardless of the valence); or (c) 
an unappraised affective negative response that is also highly activating. As far as we 
know, there is no evidence in the literature about the influence of specific affective 
dimensions on moral judgments that can predict the likelihood of both possibilities. 
Thus, further experiments should be carried out to examine the proportion to which a 
negative valence and/or a high arousal feeling is biasing this response. For example, to 
explore the potential weight of highly arousing versus negative valence feelings on the 
current effect, it might be interesting to use different primes, such as highly arousing 
positive primes (e.g., sexual images from IAPS) or slightly arousing negative primes 
(sadness elicitors).  
 
 
3. 4.2. To test the possible influence of the withdrawal motivational function in the 
effect of affective priming effect on moral judgments  
 
There is evidence suggesting that the behavioral effects of different emotions 
are better understood from their approach-withdrawal distinction (Lerner & Keltner, 
2001; Rosselló et al., 2011; for a review, see Rosselló & Revert, 2008).  In the particular 
cases of disgust and fear, both emotions are associated with increasing the distance 
between the organism and a perceived source of aversive stimulation (Davidson & 
Irwin, 1999). Thus, it is possible that, in addition to the involvement of extreme 
subjective values such as negative valence and high arousal, the withdrawal 
motivational function is also implicated in the elicitation of the obtained effect on moral 
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judgments. To explore this possibility, we propose to use an affective induction that 
matches previous ones both in the valence and arousal values but differs in the 
approach-withdrawal dimension. For instance, anger is a negative activating emotion 
that differs from disgust and fear in its approach dimension (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 
2009a, 2009b). Further experiments on the behavioral effects of the approach-
withdrawal motivational functions should adopt anger to assess whether the withdrawal 
dimension is mediating the documented reduction of the severity of moral judgments.  
 
 
3.4.3. To test whether different methods of affective induction influence moral 
judgments in the same manner  
 
Whether or not different affective inductions of disgust and fear will replicate 
the current results remains an important unanswered question. The current research used 
evocative pictures as affective primes, which are known to present unique properties 
relative to other affective elicitors. For instance, literature on emotions shows the 
potential of emotional facial expressions as affective stimuli (Phillips et al., 2004; 
Winkielman et al., 2005; Wong & Root, 2003). As mentioned in (1.4.3), the facial 
expression of a particular emotion has the quality of an emotional elicitor, in the sense 
that it elicits a response similar to other elicitors of the same emotion. Concerning facial 
expressions of emotion, there is evidence suggesting that subjective ratings of IAPS 
images are higher in arousal and valence. Thus, it may be that IAPS pictures are more 
intense and potent as affective primes than facial expressions, even though facial 
expressions appear to be more easily identified on discrete emotion labels (Britton et al., 
2006).  
 
Further, given that the priming-and-evaluative judgment paradigm differs in 
substantial aspects from other techniques of affective induction (Fiedler, 2003) 
experimental paradigms should be developed to explore whether the effect documented 
in the current research can be susceptible to methodological variations. For example, 
autobiographical recall and guided imagery have been successfully used in several 
studies to induce positive and negative affective states (Brewer, Doughtie & Lubin, 
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1980; Wright & Mischel, 1982). Importantly, because in these procedures emotions are 
activated mentally by the subjects themselves, both autobiographical recall and guided 
imagery appear to be more sensitive to individual variables.  
 
 
3.4.4 To test the effect of negative affects on the moral domain in clinical 
populations  
 
Further studies on clinical populations that involve affective-related impairments 
and dysfunctions can provide key insights to the understanding of the influence of 
negative affective variables on the moral domain. As mentioned in (1.2.2.2.2), 
neuropsychological data suggest that bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, a brain region associated with the normal generation of social emotions, 
produces an abnormally “utilitarian” pattern of moral judgments (Koenigs et al., 2007). 
Psychopathological disorders, such as affective and anxiety disorders, can also 
illuminate some important issues about this problematic. For instance, psychopaths, 
who lack the capacity for guilt, remorse, and empathy, often engage in immoral acts 
(Blair, 1995). Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients have also been shown to respond 
to disgusting stimuli differently from healthy people (Phillips et al., 2000; Shapira et al., 
2003).  
 
In addition, some studies suggest that subliminal affective processing might be 
related to psychopathologies. Participants with schizophrenia showed a stronger 
subliminal priming effect for negative emotions (Höschel & Irle, 2001), and people with 
pervasive developmental disorders did not show a priming effect for fear (Kamio, Wolf, 
& Fein, 2006) compared to healthy participants. Altogether, such studies indicate a 
promising research program, one aimed at explaining the interaction between particular 
affective processes and moral judgments.  
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3.4.5 To test the moral-specificity of the obtained effect  
 
There is a broader interpretation of the current results. We found that highly 
activating negative affective primes reduced only the severity of moral judgments, 
whereas no effect of affective primes was observed for non-moral judgments. However, 
it might be that the current effect cannot be restricted to the moral domain. In the 
General Discussion we argued that the differential factor mediating the moral-
specificity of this effect relies on the inherent affective nature of moral dilemmas: that 
is, their perception triggers negative activating feelings, and their judgmental processes 
predominantly involve affective processes. Consistent with this assumption, it cannot be 
ruled out that targets other than moral dilemmas, but that also involve high recruitment 
of affective processes in their cognitive processing, can be influenced by our primes 
consistently. In short, it might be that “affective priming of highly activating negative 
images makes affective judgments less severe”.  
 
With this explanatory aim in place, further experiments should use affective 
targets that are not moral. For example, to explore the potential influence of the current 
effect on affective judgments, we propose using as targets different vignettes that 
describe negative activating events (e.g., “X is on his way home, thinking about his 
daughter, when suddenly a terrible car accident takes place right in front of him”). 
Likewise, other types of affective targets, such as aesthetic pieces (e.g., poetry 
fragments), can be also worthwhile to test. We believe it is especially interesting to 
investigate this hypothesis because such results may provide support for the 
characterization of moral judgment as a type of affective judgment.  
 
 
3.4.6 To test the possible application of the present findings to research on 
persuasion 
 
As noted above, it might be that our effect is not moral-specific and can be 
extended to affective judgments in general. An alternative interpretation of these results 
can be made at an attitudinal level. Thus, in the present research, affective primes 
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shaped participants’ moral judgments by making them more permissive about the 
wrongness of dilemma cues. Consequently, it is possible that our affective inductions 
can also increase people’s receptiveness to some types of arguments. In particular, it 
might be that current affective primes will lead people to accept as more valid some 
persuasive messages that rely on affective arguments.  
 
In order to explore this possibility, we propose to design a variant of the current 
experimental paradigm. In short, we can apply the same experimental paradigm and 
follow the same procedure except that, after completing the evaluation of the dilemmas, 
participants would be asked to evaluate two pieces of communication that share the 
same message but differ in their persuasive treatment: a “personal/affective” piece and 
an “impersonal/rational” piece of communication. We believe that such an experimental 
design serves as a first attempt to test the applicability of the current findings to the 
persuasion field.  
 
 
3.4.7 To test the temporal dynamic of the present effect  
 
Investigations of subliminal affective priming often assume that its influence on 
subsequent evaluations is short-lived. However, it might be that subliminal affective 
priming influences people’s evaluations and behaviors in a more pervasive manner. For 
instance, there is evidence suggesting that unconscious emotional processing has long-
lasting effects, in addition to the short-term effects that are widely observed in the 
literature. Thus, Sweeny, Grabowecky, Suzuki, and Paller (2009) found that surprise 
faces (neutral target) subliminally primed by happy faces (30ms) were better 
remembered 24h later than those primed by fear or neutral faces. In their study, this 
pattern was not observed when participants processed the same primes supraliminally. 
Based on this finding, future studies should be designed to test whether reduction of the 
severity of moral judgments by super-quick negative affective primes is a transient 
phenomenon or a long-lasting effect.  
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3.4.8. To test the fundamental mechanisms by which negative affective priming 
reduces the severity of moral judgments  
 
A central unanswered question in this research is why affective primes make moral 
judgments less severe. Although the current analysis of these results and the review of 
the literature on emotional processing strongly suggest that our effect on moral 
judgments can be understood as a dimensional effect, specifically, as the effect of a 
negative-activating unappraised affective response, it is unclear why this response 
reduced the severity of moral judgments. With regard to this issue, it might be argued 
that affective primes elicit an extreme negative affective feeling that was used as a sort 
of affective standard. Thus, because relative to primes, moral dilemmas elicit a less 
extreme negative activating feeling, this second response would be experienced as more 
pleasant, favoring more permissive judgments. However, this explanation faces an 
important obstacle. If the mechanism that explains the direction of our effect is indeed a 
non-technical contrastive effect, it would be expected that this pattern would also be 
observed in judgments of non-moral dilemmas. Moreover, because non-moral dilemmas 
are more affectively neutral, it might be expected that the extreme negative affect 
elicited by the primes would even increase the permissiveness of non-moral judgments 
relative to moral dilemmas. This was not the case. Further studies on the influence of 
incidental affects on moral judgments should be carried out to examine the fundamental 
processes by which early activating negative affects produce this effect.  
 
3.4.9. To search for the neural correlates of the response(s) induced through 
affective priming  
 
Future neuroimaging studies can provide complementary data in the effort to 
understand the brain mechanisms underlying affective processing in participants during 
our experimental paradigms. For instance, various studies indicate that the 
neurocircuitry needed for basic affective responses is largely contained in subcortical 
emotional brain structures (Le Doux, 1996). Of special relevance to the present research 
is the fact that subcortical systems provide a rapid analysis of the affective attributes of 
the stimuli, before any fine-grained analysis or attentional modulation can occur. 
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Likewise, Lang (1995) argues that the structural foundation of valence and arousal 
effects is in the brain's appetitive and aversive motive systems (which are largely 
subcortical). These subcortical structures are phylogenetically ancient and may carry out 
basic operations that are essentially preconscious, compared with the more elaborated 
involvement of the human cortex in conscious emotional feelings (Liang, Zebrowitz, & 
Aharon, 2009; Tamietto & Gelder, 2010). Thus, although non-conscious perception of 
affective stimuli is mainly processed in subcortical structures74, direct connections exist 
between subcortical and cortical regions—for example, between the amygdala and 
cortical regions such as the orbitofrontal, the anterior cingulated cortex or the temporal 
cortex—(Tamietto & Gelder, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, neuroimaging data might contribute to test the dimensional 
explanation of the effects of affective priming that is proposed in this research. For 
instance, it is interesting that despite that disgust and fear are known to have different 
neural basis75, both emotions exerted a remarkably similar influence on moral 
judgments. In addition, the particular nature of our disgusting primes (pictures of human 
mutilations) might be accounted for by neuroimaging techniques. For example, Wright, 
He, Shapira, Goodman, and Liu (2004) found distinct neural responses to viewing 
pictures of contamination and human mutilation. Specifically, viewing pictures of 
mutilation caused greater activation of the occipitotemporal cortex and unique 
activation of the right superior parietal cortex than viewing pictures of contamination 
 
 
3.4.10. To examine possible implications of this line of research for neuro ethics  
 
The present findings support the claim that preferences and judgments are 
influenced by irrelevant features of the decision context. In Section (1.3.3.2), we 
reviewed various studies that show how seemingly unconnected events largely 
influenced the outcomes of moral decisions without the awareness of the decision 
                                                 
74 Interestingly, activity in subcortical structures is, in several cases, enhanced in response to non-consciously 
perceived stimuli compared with activity in response to consciously perceived stimuli (Anderson, Chriistoff, 
Panitz, De Rosa, &  Gabrieli, 2003). 
75 Thus, whereas the amygdala is involved both in conscious and non-conscious processing of fear-relevant 
information, this brain area has rarely been associated with the processing of disgust stimuli (typically associated 
with activity in the insula and basal ganglia nuclei; Calder et al., 2001). 
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maker. Clearly, the finding that incidental affective responses can distort moral 
judgments has serious implications for certain social issues outside the laboratory. 
Consider the presence of disgust in the legal system. For instance, a defense lawyer may 
attempt to elicit disgust in jurors. In so doing, the appraisal tendencies of disgust can 
color subsequent judgments by prioritizing specific concerns (such as a sense of 
offensiveness) resulting in harsher judgments. Likewise, what happens if a judge briefly 
perceives an extremely negative image in the news before he arrives at the courtroom; 
does that play a role in who gets punished or who ends up in prison? More specifically, 
can the perception of that image reduce the severity of his incoming judgments? Given 
the particular nature of the present findings, we believe that such questions deserve to 
be answered.  
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APPENDIX I: MORAL DILEMMAS  
 
 
 
 
 
1.a 
Una madre con sus dos hijos estaban caminando por el bosque. Ellos querían llegar a la 
cima de la montaña para contemplar las cataratas. De repente, cuando los niños ven las 
cataratas corren hacia la cima de la montaña, tropezando con una gran piedra que hace 
que empiecen a caer por el precipicio. En ese mismo momento, su madre atrapa a los 
dos, tomando a cada uno con una mano. Desafortunadamente son muy pesados para ella 
y empiezan a resbalarse. En este contexto, la única opción que la madre tiene es utilizar 
sus dos manos, lo cual implica dejar caer a uno de sus hijos. Si ella continúa utilizando 
solo una mano para cada hijo, los dos morirán.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que utilice las dos manos?  
 
1.b 
Una madre y sus dos hijos deciden visitar un famoso rascacielos para celebrar el 
cumpleaños de uno de ellos. Cuando ellos están en el piso más alto, ellos piensan que 
sería buena idea salir a la terraza y disfrutar la vista de la ciudad. Sin embargo, los niños 
están muy emocionados y no dejan de jugar, con la mala suerte que ambos tropiezan 
con un cable y empiezan a caer por el precipicio. Inmediatamente, su madre reacciona y 
logra atraparlos, utilizando una mano para cada uno, pero los niños son muy pesados y 
empiezan a resbalar. La única opción que ella tiene es utilizar las dos manos, lo cual 
supone dejar a uno de sus hijos caer. Si ella continua utilizando una mano para cada 
niño, ambos morirán.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que utilice las dos manos?  
 
2.a 
Un anciano está caminando por el parque cuando de repente encuentra una billetera. 
Decide abrir la billetera y comprueba que contiene la identificación de su dueño, junto 
con 200 euros. El anciano considera devolver la billetera, pero es consciente que ese 
dinero es exactamente el que le permitiría poder realizarse la operación por la cual lleva 
esperando más de un año. 
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que conserve el dinero)?  
 
2.b 
Es el día de noche vieja. Una señora de la tercera edad se encuentra se encuentra en la 
plaza del centro jugando al parchís con sus amigas.  Una vez finalizada la partida, cada 
una decide regresar a su casa. En el camino de regreso, a dos calles de llegar a su piso, 
la señora descubre que alguien se ha dejado su billetera olvidada en una banca. En ella 
figura la identificación del propietario, junto con 220 euros. La señora considera 
devolver la billetera, pero recuerda que ese dinero es justo el que necesita para no 
postergar más su operación  y empezar el año con el pie derecho.  
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En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que conserve el dinero)?  
 
3.a 
Un joven ha estado intentando encontrar un trabajo sin éxito en los últimos meses. 
Después de tantos intentos, el descubre que necesita inventar una buena historia para 
incrementar sus posibilidades de ser contratado.  En la siguiente entrevista está 
dispuesto a inventar que su hermano tiene una enfermedad degenerativa y que necesita 
el trabajo urgentemente para ayudarle. Al hacer esto, incrementará las posibilidades de 
ser contratado, en detrimento de otros candidatos que se encuentras más calificados que 
él.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que invente la historia)?  
 
3.b 
Un joven fue despedido del restaurante donde trabajaba como parte de las medidas de 
recorte de personal. Después de varios meses sin poder encontrar un trabajo, decide que 
necesita buscar nuevas estrategias, por lo que considera acudir a la siguiente entrevista 
inventando una historia: acaba de perder a su familia en un accidente de tráfico y 
necesita con urgencia el empleo. Al hacer esto, incrementará las posibilidades de ser 
contratado, perjudicando a otros candidatos que se encuentras más calificados que él.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que invente la historia)?  
 
4.a 
Un joven universitario está jugando con su cachorro favorito. Él solo lleva puestos unos 
calzoncillos, y el gatito algunas veces camina sobre ellos . Algunas veces, esto le genera 
al joven un gran placer. El gatito parece disfrutar también el juego.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que continúe jugado con su gato)?  
 
4.b 
La perra de un joven universitario ha parido 10 cachorros. Como en anteriores 
ocasiones, decide venderlos y quedarse solo con uno. Sin embargo, esta vez establece 
una relación muy cercana con el cachorro, por lo que le hace dormir en su cama. El 
joven nunca utiliza pijama, así que cuando está en la cama con el cachorro existen 
contactos que le generan placer. El cachorro también parece disfrutar del contacto. 
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que continúe durmiendo con su cachorro )?  
 
5.a 
Un perro ha sido atropellado a unos metros de la casa de su dueño. El dueño no entiende 
dónde se ha metido su perro, sin embargo, cuando sale de su casa encuentra  su cadáver. 
Él ha visto diferentes reportajes en los cuales en ciertos países la gente ocasionalmente 
come carne de perro, y tiene curiosidad de comprobar a qué sabe.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que coma a su perro como cena)?  
 
5.b 
Un perro se encuentra en el campo con su dueño, en plena excursión. De repente, el 
dueño ha perdido de vista a su perro y después de una hora le encuentra muerto víctima 
de una trampa de cazador. Él es muy aficionado a las pieles, así que piensa que sería una 
buena idea utilizar la piel de su perro para decorar su sala, pues hace juego con sus 
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muebles.    
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que utilice la piel de su perro para decoración)?  
 
6.a 
Un avión se ha estrellado en el Himalaya como resultado de una tormenta impredecible. 
Solo hay un superviviente, el resto de la tripulación murió en el accidente. Después de 
días sin comida, el sobreviviente entiende que si quiere sobrevivir debe alimentarse del 
único cadáver que ha encontrado, el cual, curiosamente, viajaba en el asiento de al lado.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se alimente del cadáver)?  
 
6.b 
Una expedición científica fue enviada a la Antártida. Un día, mientras caminaban por 
los glaciares, una gran capa de hielo que les servía de apoyo sufrió una fractura, lo que 
supuso que gran parte de la expedición muera congelada en el agua. Solo dos 
sobrevivieron, pero uno de ellos, al cabo de unos días murió como consecuencia del 
frío. El único científico sobreviviente, al verse solo y sin provisiones, entiende que si 
quiere seguir con vida debe utilizar como alimento a su compañero.     
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se alimente del cadáver)?  
 
7.a 
Un hombre con una enfermedad terminal está enfrentándose a sus últimas horas.  Él ha 
consultado a los mejores especialistas del mundo en su enfermedad y todos han 
coincidido en el mismo diagnóstico: no le queda ninguna posibilidad de sobrevivir más 
de un día. El enfermo está convencido que para salvar su alma su cadáver debe ser 
utilizado como alimento para lobos, así que decide llamar a su mejor amigo para que se 
encargue de llevar su cadáver a una reserva de lobos que se encuentra a unas horas de la 
ciudad. Su amigo comparte la misma creencia.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que su amigo utilice el cuerpo como alimento 
para lobos )?  
 
7.b 
Un hombre que ha dedicado su vida al cuidado de los perros abandonados ha sufrido un 
accidente de tráfico. Cuando es trasladado al hospital, el médico le informa que su 
muerte es inevitable e inmediata, así que se hace responsable de cumplir su última 
voluntad. El hombre le asegura que lo que más desea es ser útil a su causa, por lo que 
pide al médico que utilicen su cuerpo como alimento para los perros a los que les ha 
dedicado su vida. Para el médico no hay nada más importante que los deseos de un 
moribundo.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que el médico utilice el cuerpo como alimento 
para perros)?  
 
8.a 
Un joven de una tribu amazónica se dedica a cazar jaguares. Tiene mujer e hijos, y 
como es costumbre en su tribu el debe hacerse cargo de la economía de la familia. 
Aunque sabe que se trata de una especie en extinción, es la única forma de ganarse la 
vida que le permite mantener a su familia en condiciones dignas. Sabe que siempre 
podría dedicarse a recolectar frutos, pero esto le supondría a su familia muchas 
dificultades para sobrevivir.  
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En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se dedique a la caza furtiva)?  
 
8.b 
La caza furtiva de tigres ha dejado a esta especie al borde de la extinción. Una de las 
causas de esta situación ha sido el gran valor de su piel, codiciada en diferentes 
mercados negros del mundo. Al entrevistar a un cazador furtivo, este admitió que era 
consciente de la situación de riesgo de la especie, pero que la gran demanda de los 
productos derivados de esta especie había posibilitado poder ofrecerles a sus hijos la 
posibilidad de educación.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se dedique a la caza furtiva)?  
 
9.a 
Un joven está celebrando su cumpleaños en su casa de campo. Él ha bebido muchas 
copas de más pero tiene ganas de continuar la celebración. Al cabo de unas horas, todos 
sus invitados se han retirado, excepto su novia. De repente, ella empieza a sentir un 
fuerte dolor en el pecho, y entra en estado de shock. El joven llama a la ambulancia, 
pero nadie contesta. Él se encuentra mareado por el exceso de alcohol, pero entiende 
que la única opción que tiene de salvar a su novia es conducir hasta el hospital más 
cercano.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que conduzca en esas condiciones)?  
 
9.b 
En una íntima ceremonia, una pareja celebra sus bodas de oro acompañados de sus 
familiares y amigos más cercanos. Todos han disfrutado de una gran velada. Cuando la 
ceremonia llega a su fin, los invitados proceden a retirarse, dejando solos a la pareja. 
Inesperadamente, la señora empieza a sentir un fuerte dolor en el pecho, y entra en 
estado de shock. El señor llama a la ambulancia, pero la señal es muy mala y no 
establece contacto. Él ha bebido muchas copas de más durante la celebración y se 
encuentra mareado, pero entiende que la única opción que tiene de salvar a su mujer es 
conducir hasta el hospital más cercano.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que conduzca en esas condiciones)?  
 
10.a 
Una pareja de hermanos se encuentra de vacaciones de verano en una isla paradisíaca. 
Las vacaciones marchan muy bien, y ellos se sienten muy unidos. Un día, los hermanos 
deciden que sería divertido tener relaciones sexuales. Ambos han sido diagnosticados 
repetidas veces de esterilidad, sin embargo ellos deciden que no pierden nada siendo 
extremadamente responsables, por lo que los dos hermanos utilizan métodos 
anticonceptivos.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que  tengan sexo) ?  
 
10.b 
Es el día de la graduación de uno de los mellizos de la familia. Dentro de dos días dejará 
su casa para vivir en Japón, donde ha obtenido una beca. Él es muy unido a su hermana 
melliza, por lo que le propone que una buena forma de despedirse sería manteniendo 
relaciones sexuales la noche anterior a su marcha.  Ella piensa que es una buena idea. 
Desde hace varios años, los mellizos han sido diagnosticados de esterilidad por un 
problema genético. Sin embargo, ellos deciden que tampoco supondría un gran 
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sacrificio que ambos utilizaran métodos anticonceptivos.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que  tengan sexo) ?  
 
11.a 
Es periodo electoral. Uno de los candidatos ha sido acusado de ser el responsable de una 
gran cantidad de asesinatos. Las evidencias son clarísimas, incluso ha realizado 
asesinatos en lugares públicos, pues no teme a las autoridades. Todos aquellos que se 
enfrentan a él son eliminados. Un joven se encuentra presenciando el discurso de este 
candidato desde la ventana de su piso y considera que es una opción irrepetible para 
utilizar el arma que acaba de comprar y pegarle un tiro. Sin embargo, las únicas 
municiones que tiene están diseñadas con una pólvora especial que genera 
instantáneamente la muerte. Él sabe que de lo contrario nadie hará nada y los asesinatos 
masivos continuarán indefinidamente.    
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que utilice el arma) ?  
 
11.b 
La policía lleva persiguiendo a un asesino en serie desde hace mucho tiempo. Cuando 
finalmente dan con su casa, encuentran que está vacía. Por esos días, un joven se 
encuentra haciendo fotos sobre una desértica frontera del país que no es vigilada por 
ningún gobierno. En ese momento aparece el asesino en serie, quien corre desesperado 
hacia la frontera. El joven lo identifica y considera que sería una buena idea utilizar la 
escopeta que le regalo su padre y matarlo. La escopeta está diseñada exclusivamente 
para disparar unas balas que generan la muerte sin importar la localización del tiro. Él 
sabe que si no hace nada, el asesino huirá y seguirá con sus crímenes.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que utilice el arma) ?  
 
12.a 
Un joven arquitecto se encuentra inspeccionado un edificio en construcción. Es una 
obra importante, por lo que ese día está acompañado por su jefe. Su jefe ha sido acusado 
de violación en muchas ocasiones por empleadas de la constructora, pero debido a sus 
poderosas influencias siempre ha sido absuelto de los cargos. El joven arquitecto sabe 
que las acusaciones son fundamentadas, pues una de las víctimas fue una persona muy 
cercana a él que nunca le mentiría. Si el joven arquitecto empuja a su jefe cuando están 
revisando el nuevo edificio el jefe morirá y todos pensarán que fue un accidente.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que empuje a su jefe?  
 
12.b 
Una compañía de seguros acostumbra realizar un sorteo mensual en el cual dos de sus 
empleados tienen la opción de ganar un viaje. Este mes, los ganadores fueron un joven 
pracitcante y su jefe, quienes ganaron un billete a Chile y la posibilidad de escalar las 
montañas. El jefe del practicante es una persona muy poderosa, lo cual le ha valido para 
salir absuelto de una gran cantidad de acusaciones de violación a sus empleadas. Una de 
sus víctimas fue una persona muy cercana al practicante a la cual le tiene máxima 
confianza, por lo que él sabe que las acusaciones son fundamentadas. Si el practicante 
empuja a su jefe cuando se encuentran en la montaña el jefe morirá y todo quedará 
como un accidente.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que empuje a su jefe?  
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13.a 
Una pareja de famosos ha contraído matrimonio. Una estudiante de fotografía se 
encuentra realizando diversas fotos en el centro de la ciudad, cuando de repente 
reconoce a uno de los famosos besándose apasionadamente con una persona que no es 
su pareja. La estudiante considera la opción de realizarles una foto y enviarla a su pareja 
oficial, para que descubra el engaño.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que haga la foto) ?  
 
13.b 
Un sábado por la tarde, la catedral más importante de la ciudad es el escenario de la 
boda de dos jóvenes adinerados. Debido a la gran cantidad de coches e invitados, mucha 
gente curiosa merodea afuera de la iglesia, intrigada por tanto glamour. Cuando ha 
terminado la ceremonia, uno de los novios se aparta de los invitados asegurando que ha 
recibido una llamada de su padre, sin advertir que una estudiante de periodismo se 
encuentra justo al lado y escucha toda la conversación, en la cual reconoce que toda la 
boda es solo un montaje y ama a otra persona. La estudiante considera la opción de 
utilizar su grabadora y registrar la conversación, con el fin de enviarla a su pareja y 
descubrir el engaño.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que grabe la conversación) ?  
 
14.a 
La patrulla de bomberos de una ciudad minera tiene como regla número uno el trabajo 
en equipo. Son consientes que el error de un miembro del grupo puede costar muy caro 
a los demás. Un noche, durante el incendio de una edificio, el jefe de los bomberos 
decide que es imprescindible que el grupo no se separe a más de dos metros entre cada 
bombero, por lo cual entran todos al edificio en ruinas con una cuerda en la cintura que 
les imposibilita dispersarse. Cuando el jefe ordena la retirada, uno de los bomberos cree 
divisar a una persona atrapada en el fuego, por lo cual considera hacer un esfuerzo y 
acercarse. El bombero sabe que si no se retira al mismo tiempo que los otros miembros 
de la patrulla, esto supondría poner en alto riesgo la vida de todos.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que rompa con las órdenes de retirada) ?  
 
14.b 
Un escuadrón de policías especialistas en rescatar rehenes se dispone a realizar una 
peligrosa misión. Según los han informado, la casa donde se encuentra el rehén está 
protegida por un numeroso grupo de terroristas altamente preparados, por lo cual 
cualquier error puede costar el fracaso de la misión y numerosas vidas. Ellos han sido 
entrenados de tal forma que cada miembro del equipo hace la función de una 
extremidad de un solo cuerpo, que es el escuadrón. Si alguien falla, todos fallan. 
Mientras se encuentran realizando la operación, uno de los miembros del equipo cree 
identificar al rehén escondido debajo de una cama, por lo que considera hacer el 
esfuerzo y acercarse. El sabe que si realiza ese movimiento el equipo se encontrará 
desconcertado y esto supondrá un alto riesgo para la vida de todos.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que rompa con la organización) ?  
 
15.a 
Es el año 2020. En la ceremonia del premio Nobel de la Paz se le va a otorgar el premio 
a la persona que solucionó los problemas de pobreza extrema en varios países del tercer 
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mundo. El insiste en que aún queda mucho por hacer, y que tiene un plan para 
solucionar la pobreza extrema en los próximos años. Una madre soltera presencia el 
discurso con gran satisfacción, cuando de repente visualiza a un francotirador que está 
dispuesto a disparar al flamante ganador. Ella sabe que la única forma de salvarlo es 
interponerse en la trayectoria de la bala, pero que esto supondría dejar huérfano a su hijo 
de 4 años, quien no tiene a nadie más que cuide por él. Si no se interpone en el disparo, 
el ganador del premio Nobel morirá, y la pobreza extrema no encontrará solución.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se sacrifique)?  
 
15.b 
Es el año 2030.  Ha terminado la tercera guerra mundial  y muchos países han quedado 
en ruinas. En una ex -potencia mundial se han realizado las elecciones, resultando 
ganador el único candidato que está dispuesto a mantener la paz entre su país y los 
países vecinos. Con la elección de este presidente surge la única posibilidad de 
restablecer la prosperidad, pues sus rivales buscan mantener la pobreza extrema para sus 
beneficios personales. El día del primer discurso del nuevo presidente, un francotirador 
está dispuesto a disparar. Una señora advierte su presencia. Ella sabe que si no se 
interpone en la trayectoria de la bala el nuevo presidente morirá, pero es consciente que 
esto supondría dejar a su hijo pequeño huérfano, pues no tiene más familia que ella. De 
lo contrario, si no se interpone al disparo la pobreza extrema de la post-guerra se 
mantendrá.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se sacrifique)?  
 
16.a 
Es la reunión trimestral de una empresa exportadora de libros. Llevan reunidos muchas 
horas realizando el balance económico. Un padre de familia le ha prometido a su hijo 
que lo iría a ver actuar en una obra de teatro que realiza junto a otros compañeros de su 
colegio. El niño ha ensayado mucho y es su única representación. Cuando finalmente 
termina la reunión de la empresa, el padre de familia conduce hacia el teatro, pero por 
controles rutinarios es detenido momentáneamente por un policía, quien le solicita el 
carnet de conducir. Para su mala suerte, el padre de familia lo ha olvidado, por lo que 
considera sobornar al policía, quien le ha sugerido esa posibilidad. Él sabe que si no lo 
hace, no podrá ver a su hijo y se sentirá muy decepcionado.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que realice el soborno)?  
 
16.b 
Un joven estudia en un colegio muy prestigioso. Su familia es muy pobre, y para pagar 
el colegio su padre debe hacer un gran esfuerzo y trabajar prácticamente todo el día. En 
el examen final de una asignatura el joven tiene un mal día y suspende. Cuando 
conversa con su profesor, este le sugiere que podría modificar la nota si recibe una 
cantidad de dinero. El niño tiene amigos que le podrían prestar esa cantidad, por lo que 
considera aceptar la oferta. Él sabe que si no lo hace, suspenderá la asignatura y su 
padre se sentirá muy decepcionado.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que realice el soborno)?  
 
 
17.a 
Un practicante necesita ir al baño con urgencia. En ese momento todos están ocupados, 
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así que entra al que se encuentra al lado de la oficina del gerente general. Como las 
paredes son muy delgadas, el practicante escucha con toda claridad una conversación en 
la cual el gerente asegura que tiene pensado despedir a su jefe directo, y que el propio 
practicante será ascendido al cargo disponible. Cuando  el practicante regresa a su 
oficina se encuentra con su “aún” jefe directo y considera que sería buena idea 
informarle de las nuevas noticias.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que sea indiscreto)?  
 
17.b 
Un estudiante se encuentra cursando las últimas asignaturas de su carrera. Él ha 
solicitado al Decano del departamento una plaza para ser profesor asociado. Una tarde, 
mientras realiza unos trámites cerca de la oficina del Decano, el estudiante lo escucha 
gritar visiblemente alterado que tiene decidido despedir a un profesor asociado y 
contratar al propio estudiante para que lo reemplace. El profesor que van a despedir es 
su director de tesis. Cuando el estudiante termina sus trámites se encuentra a su “aún” 
director de tesis y considera que sería buena idea informarle de las próximas noticias. 
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que sea indiscreto)?  
 
18.a 
Una mujer se encuentra descansando en casa cuando recibe el mail de una importante 
organización internacional para la lucha contra el SIDA. La organización le solicita 
realizar una donación equivalente a la mitad de su ingreso mensual. La carta le explica 
que esa donación hará posible que la organización pueda facilitar atención médica para 
gente en extrema pobreza alrededor del mundo. La mujer le ha prometido a su hijo 
pequeño que lo llevaría a Disney esas navidades y el niño está muy ilusionado. Si 
realiza la donación no podrá cumplir su promesa, pues no le alcanzará el dinero. 
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que haga la donación?  
 
18.b 
Un niño está muy ilusionado con pasar las navidades en una cabaña en la nieve y su 
madre le ha prometido que cumplirá su deseo. Un día, la madre recibe una carta de una 
organización muy importante que se dedica a ayudar a enfermos de cáncer. La 
organización le solicita que realice una donación (equivalente a la mitad de su sueldo) 
que les permitirá ayudar a aquellos enfermos que se encuentran en extrema pobreza en 
el tercer mundo. Si la madre realiza la donación no le alcanzará el dinero para cumplir 
con la promesa que le hizo a su hijo de pasar la navidad en la cabaña.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien que haga la donación?  
 
19.a 
Un joven estudiante se encuentra muy preocupado. Una persona muy cercana a él ha 
decidió ingresar a una secta religiosa que promueve una vida de reclusión extrema, por 
lo que ahora esta persona vive en una montaña aislada de toda la civilización.  Los 
miembros de esta secta están convencidos que solo mediante esa forma de vida se puede 
alcanzar la salvación.  El joven estudiante recuerda que hasta hace poco esta persona 
disfrutaba mucho de los placeres cotidianos de la vida,  y era muy  conocida por ser 
especialmente alegre.  Él decide conversar con esta persona para conocer su opinión, 
pues teme que haya sido manipulada por el líder de la secta. La persona le asegura que 
no ha sido manipulada y que desde que ingresó a la secta ha descubierto la verdadera 
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felicidad.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que respete su decisión)?  
 
19.b 
Dos estudiantes de filosofía comparten una relación muy cercana. Ambos están 
sorprendidos por el crecimiento de una nueva secta religiosa que promueve un estilo de 
vida en absoluta soledad como camino a la salvación. Los dos estudiantes están 
convencidos que es posible refutar los principios de esta secta, y han dedicado los 
últimos años a obtener evidencias para informar a la opinión pública.   Ambos deciden 
que es tiempo de tomar unas vacaciones pues están exhaustos. Al regreso, uno de ellos 
le comunica al otro que se ha unido a la secta. El otro estudiante no entiende el cambio 
y le expresa su temor que haya sido manipulada por el líder de la secta. La estudiante le 
asegura que no ha sido manipulada y que desde que ingresó a la secta ha descubierto la 
verdadera felicidad.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que respete su decisión)?  
 
20.a 
Al terminar sus estudios universitarios, un joven decide que es momento de vivir algo 
diferente.  Él ha sido el mejor estudiante de su promoción, sin embargo no tiene ningún 
interés en aceptar las ofertas de trabajo que recibe. Un día decide irse a las montañas a 
sentir el contacto con la naturaleza. No informa a nadie, solo a su hermano, pero le hace 
jurar que no diga nada a sus padres, pues son muy represivos.  Al cabo de unos días los 
padres han movilizado a la policía para que lo busque, pero no tienen la menor idea de 
cuál puede ser su paradero.  Él joven aventurero se comunica regularmente con su 
hermano y le dice que es increíblemente feliz, y que por favor no comente a nadie sobre 
su nueva vida.  Su hermano sabe que si rompe su promesa y les dice a sus padres que 
está todo bien, ellos insistirán hasta que les haga confesar su paradero, y la nueva y feliz 
vida del joven aventurero terminará.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que mantenga silencio)?  
 
20.b 
Un joven y brillante deportista se siente inconforme con su vida. El tiene un futuro 
profesional prometedor, pero decide no fichar por ningún club, pues siente que es 
momento de cambiar drásticamente el rumbo de su vida. El día que se va de casa decide 
no avisar a nadie. Cuando su familia advierte que se ha marchado inicia una búsqueda 
constante, sin ningún éxito. Al cabo de un tiempo, su hermano lo encuentra en la calle y 
nota que la personalidad del joven deportista ha cambiado por completo. El joven 
deportista le dice que es realmente feliz,  que desde que dejo su casa ha vivido en el 
campo y que ha encontrado la paz interior que buscaba.  Cuando se van a despedir, el 
joven deportista le hace jurar a su hermano que no dirá nada, pues con toda seguridad 
sus padres no se detendrán hasta llevarle de vuelta a casa. Su hermano accede a guardar 
el secreto.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que mantenga silencio)?  
 
21.a 
Un flamante padre de familia ha sido contratado por una prestigiosa empresa 
multinacional.  Él siempre se ha sentido orgulloso de ser fiel a sus principios, 
renunciando en varias ocasiones a oportunidades laborales que se enfrentaban a sus 
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valores. La multinacional le ofrece un sueldo que mejorará en gran medida la calidad de 
vida de su familia, que acaba de tener un nuevo miembro.  Cuando ingresa a la empresa, 
es testigo de conductas gravemente racistas, lo cual le hace considerar la posibilidad de 
denunciar a la empresa. Él sabe que esto le supondrá ser despedido, lo cual es un gran 
problema, pues debe mantener a su hijo recién nacido.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que denuncie a la empresa)?  
 
21.b 
Un profesional encuentra trabajo en la industria líder en manufacturación de productos 
textiles. Al cabo de los meses comprueba que la empresa  utiliza mano de obra de países 
del tercer mundo en condiciones ilegales, pues estos empleados se ven forzados a 
trabajar sin descanso y por un sueldo mínimo.  El profesional es un humanista 
convencido y considera denunciar a su empresa.  Él sabe que esto le supondrá ser 
despedido y tendrá que encontrar un nuevo empleo rápidamente, pues debe mantener a 
su hijo recién nacido.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que denuncie a la empresa)?  
 
22.a 
Durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, un campo de concentración es el escenario de 
diversas barbaridades. El máximo responsable de este campo de concentración es un 
guardia que disfruta de hacer sufrir a sus prisioneros. Un día, elige a dos prisioneros y le 
realiza una proposición al más joven de ellos: si el joven prisionero no ejecuta al otro 
prisionero (quien es su propio padre), el guardia ejecutará a ambos, padre e hijo.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que ejecute a su padre)?  
 
22.b 
Un grupo terrorista ha secuestrado una embajada. Ellos saben que si abandonan la 
embajada, la policía y el ejército tiene orden de disparar contra ellos, así que deciden 
permanecer en sus posiciones.  Después de varios días,  el jefe decide que es necesario 
tomar alguna medida, por lo que autoriza que entre una cámara de televisión a trasmitir 
en directo una escena. Posteriormente, el jefe terrorista escoge a un prisionero para que 
ejecute una tarea: debe matar a su propio padre, quien también es prisionero. Si no lo 
hace, el jefe terrorista ejecutará a ambos, padre e hijo.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que ejecute a su padre)?  
 
23.a 
Un vendedor comprueba que los ordenadores que ha recibido para comercializar son de 
mala calidad, ya que suelen sobrecalentarse con mucha facilidad y dejar de funcionar.  
Los fabricantes que le suministraron el producto niegan todo. Un hotel le ha solicitado 
una gran cantidad de productos. Esto supondría un gran ingreso económico para el 
vendedor, quien necesita el dinero para  operar a su abuelo de una hernia.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que realice la venta)?  
 
23.b 
La demanda por productos “light” se ve incrementada año tras año. En este contexto, un 
vendedor de suplementos dietéticos  ha recibido un nuevo producto para comercializar.  
Se trata de unas pastillas dietéticas que dificultan la asimilación de grasas en el cuerpo. 
Según las indicaciones, es necesario ingerir dos pastillas diarias durante 2 meses para 
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observar resultados.  Un amigo del vendedor ha trabajado en la fábrica de estas pastillas 
y le informa que en realidad son un placebo y si bien no suponen ningún daño, tampoco 
sirven para nada. El vendedor tiene un importante pedido de un gimnasio, el cual le 
supondría la cantidad de dinero que necesita para la operación de su abuelo, quien 
padece de una úlcera.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que realice la venta)?  
 
24.a 
La asistencia a un museo que expone cuerpos humanos está disminuyendo. La 
representante de marketing de la empresa recibe un ultimátum de los directores del 
museo: si no propone una medida que cambie la tendencia será despedida. Después de 
descartar muchas opciones, a ella se le ocurre inventar  el robo de un pulmón de uno de 
los cuerpos en exposición y convocar a conferencia de prensa para obtener impacto 
mediático e impulsar la asistencia.  Los directores del museo aprueban la idea.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que mienta al público)?  
 
24.b 
Una vendedora de casas necesita hacer una venta antes que termine el mes si no quiere 
ser despedida. La situación económica de todo el país es difícil y no son buenos tiempos 
para la adquisición de grandes propiedades.  La vendedora piensa que sería buena idea 
inventar que en dicha casa tuvo lugar hace muchos años un increíble milagro.  Ella sabe 
que si su cuento es creíble puede facilitar mucho la venta, por lo que contrata un espacio 
en un diario para contar la historia.  Sus jefes aprueban su iniciativa.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que mienta al público)?  
 
25.a 
Un joven empleado intenta estacionar en la cochera de su oficina. Accidentalmente le da 
un ligero golpe al coche de al lado, lo cual se traduce en una abolladura. Ésta no se ve a 
simple vista, por lo que el dueño del coche probablemente no la detecte 
inmediatamente. El empleado mira a su alrededor y nadie ha observado lo sucedido.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que ignore lo sucedido)?  
 
25.b 
Un domingo por la mañana, un joven empleado está jugando al fútbol. Decide chutar 
con la izquierda, y como es diestro, el balón le sale muy desviado con la mala suerte que 
da a pegar con un coche que está estacionado cerca del campo de fútbol.  El coche es 
abollado, pero solo levemente. El joven mira a su alrededor y nadie ha observado lo 
sucedido.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que ignore lo sucedido)?  
 
26.a 
Una señora acostumbra a alimentar a su perro todas las mañanas antes de ir a su oficina. 
Su perro nació con problemas en el estómago, por lo que requiere de una dieta muy 
especial. Por esta razón, la señora tuvo que aprender cuidadosamente cómo prepararle la 
comida a su mascota, pues cualquier error le supondría la muerte. Se trata de un perro 
travieso, por lo que ella contrató a un entrenador para que le pasee todos los días a 
primera hora y le enseñe cómo comportarse.  Una mañana, mientras espera que su perro 
vuelva de su paseo, recibe una llamada de la oficina. Surgió una emergencia laboral y 
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requieren que realice un viaje con urgencia, de lo contrario será despedida. Ella sabe 
que si viaja no le podrá preparar la comida especial a su perro y este morirá.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que acuda al viaje)?  
 
26.b 
Una señora ha sido ascendida a un cargo muy importante en su trabajo. Sin embargo no 
todo es perfecto, pues su perro ha enfermado.  El veterinario le informa que se trata de 
un nuevo virus, pero que con mucho esfuerzo él ha creado la formula que le permitirá 
sobrevivir.  Solo hay un problema: el veterinario se marcha para Japón esa misma 
noche, así que le deja todo el preparado a la señora para que se lo administre 
diariamente al perro.  Una noche, la señora recibe una llamada urgente de su trabajo 
donde le piden que realice un viaje de emergencia que la mantendrá dos días fuera.  Si 
ella no realiza el viaje será despedida.  Por otro lado, si permanece dos días fuera su 
perro morirá. Ella sabe que no tiene tiempo de enseñarle a nadie como administrarle el 
preparado al perro, pues requiere de un delicado procedimiento que tarda muchos días 
en ser aprendido y equivaldría a condenar a una muerte segura a su mascota.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que acuda al viaje)?  
 
27.a 
Hace muchos años, un joven cometió un robo. El era muy pobre, por lo que robo un 
poco de pescado. A los pocos días, un ladrón que ya había cometido diversos robos fue 
atrapado y enviado a prisión por ese  crimen, pues el ladrón y el joven eran homónimos. 
El joven respiró por aquel entonces aliviado, pero después de muchos años tiene 
muchos remordimientos. Él piensa que debe entregarse a la justicia, pero sabe que si lo 
hace perjudicaría a mucha gente, pues ahora es médico y se encarga de cuidar por la 
salud de muchas familias sin recursos.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se entregue a la justicia)?  
 
27.b 
Hace muchos años, un joven desesperado por su pobreza decidió robar algunos 
alimentos del supermercado. El joven logró escapar, y la policía detuvo a un conocido 
ladrón en su lugar, pues eran físicamente muy parecidos.  Cuando el ladrón fue enviado 
a prisión el joven sintió un gran alivio. Actualmente, sin embargo, tiene muchos 
remordimientos. El piensa en decir la verdad y entregarse, pero es consciente que si lo 
hace no podrá continuar con su labor humanitaria ayudando a los enfermos de lepra.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se entregue a la justicia)?  
 
28.a 
Un señor de mediana edad es testigo de un asalto. El ladrón acaba de asaltar a una 
señora mayor, quien ha quedado fuertemente golpeada por el forcejeo. El señor 
consideró intervenir pero pensó que probablemente el ladrón tendría un arma, así que se 
mantuvo al margen.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se mantuviera al margen)?  
 
28.b 
Un hombre en evidente estado de ebriedad ha golpeado fuertemente a una mujer. 
Cuando la mujer recibe el golpe, el borracho decide que es momento de irse y se aleja 
de la escena. Un señor de mediana edad ha presenciado todo lo ocurrido. Él considero 
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intervenir para ayudar a la mujer, pero le pareció identificar un arma en la chaqueta del 
borracho, por lo que optó por mantenerse al margen.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que se mantuviera al margen)?  
 
29.a 
Una madre tiene una relación muy difícil con su hija adolescente. Ellas se ven inmersas 
constantemente en fuertes peleas y pueden llegar a insultarse. Cuando no pelean, la 
relación es inexistente, llegando a estar días sin dirigirse la palabra. La madre siempre 
ha evitado utilizar la fuerza, sin embargo un día pierde el control y le pega un fuerte 
bofetón a su hija. La hija ha quedado fuertemente golpeada, incluso ha perdido un 
diente. La hija escapa de su casa y considera denunciar a su madre por maltrato familiar. 
Recientemente se ha aprobado una ley que especifica que en todos los casos de maltrato 
familiar los(las) agresores(as) serán penalizados con dos semanas de cárcel.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que denuncie a su madre)?  
 
29.b 
Una adolescente vive con su madre en un piso. La adolescente considera a su madre una 
persona histérica que lo único que hace es gritarle constantemente. Por otro lado, la 
madre considera a su hija una irresponsable que solo busca estar fuera de casa. La 
relación entre ellas es bastante mala. Un día, la hija decide escaparse sin avisar y tienen 
una dura discusión, que termina en un fuerte bofetón. La madre nunca antes había 
querido llegar a la violencia física, pero esta vez no pudo contenerse. La hija ha 
quedado fuertemente golpeada, incluso se ha fracturado la nariz, por lo cual decide 
escaparse y considera denunciar a la madre por maltrato al menor. Recientemente se ha 
aprobado una ley que especifica que en todos los casos de maltrato a menores los(las) 
agresores(as) serán penalizados con dos semanas de cárcel.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que denuncie a su madre)? 
 
30.a 
Un joven estudiante tiene una enfermedad terminal. Toda su familia intenta evitar el 
fatídico desenlace y ha decidido explorar todas las opciones que existen para poder 
ayudar al joven. Después de consultar con diferentes expertos, ellos deciden unirse para 
poder pagar un caro tratamiento. Sin embargo, pasan los meses y el tratamiento no 
ofrece ningún resultado importante, por lo que la familia debe decidir si continúan 
invirtiendo todo su dinero o deciden poner una fecha límite de mejoría. Ninguno de 
ellos es millonario, y todos tienen hijos que mantener.  
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que establezcan una fecha de mejora límite 
para continuar con el tratamiento)? 
 
 
30.b 
Un joven aficionado al deporte ha sido diagnosticado con una enfermedad terminal. Los 
médicos son pesimistas con sus posibilidades, pero le informan que existe un 
tratamiento que, en caso tenga éxito, podría alargar un poco su vida. La familia del 
joven está dispuesta a ayudar en todo lo posible pero el tratamiento es carísimo y las 
probabilidades de éxito son prácticamente inexistentes. Además, dependiendo de cómo 
asimile el joven el tratamiento, la inversión inicial puede verse incrementada 
progresivamente. Realizar la inversión supondría dejar a todos los miembros de la 
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familia en una muy delicada situación económica y todos tiene hijos que mantener.   
En esta situación, piensas que está bien (que establezcan una cantidad límite para 
invertir en el tratamiento)? 
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APPENDIX II: NON-MORAL DILEMMAS  
 
 
1.a 
Un estudiante de periodismo se levantó tarde y tiene un examen muy importante. Si no 
lo aprueba suspende la asignatura por segunda vez. Para ir a la universidad tiene dos 
opciones: coger el metro o el bus. El metro es más rápido por lo que no tendría 
problemas en llegar a tiempo; sin embargo, algunas veces puede llegar a tardar hasta 
media hora entre cada tren y en ese caso podría llegar 20 minutos tarde. El bus es más 
lento pero pasa con la misma frecuencia por lo que llegaría con seguridad 10 minutos 
tarde. El estudiante considera que vale la pena arriesgarse y decide utilizar el metro. 
En esta situación,  te parece buena elección que utilice el metro? 
 
1.b 
Un estudiante de publicidad anotó mal la fecha de su examen y acaba de descubrir que 
es dentro de 30 minutos. Si no consigue llegar a tiempo va a suspender por segunda vez.  
Para llegar tiene dos opciones: coger el bus o ir en bicicleta. Es invierno y está lloviendo 
torrencialmente. El bus es muy puntual pero llegaría 10 minutos tarde. En bicicleta 
llegaría a tiempo si va a toda prisa; sin embargo, la lluvia podría jugarle una mala 
pasada y obligarla a desviarse, lo cual supondría que llegue a su examen con 20 minutos 
de retraso. El estudiante se arriesga y elige la bicicleta. 
En esta situación te parece una buena elección que prefiera ir en bicicleta? 
 
2.a 
Un trabajador en una planta industrial se encarga de llenar con galletas las cajas de 
cartón que son transportadas por una cinta hasta su puesto. Como lleva varios años en la 
misma planta, el trabajador  sabe que la cinta transportadora circula muy lentamente. Él 
tiene tiempo de descansar entre caja y caja mientras sus compañeros de trabajo no cesan 
de laborar. El trabajador podría incrementar la velocidad de la cinta para que las cajas 
circulen más rápido, lo cual posiblemente le merecería una felicitación de parte de su 
jefe, pero reduciría su descanso.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que incremente la velocidad de la faja y 
reduzca su descanso? 
2.b 
Un trabajador de una fábrica de calzados es el encargado de colocar la etiqueta interior a 
los calzados de damas. Su trabajo lo hace con gran minuciosidad y, aún así, le queda 
mucho tiempo para descansar, mientras que sus compañeros siguen trabajando. El 
trabajador sabe que con la nueva máquina de etiquetado el trabajo es muy veloz y le 
sobra mucho tiempo. Si él comunica a su jefe que le sobra tiempo, este seguramente lo 
felicitaría por su fidelidad, pero el trabajador ya no podría gozar de ese descanso.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que hable con su jefe y reduzca su 
descanso? 
 
3.a 
Un empleado acaba de regresar de la oficina. Unos niños están jugando futbol en la 
calle de su casa, cerca de su nuevo coche. En el momento que el empleado se percata de 
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ello está a punto de echarse una breve siesta, muerto de cansancio. Él sabe que es 
probable que el balón quiebre alguno de los cristales de su auto, pero sabe también que 
el ascensor estará fuera de servicio toda la tarde, lo cual significa que tendría que bajar 8 
pisos por las escaleras. 
Es esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el empleado suspenda la siesta?  
 
3.b 
Un empleado acaba de comprar un hermoso sofá y lo ha colocado en su sala. Al rato de 
regresar de un duro día de trabajo, él sube a su dormitorio porque echarán su serie 
favorita y se mereces ese gusto. Cuando está a mitad de la serie el empleado recuerda 
que olvidó cerrar la puerta del jardín y que su perro suele aprovechar esos descuidos 
para entrar a su sala y morder los muebles. De otro lado, sabe que si baja, su perro 
insistirá para que lo saques a pasear, por lo que es probable que no pueda regresar a 
tiempo para ver su programa.    
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el empleado interrumpa su serie? 
 
4.a 
Una joven trabaja como asistenta de un cardiólogo. Entre otras labores, ella es la 
encargada de asignar las citas a los pacientes.  La llama por teléfono un paciente nuevo 
solicitando una cita de atención para el lunes por la tarde.  Al minuto siguiente un 
paciente antiguo se acerca al consultorio solicitando una cita para el mismo lunes, 
preferiblemente también por la tarde. La joven revisa su agenda y verifica que hay un 
espacio libre para el lunes por la tarde y otro para la mañana.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que asigne al paciente antiguo al lunes 
por la mañana? 
 
4.b 
 Una joven es empleada de una famosa línea aérea. Ella está a cargo de asignar los 
asientos a los pasajeros. De repente, un pasajero se le acerca y le solicita un asiento libre 
que se encuentra en la primera fila. Inmediatamente, un segundo pasajero que es cliente 
habitual de la línea aérea le expresa también su deseo de cambiar de asiento, 
preferiblemente a un asiento de la primera fila. La joven revisa los asientos libres y 
comprueba que solo queda un asiento en la primera fila y otra en la cuarta fila.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que asigne al pasajero habitual a la cuarta 
fila? 
 
5.a 
Una joven se ha levantado con un ligero escozor.  Antes de ir a la oficina decide pasar 
por la farmacia que queda en el primer piso para comprar la crema que suele utilizar en 
estos casos. El farmacéutico le dice que ese producto se le ha terminado pero que tiene 
en stock el mismo medicamento en nombre genérico, el cual le recomienda como un 
producto de la misma calidad.   
En esa situación, te parece una buena decisión que siga el consejo del farmacéutico? 
 
 
5.b 
Es el día de lavandería de una joven. Tiene ropa muy delicada para lavar así que decide 
buscar un detergente de confianza.  Cuando llega a la tienda no puede encontrar la 
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marca que tenía pensada así que le pregunta a un empleado de la tienda, al cual conoce 
hace muchos años, por alguna otra marca similar.  El empleado le dice que compre la 
versión genérica, que es tan buena como el detergente de confianza.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión que acepte la recomendación del 
empleado? 
 
6.a 
La Navidad se acerca y una madre le ha ofrecido a su hija preparar alguno de los 
famosos potajes que preparaba la abuela en Navidad. Después de muchas indecisiones 
la madre se dispone a preparar las galletas navideñas que preparaba la abuela. La madre 
sabe que la hija tiene mucha ilusión en probar la receta original; sin embargo, la receta 
original lleva nueces, pero como a su hija no le gustan, decide reemplazarlas por higos 
para que le agrade más.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que la madre le diga a su hija que ha 
reemplazado un ingrediente? 
 
6.b 
Un padre de familia se encuentra indeciso. Hace muchos años, cuando él cumplió siete 
años, su padre le regaló un tren eléctrico que le pareció en ese momento el mejor regalo 
del mundo. Ahora es su hijo quien cumple siete años y le ha pedido que le regale el 
mismo regalo que recibió él a su edad. El padre de familia sabe que su hijo no siente 
fascinación por los trenes, sino por los coches. 
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el padre le diga a su hijo que ha 
reemplazado el regalo? 
 
7.a 
 Una joven asistente está organizando una fiesta sorpresa para su jefe. Los invitados 
empezarán a llegar a las 7 pm y su jefe una hora después. Falta apenas una hora para 
que empiecen a llegar los invitados y aún no ha comprado el pastel de cumpleaños.  Ella 
ha visto un hermoso pastel en la tienda, uno de los preferidos de su jefe, pero el 
empleado no le asegura que pueda estar listo para las 7 pm, ni siquiera para las 8 pm. La 
asistente considera comprar un pastel que ya está listo para poder llevarlo a su casa de 
inmediato.    
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión que compre el pastel estándar?  
 
7.b 
 Una joven recepcionista tiene su fiesta de cumpleaños el sábado por la noche.  Es 
sábado por la tarde y su mejor amiga quiere hacerle un regalo sorpresa a la joven. La 
mejor amiga ha pensado en comprarle el vestido que la joven recepcionista tanto quiere, 
pero en la tienda la dependienta le comenta que ese modelo no lo tienen en stock y que 
no sabe con seguridad que día puede llegarles. En la tienda hay otros buenos vestidos de 
la talla de la joven que ya están listos para comprar.   
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión que compre alguno de los modelos que 
ya están listos para llevar? 
 
8. a 
Un camarero desea comprar un nuevo televisor de pantalla grande para poder disfrutar 
más de sus películas favoritas. El modelo que le agrada cuesta casi la misma cantidad de 
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dinero que el camarero cobre en un mes. Cuando el camarero le comenta su idea a un 
amigo especializado en  artefactos eléctricos, él amigo le sugiere que espere hasta fin de 
mes porque los precios bajarán significativamente  hasta un 40%.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión que postergue su compra algunas 
semanas para aprovechar los descuentos? 
 
8.b  
Un panadero está en Japón y quieres comprar una extraordinaria cámara fotográfica 
profesional para reemplazar a su antigua cámara. La cámara cuesta mucho dinero, y el 
panadero debería invertir gran parte de su sueldo mensual. Sin embargo, un amigo 
japonés le ha confirmado que a comienzos de diciembre, es decir en tres semanas, los 
precios bajarán en un 45%.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión que postergue su compra algunas 
semanas para aprovechar los descuentos? 
 
9.a 
Un joven se encuentra disfrutando de una cena a solas en su piso. Ha puesto su música 
favorita y está a punto de empezar la cena cuando de repente suena el teléfono. Al 
contestar le solicitan que participe en una encuesta de opinión telefónica. Al parecer, el 
joven ha sido seleccionado entre cientos de candidatos y su opinión es importante por lo 
que le pagarán 100 euros, es decir, lo que gastó en la cena.   
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección acceder a responder la encuesta ?    
 
9.b 
  Una joven es peluquera y suele ir al masajista todos los viernes. Ella sufre de dolores 
en la espalda y los masajes la renuevan para seguir con su rutina diaria. De pronto, justo 
antes de salir a su masaje semanal, una clienta le ofrece 100 euros si acepta ir a su casa 
para hacerle un nuevo peinado. Esos 100 euros es lo que le cuesta semanalmente el 
masajista.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección acceder a realizar ese trabajo 
imprevisto?    
 
10.a 
 Un becario se propone disfrutar de un fin de semana largo. Los hoteles están muy 
demandados y casi no quedan cupos en su balneario favorito. Tiene para escoger entre 
dos alternativas, ambas por el mismo precio. La primera le ofrece chalets en la primera 
fila de la playa con una preciosa vista al mar, pero el servicio de limpieza no está 
incluido. La segunda opción le ofrece servicio completo en apartamentos situados a 
medio kilómetro de la playa. 
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión elegir los apartamentos con servicio 
completo? 
 
10.b 
Finalmente, un becario viajará a la ciudad de sus sueños. Ha buscado hospedaje y 
consiguió dos alternativas interesantes, ambas por el mismo precio. La primera es 
alquilar un pequeño piso en pleno centro histórico de la ciudad, justo al lado de todos 
los lugares que quiere visitar.  El otro es una suite en un hotel ubicado en la zona 
bancaria, una zona que se caracteriza por su modernidad y por ser el centro de los 
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negocios.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena decisión elegir la suite en el hotel? 
 
11.a 
Un estudiante de tercer año necesita presentar un proyecto para aprobar una asignatura. 
El plazo vence en una semana, y él ha calculado que si le dedica 4 horas al día no tendrá 
ningún problema en terminarlo.  Al siguiente día avanza algo más de lo que tenía 
previsto, por lo que considera utilizar el tiempo “ganado” para dar un paseo.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que de el paseo?  
 
11.b 
En el tercer año de su carrera, un estudiante ha decidido mudarse a un piso. El contrato 
exige que el piso se limpie al menos una vez por semana, y para asegurarse de eso el 
arrendatario está autorizado para hacer una breve visita cada sábado. El único día que el 
estudiante no tiene clases es el jueves, por lo que ese día se ve obligado a realizar todos 
los quehaceres del hogar.  Es jueves por la tarde, y el estudiante ya casi ha terminado de 
limpiar, por lo que considera  salir un momento a dar un una vuelta en bicicleta.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que de la vuelta en bicicleta?  
 
12.a 
Es  cumpleaños de una gran amiga de una enfermera.  Es día de semana y todos los 
invitados deben trabajar al día siguiente, por lo que la celebración se limitará a una cena 
en un buen restaurante. La enfermera ha gastado mucho dinero ese mes, por lo que 
considera llamar a su amiga para excusarse.   
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que no asista a la cena? 
 
12.b 
Una tarde, una becaria recibe una llamada. Una de sus mejores amigas ha ganado una 
beca y quiere celebrarlo, por lo que ha reservado asientos para una obra de teatro. A 
continuación, todos los invitados compartirán una cena. La becaria tiene una importante 
reunión en su oficina, y para llegar a tiempo tendrá que levantarse a las 4 de la 
madrugada, por lo que considera llamar a su amiga para disculparse.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que no asista a la celebración? 
 
 
13.a 
Un vendedor se dirige a su centro de trabajo, el cual se encuentra a tan solo una calle de 
distancia. Él tiene mucha pereza y considera una buena opción utilizar el coche.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que utilice el coche?  
 
13.b 
Un vendedor ha decidido visitar a un amigo. Su amigo vive en la segunda planta del 
edificio. Sin embargo, él siente pereza de utilizar la escalera y considera hacer uso del 
ascensor.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que utilice el ascensor?  
 
14.a 
Un señor ha decidido hacer un viaje. Él considera que es un buen momento, pues tiene 
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un poco de dinero ahorrado y hace buen tiempo. Tiene dos opciones: la primera es ir a 
una ciudad que le queda cerca y donde conoce gente que le podría ofrecer donde dormir. 
La segunda es ir a una ciudad bastante más lejana, que le interesa más pero donde no 
conoce a nadie. En la primera opción podría conservar algo del dinero presupuestado, 
en la segunda gastaría hasta el último euro.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija la segunda opción? 
 
14.b 
Por el día de su cumpleaños, un señor ha decidió que merece un buen regalo. Ha sido un 
año un poco difícil y cree que necesita un premio. La empresa donde trabaja le ha 
otorgado un sueldo extra por buen rendimiento y decide invertirlo en una moto. La 
primera opción es una moto que cumple con lo que pide y está a muy buen precio, 
además la vende un colega suyo. La segunda opción es una moto que no se encuentra en 
stock,  pero le gusta más. En la primera opción podría conservar parte del sueldo extra, 
en la segunda lo gastaría todo.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija la segunda opción? 
 
15.a 
Una joven ha sido contratada por una agencia de publicidad. A los dos meses de iniciar 
su nuevo trabajo, le ofrecen la posibilidad de ser transferida a un nuevo país. Ella 
considera que la opción es interesante y acepta la oferta. Al realizar sus cuentas, ella 
destina una cantidad mensual para ahorrar. Una tarde, mientras camina por la calle 
observa un vestido que la deslumbra y se siente tentada a comprarlo. Si lo compra no 
podrá ahorrar dinero ese mes.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que compre el vestido? 
 
15.b 
Una joven ha terminado sus estudios de licenciatura. Después de diversas entrevistas, 
obtuvo un trabajo que le satisface y decide mudarse a un nuevo piso. Ella cree que es 
muy importante hacer un balance económico cada mes, pues así se siente segura que 
todo marcha bien. Además, a ella le gusta terminar el mes con cierto beneficio que a la 
larga le permita hacer una buena inversión. Una mañana mientras revisa el diario ve el 
anuncio de unas botas que la deslumbran. Ella está tentada a comprarlas, pero sabe que 
si lo hace no terminará el mes con ningún saldo positivo.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que compre las botas? 
 
16.a 
Un joven deportista acostumbra ir al gimnasio regularmente. Él prefiere entrenar por las 
tardes, pues es cuando menos interfiere con el resto de actividades que realiza.  
Recientemente, los directores del gimnasio han decidió reducir los precios, por lo cual 
se ha incrementado las inscripciones. Por esta medida, últimamente hay mucha gente en 
el horario de la tarde, por lo que el joven deportista considera buscar un nuevo horario y 
reorganizar sus actividades.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que cambie de horario? 
 
16.b 
En unas residencias universitarias, un joven deportista disfruta de cenar en tranquilidad.  
Normalmente, el comedor abre a las 8 para cenar, y recién una hora después suele llegar 
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la mayoría de la gente con el ruido excesivo. El joven deportista se ha acostumbrado a 
cenar a las 8 cuando hay poca gente, y además cenar a esa hora le viene mejor para 
poder entrenar por la noche. Sin embargo, últimamente la mayoría de la gente está 
acudiendo a cenar a esa misma hora, y como el ruido excesivo le resulta molesto 
considera buscar un nuevo horario y reorganizar su rutina.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que cambie de horario? 
 
17.a 
Una practicante ha recibido una llamada de sus nuevos compañeros de trabajo. Ellos le 
informan que tienen pensado ir a cenar a una pizzería. Unos días atrás, la practicante se 
había hecho la firme promesa de iniciar una dieta, pues no está satisfecha con su 
apariencia.  Ella sabe que si cena en la pizzería no podrá resistir la tentación y romperá 
su compromiso, sin embargo, le apetece muchísimo una pizza.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que cene en la pizzería? 
 
17.b 
En el aniversario de la empresa donde trabaja, una practicante disfruta de una cena. Ella 
ha iniciado recientemente una severa dieta para cambiar su apariencia, pues ha ganado 
muchos kilos en los últimos meses y está cansada de no verse como le gustaría. Durante 
toda la cena ella ha sido muy cuidadosa con sus elecciones, pues sabe que es muy 
importante mantener firme su compromiso. Sin embargo, cuando llega el momento de 
los postres observa uno que le apetece muchísimo.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que pida el postre? 
 
18.a 
Un joven camarero ha ingresado un dinero y decide ir a un almacén a comprar algo.  
Después de evaluar diferentes artículos interesantes, decide comprar unos vaqueros. Él 
está muy satisfecho con su compra, sin embargo, cuando los lleva a clases sus amigos le 
recriminan su mal gusto, pues ellos consideran que los vaqueros del joven camarero son 
bastante “horteras”. Él se siente incómodo por los comentarios, por lo que considera 
devolver los vaqueros.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que devuelva los vaqueros? 
 
18.b 
Es el día de Nochevieja y un joven recepcionista ha decidió que es el mejor momento 
para un cambio. Por la mañana, decide visitar una peluquería y teñirse el pelo de rubio. 
El está muy satisfecho con el resultado, pero cuando sus colegas lo ven no cesan de 
hacer bromas de su nuevo “look” y de reprocharle su mal gusto. El joven se siente 
incómodo ante tanto reproche, y considera recuperar su antiguo color de pelo.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que recupere su color de pelo original? 
 
19.a 
Un estudiante tiene un importante examen. Es la noche anterior, y si bien lleva muchos 
días preparándose, no le vendría mal unas horas más de estudio. Es ya bastante tarde y 
empieza a sentirse muy cansado, por lo que considera beberse otra taza de café. Él ya ha 
bebido mucho café ese día por lo que quizás le podría sentar un poco mal.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que beba una última taza de café? 
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19.b 
Es la noche anterior a la defensa de tesis de un estudiante de posgrado. Él se encuentra 
preparando su presentación, pero empieza a sentir mucho sueño. El estudiante es 
alérgico a la cafeína por lo que acostumbra darse una ducha fría cuando quiere espantar 
el sueño. Él necesita avanzar un poco más de su presentación, pero es muy tarde y hace 
mucho frío,  por lo que una ducha fría podría sentarle un poco mal.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que se dé una ducha fría? 
 
20.a 
Un señor de mediana edad ha decidido empezar a practicar deporte. Él ha consultado 
con diversos expertos y le han recomendado que lo mejor para alcanzar una buena 
condición física es salir a correr o nadar. Él solo puede escoger una opción, pues no 
tiene tiempo de practicar los dos deportes.  A él le gusta más correr, pero en su barrio las 
calles son muy transitadas y resulta difícil. Recientemente han abierto una piscina a 
unos metros de su casa, por lo que considera elegir esta opción.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija practicar natación? 
 
20.b 
Un señor ha consultado un dietista pues ha decidido empezar una dieta. El dietista le 
recomienda que cambie sus alimentos en el desayuno, pues el señor acostumbra 
excederse en las grasas. El dietista le da a elegir entre un desayuno basado en frutos 
secos o en pan integral. A él le gustan más los frutos secos, pero no los venden cerca de 
su casa, mientras que el pan integral lo puede comprar en la panadería de la esquina.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija el desayuno de pan integral? 
 
21.a 
Un señor ha decidido estudiar un máster. Él ha revisado muchas opciones, y finalmente 
ha reducido su decisión a dos opciones. El primer máster le resulta muy interesante, 
pues está relacionado a temas que siempre le han producido gran inquietud. El segundo 
no le produce el mismo entusiasmo, pero está muy relacionado a su profesión y le 
resultará de mayor utilidad.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija la opción más útil? 
 
21.b 
Al finalizar el instituto, un joven debe decidir qué carrera estudiar. Su familia tiene la 
tradición de dedicarse al derecho, y tienen un importante negocio familiar. El joven 
siempre ha asumido que seguiría en el mismo negocio, pues le agrada el derecho y le 
garantiza un buen futuro. Sin embargo, tiene también un gran interés por la medicina, y 
considera que quizás esta línea profesional le resulte más gratificante.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que elija la opción más útil?  
 
22.a 
Un joven que es muy aficionado al cine acude al estreno de una película que ha 
esperado mucho tiempo. Cuando empieza la película, la señora que se encuentra a su 
lado le pregunta por el nombre del director. El joven está muy emocionado, y empieza a 
comentarle innumerables curiosidades de la película. La señora no le interrumpe, pero 
tampoco se muestra muy interesada y como el joven disfruta compartiendo su afición 
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por el cine, continúa hablando sin parar.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que continúe hablando? 
 
22.b 
Han estrenado una nueva obra de teatro en la ciudad, la cual tiene como tema la 
ilustración. Esta obra despierta un gran interés en un joven, pues él siempre ha sentido 
gran pasión por este tema. El día del estreno, una vez empezada la función, escucha que 
el señor de la fila de adelante le hace un comentario erróneo, por lo cual el joven 
aficionado le corrige. El señor le agradece su gesto, por lo cual el joven entiende que es 
una buena oportunidad para compartir sus conocimientos. El señor no le interrumpe, 
pero tampoco parece compartir su interés, y como el joven aficionado disfruta mucho 
de conversar sobre el tema continúa hablando sin detenerse.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que continúe hablando? 
 
23.a 
Un joven regresa caminando a su casa después de un duro día en la oficina. A lo lejos, 
en la acera de enfrente, ve acercarse a un amigo que no ve hace tiempo. Él sabe que si lo 
saluda se verá en el compromiso de quedar para salir con su amigo, quien siempre ha 
sido muy insistente y aficionado a la vida nocturna. Por el contrario, si se escabulle a la 
panadería que tiene a unos metros, podrá evitar el encuentro y utilizar su tiempo libre 
para descansar y recuperarse de el exceso de trabajo.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que se evite el encuentro? 
 
23.b 
Después de trabajar, un empleado se inscribe a un taller. El primer día, descubre que el 
hijo de un amigo asiste a su misma clase. El empleado sabe que el hijo de su amigo no 
lo conoce, por lo que considera que debería presentarse. Sin embargo, si el empleado se 
presenta se sentirá en compromiso de realizar el trabajo en grupo con él, lo cual le 
supone un inconveniente pues prefiere trabajar con otras personas.   
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que evite la presentación? 
 
24.a 
La abuela de un joven becario le ha tejido una bufanda por su cumpleaños. Ella ha 
trabajado mucho para ofrecerle un buen regalo, pero realmente el joven becario siente 
que la bufanda no le “pega” nada, pues su forma de vestir es muy diferente. Es la fiesta 
de cumpleaños del joven y la abuela ha prometido que asistirá. El joven becario sabe 
que ella espera verle con la bufanda, pero si la utiliza se sentirá ridículo ante sus 
invitados.  
En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que no utilice la bufanda? 
 
24.b 
Es el día del cumpleaños de un joven pianista. Su hermano le ha regalado unas gafas de 
sol de una muy buena marca. El joven pianista sabe que su hermano ha ahorrado mucho 
para poder comprárselas, pero realmente a él no le gustan nada. Además, la tienda 
dónde han sido compradas las gafas no acepta devolución. Para celebrar el cumpleaños 
el joven pianista había organizado una gran reunión en la playa, y su hermano está 
invitado. El joven pianista sabe que él espera verle con sus nuevas gafas, pero si las 
lleva puestas se sentirá ridículo ante sus invitados.  
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En esa situación, te parece una buena elección que no utilice las gafas? 
 
25.a 
El nivel de inglés de un practicante no es bueno. Él sabe que debe de mejorarlo, pero no 
le parece que sea urgente, pues suele apañarse con sus conocimientos elementales. Una 
mañana recibe un mail de la empresa donde trabaja invitándole a que se inscriba en un 
curso de inglés, que se impartirá todos los días a las 6 a.m (horario único). La empresa 
pagará todos los gastos. El practicante suele acostarse muy tarde, pues después de 
trabajar en la oficina le dedica varias horas a estudiar, por lo que inscribirse en el curso 
de inglés en ese horario le supondría un gran esfuerzo.   
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que se inscriba en el curso de inglés? 
 
25.b 
Un practicante es invitado a inscribirse en un curso acelerado de Excel, con todos los 
gastos pagados por la empresa donde trabaja. Él no está familiarizado con el programa, 
y sabe que en algún momento necesitará aprender cómo funciona, pero no siente 
urgencia pues por el momento suele apañarse con las dos cosas que sabe. El curso de 
Excel al que es invitado se impartirá  todos los días a las 6 a.m (horario único). El 
practicante tiene un segundo trabajo como diseñador gráfico, al cual le dedica varias 
horas por la noche, cuando regrese de la oficina por lo que suele irse a la cama muy 
tarde. Si se inscribe en el curso de Excel en ese horario le supondrá un gran esfuerzo.  
 En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que se inscriba en el curso de Excel? 
  
26.a 
Ha comenzado el verano y un estudiante de derecho tiene mucho calor. El último día la 
temperatura ha sido muy altas y él no ha podido dormir bien, pues no ha dejado de 
sudar, por lo que el estudiante considera que sería buena idea comprar un ventilador. Sin 
embargo, en solo 24 horas él viajará a otro país donde no es verano y las temperaturas 
suelen ser muy moderadas durante todo el año, por lo que el ventilador solo le serviría 
para llevar bien ese último día y tener una noche tranquila.  
 En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que compre el ventilador? 
 
26.b 
En una ciudad del norte la temperatura acaba de cambiar drásticamente. Las últimas 24 
horas han sido de un frío muy intenso, y un joven administrador incluso no ha podido 
dormir bien por esta razón. El es muy friolero y piensa que sería una buena opción 
comprar una pequeña calefacción. Sin embargo, el joven administrador sabe que en 24 
horas viajará al extranjero, concretamente a un país donde hace muy buena temperatura 
y no necesitará la calefacción. Si compra la calefacción, esta solo le servirá para llevar 
mejor el último día y pasar una noche más placentera.  
 En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que compre la calefacción? 
 
27.a 
Un joven licenciado ha sido contratado por una importante empresa multinacional. Él 
siempre había tenido la ilusión de pertenecer a esa organización y finalmente lo ha 
conseguido. Todas las condiciones del nuevo empleo le satisfacen ampliamente pero 
tiene una mala relación con sus compañeros de trabajo. Si bien no ha sucedido ningún 
problema, no hay un buen “feeling” entre ellos y el joven licenciado no se siente 
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cómodo en ese ambiente laboral. Después de un periodo de prueba, al joven le ofrecen 
renovar por 3 años.   
 En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el joven renueve? 
 
27.b 
Un joven ha dedicado un gran esfuerzo a su carrera como futbolista. Finalmente, un 
gran club lo ha fichado y él siente que ha cumplido su gran objetivo. Sin duda, se trata 
de uno de los mejores clubs, pues ofrece a los futbolistas de las mejores condiciones 
profesionales, sin embargo, el joven no se siente bien en el vestuario, pues es evidente 
que no hay un buen “rollo” con sus compañeros. No han tenido ningún enfrentamiento, 
pero es evidente que la relación no es de compañerismo y el joven futbolista no se siente 
cómodo en un vestuario de este tipo. Después de la pretemporada, el club le ofrece al 
joven futbolista renovar por 3 años.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el joven renueve? 
 
28.a 
Un joven es muy aficionado a un equipo de futbol. Su equipo juega la final de un torneo 
mundial y él está muy ilusionado con poder ganar ese título. El problema es que por 
diferencias horarias, debe levantarse a las 3 A.M si no quiere perdérselo. El joven sabe 
que tiene una práctica muy temprano, y debería ir a clases. A la mañana siguiente suena 
el despertador y el joven considera apagarlo.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que apague el despertador? 
 
28.b 
Una joven es una gran admiradora de un actor de Hollywood. Es la noche de los Oscar y 
el actor ha sido nominado. Ella está muy entusiasmada con esto, pues le haría mucha 
ilusión que su actor favorito gane el premio. La ceremonia comienza muy tarde, y para 
cuando entregan el premio al mejor actor son ya las 3 A.M. Ella tiene una práctica muy 
temprano, por lo que debería ir a la universidad. A la mañana siguiente suena el 
despertador y la joven  considera apagarlo.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que apague el despertador? 
 
29.a 
Un doctor ha pasado los últimos meses fuera de su país. Cuando regresa decide visitar a 
su madre,y se da con la sorpresa que ella ha dejado su antiguo cuarto impecable, pero al 
saludarla advierte que su pelo huele realmente mal.  
En esa situación, piensas que está bien (que le haga saber lo que piensa)?  
 
29.b 
Para celebrar su ascenso, un abogado decide cenar con su madre. Ella le ha preparado su 
cena favorita. Sin embargo, cuando se dispone a probarla descubre que hay muchos 
pelos en la sopa.   
En esa situación, piensas que está bien (que le haga saber lo que piensa)?  
 
30.a 
Es una calurosa noche de verano y un abuelo decide abrir la ventana para respirar un 
poco de aire fresco. Con la ventana abierta la temperatura es buena, y como es un poco 
tarde, el abuelo decide que es buen momento para irse a dormir. Sin embargo, cuando 
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está en la cama recuerda que si deja abierta la ventana entrarán a su cuarto los 
mosquitos y le causarán diversas molestias. Si cierra la ventana, el calor seguirá siendo 
insoportable.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el abuelo cierre la ventana? 
 
30.b 
Es un día de intensas lluvias. Cuando paró de llover, un anciano abrió la ventana pues 
necesitaba respirar algo de aire fresco. Al minuto siguiente las lluvias se reanudaron y el 
anciano se dio con la sorpresa que habían entrado mosquitos a su cuarto. La única 
opción para evitar las molestias que le suponen los mosquitos es utilizar un spray muy 
efectivo pero que genera un olor insoportable.  
En esta situación, te parece una buena elección que el anciano utilice el spray? 
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